Over the past three decades, immigrant transnational organizations in the United States have proliferated with accelerated international migration and the rise of new transportation and communication technologies that facilitate long-distance and cross-border ties. Their impact and influence have grown in tandem with immigrants’ drive to make it in America—their new homeland—as well as with the need for remittances and investments in sending countries—their ancestral homelands. Numerous studies of immigrant groups found that remittances and migrant investments represented one of the major sources of foreign exchange of sending countries and were used as “collateral” for loans from international financial institutions (Basch et al. 1994; Glick-Schiller et al. 1992; Portes et al. 1999). Past studies also found that transnational flows were not merely driven by individual behavior but by collective forces via organizations as well (Goldring 2002; Landolt 2000; Moya 2005; Piper 2009; Popkin 1999; Portes et al. 2007; Portes and Zhou 2012; Schrover and Vermeulen 2005; Waldinger et al. 2008). But the density and strength of the economic, sociocultural, and political ties of immigrant groups across borders vary, and the effects of immigrant transnational organizations on homeland development vary (Portes et al. 1999, 2007). Nevertheless, the sum total of the transnational movements and the subsequent contributions of immigrants to families and communities left behind acquire “structural” importance for both sending and receiving countries as these flows affect both the pace and forms of incorporation of immigrants in the US and the economic prospects of those they left behind.

There are obvious gaps in the existing literature, however. Prior research on immigrant transnationalism in the United States to date has paid more attention to immigrant groups from Latin America than those from Asia and focused more on the individual than the organization as the unit of analysis. This study aims to fill the gap by zooming in on the Chinese case. The focus on Chinese immigrant transnational organizations in the United States is highly significant for three reasons. First, Chinese Americans are one of the oldest and the largest Asian-origin groups in the United States with long-standing ethnic enclaves—Chinatowns—and as emerging ethnoburbs (ethnic middle-class suburbs) and they have made remarkable socioeconomic achievements in American society. Second, China is the largest sending country of any immigrant group in the United States. It is not an under-developed homeland in the conventional sense, but one that is a rising “capitalist” nation with a rapidly globalized market economy, a high rate of emigration, and a large reserve of potential migrants. Third, the United States and China are simultaneously the most important trade partner and the biggest economic competitor to each other. Thus, studies of immigrant transnationalism would simply be incomplete without considering Chinese Americans and their ancestral homeland—the People’s Republic of China (PRC). For exploratory purposes, this chapter attempts to explore three main questions: 1) What
are the types, scope, and nature of Chinese immigrant organizations in the new homeland? 2) What role does the Chinese state play in affecting organizational transnationalism? 3) How does organizational transnationalism matter for the individual, the ethnic community, and the ancestral homeland?

**Immigrant Transnationalism**

Transnationalism is an old phenomenon, inherent to immigrant experiences in the U.S. and in many other migrant-receiving countries around the world. It is generally defined as “the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Baschet al. 1994: 6). Portes (1994) delimits this general definition to occupations and activities that require regular and sustained social contacts over time across national borders for their implementation. What is new about contemporary transnationalism is the scale, diversity, density, and regularity of such movements and the socioeconomic consequences that they have brought about by jet flights, long-distance telephone and fax services, the Internet, and other high-tech means of communication and transportation, and most importantly, the restructuring of the world economy and the globalization of capital and labor (Glick-Schiller et al. 1992; Portes 1994). It is the intensity of exchanges, not just the occurrences themselves (trips, occasional contacts or activities), that becomes a justifiable topic of investigation.

The existing literature highlights structural disadvantages associated with immigrant status (such as cultural and language skills, racial discrimination), human capital (such as education, job skills, and citizenship status), and other key demographic characteristics (such as age, sex, and marital status) as important determinants of immigrants’ engagement with their homeland (Guanizo et al. 2003). Highly educated immigrants have been found quitting their well-paying salaried jobs to engage in economic activities across borders because they can better utilize their skills, bicultural literacy, and social networks to reap material gains. Low-skilled immigrants also engage in transnational activities, but their practices are limited to sending remittances regularly to support families and kin, buying land or building houses for their own transnational lives, and establishing small, sustainable businesses in their homelands. These are effective ways to convert their meager wages earned in the United States to material gains and social status recognition in their countries of origin (Diaz-Briquets and Weintraub 1991; Itzigsohn 1995; Goldring 1996; Popkin 1999; Portes and Guarnizo 1991). Thus, transnationalism works as an effective means of maximizing immigrants’ human capital returns, preserving and expanding their middle-class status, and, for the low skilled, achieving upward social mobility (Gold 2001; Guarnizo et al. 1999; Light et al. 2002).

The level of homeland development also leads to different types of transnational activities for different immigrant groups (Goldring 2002; Iskander 2010). For example, in sending countries where industrialization and development are at their early stages, informal trade and viajeros predominate. Mexicans, Salvadorans, Columbians, and Dominicans traveled back and forth to engage in informal activities that bypassed existing laws and state regulatory agencies in both sending and receiving countries; thus, taking advantage of demands and prices in both countries (Portes and Guarnizo 1991; Portes et al 2001). In contrast, in more developed sending countries, formal and large scale transnational activities predominate. These include import/export, transnational banking, and investment in knowledge-intensive and labor-intensive industries, as seen among Taiwanese and Koreans (Min 1986/87; Yoon 1995; Li 1997).
Regarding to the effects of transnationalism, recent studies have focused attention on the well-being of families left behind or on homeland development (Glick-Schiller and Fouron 1999; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Jones-Correa 1998; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001; Rouse 1989; Smith 2005). The most salient feature of transnationalism is in the form of monetary remittances for supporting migrant families left behind in the homeland (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Mahler 1995; Chin et al. 1996; Durand et al. 1996; Gold 2001; Goldring 2004; Guarnizo 1997; Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Landolt 2001; Levitt 2001; Portes et al. 2002; Rubenstein 1983). Other forms of transnationalism include religious remittances (Levitt 2007); political remittances (refers to the transfer of egalitarian ideology and leadership styles), activism, migrant rights (Piper 2009); and social remittances (ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending-country communities) (Levitt 1998; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011). These transnational activities, in turn, have positive impacts on sending-state policies, as many nation-states have come to depend on migrant remittances and capital investments as a reliable source of foreign exchange, collateral for the solicitation of international loans, and capital mobilization for economic development (Portes 2003; Portes and Zhou 2012).

There are two obvious oversights in the existing literature regarding homeland development. First, the emphasis is almost exclusively on individuals and families, overlooking a third important actor—organizations (Portes and Zhou 2012). Portes and his associates argue that transnational activities conducted on an individual basis are exceptional and many activities are channeled through organizations (Guarnizo et al. 2003; Portes et al. 2007). Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2011) indicate that individuals communicate ideas and practices to each other as friends, family members, or neighbors as well as organizational actors. Second, the attention has been paid more to the agency of the individual than to the role of the sending state. Iskander (2010) noted the transformative effect of migrant remittances on sending-country economies but argued that such effect depends on the interaction between migrants and various levels of sending-country government through on-going processes of social learning and innovation. We agree that immigrant transnational flows are not merely driven by individual behavior but also by collective forces via organizations, and that organizational and state actors are constantly interacting with each other and negotiating mutual interests. We seek to contribute to the transnationalism literature by exploring the nuances of such interaction and negotiation.

Methodology

This study grew out of the Comparative Immigrant Organizations Project (the CIOP hereafter), which combined a quantitative approach to document the number and size of immigrant organizations with a qualitative approach to focus on the views and activities of their leaders and their home country counterparts. The CIOP originally targeted three immigrant groups—Mexicans, Colombians, and Dominicans and was later extended to include three Asian immigrant groups—Chinese, Indians, and Vietnamese. The CIOP research design required developing directories of all existing associations for each national origin group and categorizing them by type, with particular attention to the difference between those involved in programs focused solely on the domestic needs of immigrant communities and those involved in cross-national activities (Portes and Zhou 2012).

Data on immigrant organizations are scant, and national sampling frames are non-existent for any representative sampling. Thus, we used mixed methods. Our data were collected both in the United States and China, including the compilation of an organizational inventory, a survey
with organizational leaders, in-depth interviews, field observations, and focused group discussions. In the U.S., we constructed an inventory of ethnic Chinese organizations through: a) Chinese language business directories in major US cities; b) organizational newsletters and websites; c) discussions with informants in the Chinese immigrant community; and d) official listings with the Chinese consulates in the US and government agencies in China, obtained by email and phone or through interviews in person. In the United States, the study focused on three major metropolitan areas that had the largest concentrations of Chinese immigrants and their organizations—Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York. As of 2010, more than half of the Chinese in the United States concentrated in the states of California (37%) and New York (17%). The Chinese cluster in traditional Chinatowns in the inner city as well as in middle-class suburbs where they establish visible “ethnoburbs” (middle-class suburbs dominated by new immigrants of diverse origins). As of January 2010, we had compiled an inventory of 1,371 organizations, most registered as nonprofits located in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York, principal metropolitan areas of Chinese concentration. This inventory was national but had a focus on Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York. It was by no means complete as accurate counts were impossible. An official at the Chinese Consulate General in Los Angeles estimated that Southern California alone would have an estimate of 2,000 ethnic Chinese organizations. Even though this inventory list represented only a fraction of all Chinese organizations in the U.S., it nonetheless captured the wide range of organizations in size, type, and scope.

A survey of 55 Chinese organizations was administered, using a close-ended questionnaire with a few open-ended questions. Leaders of these organizations were selected to be interviewed, ¾ by telephone and the rest, face-to-face. The organizations selected for the survey, as well as for fieldwork, were not chosen at random, but as “emblematic” of the principal types detected in the national inventory. Many were long-standing, well-established, and had a “track record” of completed projects in the home country. Thus, they were sufficiently large to make a difference in their contributions and programmatic initiatives at the local level, or were in the process of implementing one or more significant initiatives in the home country.

Fieldwork contained site visits to meetings or activities of the organizations. We paid specific attention to the density and variety of immigrant organizations through observing organizational activities and social relations emerging from interactions among these organizations and between organizations and their individual members. Site visits to organizational activities included, for example, organizational luncheons of alumni associations in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York; annual convention of professional organizations held in southern California; fund-raising luncheons and dinners by various Chinese organizations in Los Angeles’ Chinatown and Monterey Park; traditional holiday celebrations in Los Angeles’ Chinatown; welcoming banquets for Chinese officials visiting Los Angeles sponsored by various Chinese organizations; and the PRC National Day (October 1st) party sponsored by the Chinese Consulate General in Los Angeles.

In China, we collected data primarily from fieldwork (62 face-to-face interviews, focus group discussions, and numerous site visits) in Beijing—the capital city—and two provinces—Guangdong and Fujian—China’s most important qiao-xiang (hometown or place of origin for overseas Chinese). A qiao-xiang (literally meaning “sojourners’ village”) refers to a place where the ratio of returned overseas Chinese and relatives of overseas Chinese to the total population is 10% or more, as established by the Chinese government in 1957 (Pan 1999, p. 27). Guangdong is the largest qiao-xiang. About 70% of all pre-World-War-II Chinese emigrants were from Guangdong, and nearly 80% of all pre-World War II Chinese immigrants to North
America and the Americas were from Guangdong.\(^7\) The ratio of returned overseas Chinese and relatives of overseas Chinese in Guangdong to the total provincial population is about 36%. Major sending places in Guangdong for migrants to the US included Jiangmen (also known as Wuiy encompassing five original counties Taishan, Kaiping, Engping, Heshan, and Xinhui). Twenty-five interviews were conducted in Guangzhou, Jiangmen, Sunde, and Zhongshan of Guangdong Province.\(^8\)

Fujian is the second largest qiao-xiang.\(^9\) People from Fujian have had a long history of emigration, but those who came to the U.S. in large numbers (a good portion undocumented) arrived after the late 1980s. About 9 million Chinese overseas can find their roots in Fujian Province. The ratio of returned overseas Chinese and relatives of overseas Chinese in Fujian to the total provincial population is about 26%. Major sending places in Fujian for migrants to the U.S. include Fuzhou (the provincial capital), Changle, Fuqing, and Lianjian. Twenty-five interviews were conducted in Fujian Province.\(^10\)

Beijing has emerged as the new qiao-xiang since the 1980s, as many highly skilled Chinese immigrants had attended universities and worked in Beijing before migration. Twelve interviews were conducted.\(^11\)

We are keenly aware the non-random nature of such data collection methods. However, given the paucity of existing data and the lack of available and reliable sampling frames, we do not aim at generalizing findings but rather at discerning patterns of interorganizational, interpersonal, person-organization relations which adds subtitles and nuances for theory-building.

**Immigration and Organizational Development across Time and Space**

*Contemporary Chinese immigration*

The people of Chinese ancestry living outside of China, Hong Kong, and Macau were estimated at about 48 million as of 2008, less than three percent of China’s population. The vast majority of the Chinese Diaspora live in Southeast Asia.\(^12\) Outside of Southeast Asia, the United States has the largest ethnic Chinese population, estimated at 3.8 in 2010. The Chinese have had a long history of international migration that dates back to the 12th century and have established dense economic, social, and cultural networks between the Diaspora and the ancestral homeland. However, transnational flows to and from China were discouraged or outlawed by the emperors of several dynasties and were disrupted and strictly controlled between 1949 at the founding of the PRC and 1978.

The United States implemented liberalized immigration policy reform in the mid-1960s. Congress passed the Hart-Celler Act of 1965 to allow for family reunification and migration of the highly skilled, which ushered in a new era of Chinese immigration first from Taiwan and Hong Kong and then from the mainland and other parts of the world. China began to implement its open-door policy and economic reform in 1978 and normalized its diplomatic relations with the U.S. in 1979, leading to rapid urbanization and mass international migration to the U.S. As the upper panel of table 1 shows, China had a population of 1.34 billion, the largest in the world. Its urban population increased from 26% in 1990 to 47% in 2010. GDP (PPP) per capita was estimated at US$8,200, ranked 119th in 2011 (China was among the poorest in the world in 1949 with a GDP at only US$148.00, lower than India, at US$248).\(^13\) China remained a relatively poor country with a widening gap between the rich and the poor and fairly low overall levels of education. But it is not an under-developed country in its conventional sense. Its economy had experienced double-digit growth since the late 1980s, becoming the third largest economy in the
world with a GDP (PPP) at US$11.29 trillion.\textsuperscript{14} And its overall labor force participation rate was high and unemployment rate low. Such development implies the significance of two potential trends: continually high rates of emigration for those seeking better opportunities abroad and returned migration for those attempting to capture economic opportunities in China.

[Table 1 about here]

Thanks to contemporary Chinese immigration, Chinese Americans (including those originated from Taiwan and the Chinese Diaspora) have become the largest Asian-origin group and the second largest contemporary immigrant group, next to Mexicans, in the U.S. Numerically, the ethnic Chinese population in the U.S. grew exponentially, from 435,062 in 1970 to nearly 3.8 million in 2010. Much of the ethnic population growth is due to international migration. According to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, more than 2 million immigrants were admitted to the United States from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan as permanent residents between 1960 and 2009.\textsuperscript{15} This, of course, does not take into account the number of unauthorized immigrants. Since 1980 China has been on the USCIS’ list of top ten immigrant-origin countries in the United States. The U.S. census also attests to the big part played by immigration. Over 60% of the Chinese ethnic population has been foreign born since 1980. As of 2009, 31% of the foreign born arrived after 2000 and 60% of the foreign born were naturalized U.S. citizens. Noted in the lower panel of Table 1, contemporary Chinese immigrants are positively selected with higher average level of education and socioeconomic standing than the general population in China. They are concentrated in traditional immigrant gateway cities and nearby ethnoburbs, while also spreading out to all parts of the U.S. Since the late 1970s, transnational linkages between China and Chinatowns or the newly emerged Chinese ethnoburbs are being renewed, strengthened, and developed by immigrants and their organizations. Next, we turn to describe in greater detail the type, scope, and nature of Chinese immigrant organizations in the United States.

\textit{Chinatown-based organizations and pre-1980 development}

Historically, Chinese diasporic communities were supported by the ethnic economy and three pillars—Chinese education, the language media, and ethnic organizations (i.e., guilds, associations, and non-governmental civic organizations) (Liu 1998). The ethnic Chinese community in the United States has followed a similar organizational pattern with ethnic businesses serving as its base on which a range of ethnic organizations are formed. In the era of Chinese exclusion prior to World War II, the ethnic Chinese community displayed several distinctive features: (1) a small merchant class established a firm foothold at the outset of Chinatown’s formation; (2) interpersonal relations were based primarily on blood, kin, or place of origin; (3) ethnic businesses were interconnected to a range of interlocking ethnic institutions that guided and controlled interpersonal and inter-organizational relations; and (4) the ethnic enclave as a whole operated on the basis of ethnic solidarity internally and social exclusion by external forces (Zhou 2009).

Traditional organizations, which were rooted in Chinatowns of major urban centers, were made up of three main types: family/clan associations based on kinship, district or hometown association based on place of origin, and merchant guilds or tong based on common interest and/or sworn brotherhood. All operated as mutual aid societies (Kuo 1977; Wong 1988).

Family/clan associations encompassed not only close kin but the entire clan, whose members were not related by blood, but had the same surname or descent from common ancestors. Some family/clan associations were more inclusive than others, based on a
combination of common surname, ancestral descent, and village of origin. For example, there were single-surname clan associations, such as the Lee On Dong Benevolent Association and the Eng Family Benevolent Association, or multiple surnames clan associations such as the Fong Lun Association (Sit, Seto), the Soo Yen Fraternal Association (Lui, Fong, Kwong), the Lung Kong Tin Yee Association (Lau, Kwan, Cheung, Chiu), and the Gee Tuck Sam Tuck Association (Choi, Ng, Chow, Yung, Tau). Family/clan associations were patriarchal and varied in size, ranging from small single-surname associations with 20 to 100 members to larger multi-family associations with 100 to ten thousand members (Kuo 1977; Wong 1988). There are few such family/clan-based associations among other Asian or Latin American groups in the US.

Hometown associations (also known as hui guan or tongxiang hui) were organized around a common place of birth or origin. These associations were usually named after a village or a district (township, county, or a place encompassing several counties) in the homeland and members were recruited based on these specific places of origin. Examples are the Yeong Wo Benevolent Association, the Ning Yeung Hui Guan, and the Hainan Hui Guan. Members also spoke the same dialect. The village-based associations resemble some features of the Latin American hometown committees and associations.

Unlike family or hometown associations, merchant guilds and tongs (brotherhoods) were organized as merchant-labor associations. These organizations were not based by blood, surname, ancestral descent, or village of origin. Tongs, in particular, used to operate as “secret societies.” Tong members pledged allegiance to one another as “brothers in blood oath.” Each tong had a highly unified military force, as violence was accepted as necessary for self-defense (Chin 1996; Wong 1988). With intricate ties to family and hometown associations, tongs had greater finances, larger membership, and more menacing soldiers than other associations—operating under both the legitimate and illegitimate layers of social order (Chin 1996). Through secret language and mythical religious rituals, the bonds of tong members were solidified with a code of loyalty and pledge to revenge any offense committed by outsiders against one of their own members. The tongs controlled the economic life of a good part of old Chinatown and was involved in homeland politics as well. Some of the best-known tongs are the Suey Sing Association, the Hop Sing Tong, the On Leong Chinese Merchants Association, and the Chee Kung Tong.

Most of the above-mentioned traditional organizations were established in the late 19th century with chapters in major Chinatowns across America. At the early stage of organizational development in the late 19th century, ethnic organizations were conflict-prone, and turf wars between organizations within Chinatown were common. The Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA) was established in the late 19th century as an overarching ethnic federation, acting as the only legitimate government of Chinatown to maintain social order. Known originally as the Six Companies first developed in San Francisco’s Chinatown, this overarching “inner government” federated existing family, hometown, and merchants associations under a unifying leadership, monopolized key businesses in the community, mediated internal conflicts, controlled the social behavior of its members, and negotiated with the outside world in the best interest of the community. For example, the CCBA in New York was established in 1883 to represent a cross-section of the Chinese community in New York. It is made up of 60 member organizations, including hometown associations such as the Ning Yeung Association; family associations such as the Lee Family Association; political organizations such as the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) Eastern Region Office; professional and trade organizations such as the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the Chinese American Restaurant Association; and religious, cultural, and women’s organizations. Los Angeles’ CCBA was established in 1889, made up of
There were types of civic and voluntary associations exited in Chinatowns prior to the surge of contemporary Chinese immigration, such as Chinese American Citizen Alliance (formerly the Native Sons of the Golden State) and the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance of New York.

To a large extent, Chinese exclusion created opportunities for organizations and gave rise to an ethnic infrastructure in which the enclave economy and ethnic organizations were interconnected and where the relations among coethnics, individuals, and organizations were interdependent. Since the 1980s, traditional organizations have continued to exert influence in the ethnic life of the Chinese community but their authority and functions have been weakened for several reasons. First, there are more opportunities for mobility in the host society, allowing those with higher socioeconomic status (SES) to move out of urban enclaves and resettle in other urban neighborhoods of higher socioeconomic standing, white middleclass suburbs, or ethnoburbs. Second, new immigrants are no longer low-skilled sojourners from the same village that depend entirely on ethnic organizations like the old-timers did. Rather, they have migrated with their families and can access a wider variety of services in and out of the ethnic community. Third, new immigrants, especially the highly skilled, arrive from major metropolitan areas outside of traditional sending regions in China, creating tremendous diversity in place of origin and SES. Fourth, rapid urbanization in China have transformed the notion of “hometown” beyond village or township. Nonetheless, traditional organizations are stable, economically resourceful, and are anchored in Chinatown with legitimacy.

Post-1980 development: Modern Chinese immigrant organizations at a glimpse

Chinese America has experienced drastic transformation since 1980 with accelerated migration from mainland China and the Chinese Diaspora. While Chinatowns continue to receive new immigrants, new Chinatowns and Chinese ethnoburbs develop to accommodate newcomers of diverse origins and socioeconomic backgrounds. New immigrants also disperse in white middleclass suburbs upon arrival or after a short time in the U.S. Organizational development beyond old Chinatowns reflects these demographic trends. Table 2 is a summary of the organizational inventory that we compiled mainly from Chinese language phone directories in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York. Even so, the inventory is by no means exhaustive. Nonetheless, it offers a glimpse into high levels of organizational density and variety in the Chinese immigrant community. Such development is paralleled by the development of the Chinese enclave economy. As a partial reflection of this trend, the 2010 Chinese Consumer Yellow Pages, a 3.5-inche thick bilingual telephone directory of firms and organizations runs to 2,790 pages.

As Table 2 shows, traditional organizations, which are historically based in Chinatown, are the most numerous in the ethnic Chinese community, making up 40% of all organizations in our inventory. Since the 1980s, Chinese immigrant organizations have proliferated beyond Chinatown. Despite the limitation of data collection, modern organizations are roughly grouped into the following broad categories: civic, cultural, educational, music/arts, sports, health, social services, religious, political, economic or business, alumni, and professional organizations. Modern Chinese immigrant organizations emerge on the basis of ethnicity but most do not based in Chinatown. Modern organizations share some similar functions as traditional organizations, such as meeting specific needs for immigrant settlement and adaptation and helping members
rebuild social ties. Additionally, they de-emphasize the importance of place of origin, do not have organizationally owned properties, and have no physical imprints or addresses in the ethnic community. Among modern Chinese immigrant organizations, four types are particularly noteworthy — extended hometown associations, economic and business associations, alumni associations, and professional organizations—as they are not only modern but also engage the homeland in ways quite different from traditional organizations.

**Extended hometown associations.** Modern-day hometown associations have a very different notion of the hometown. In the past, a hometown association is usually named after a migrant sending village, or qiao-xiang (literally meaning “overseas Chinese sending villages” in Chinese). Today, the hometown is likely extended beyond traditional sending villages because rapid industrialization and urbanization. Newly established hometown associations are often named after a town (as in Guantou Association), a county (as in Lianjiang Association), a city (as in Changle Association), a region (as in Wuyi Association), a major metropolis (as in Beijing Tongxiang Hui), or even a province (as in Sichuan Tongxiang Hui). Many sending places of the extended hometown associations are not rural but newly urbanized areas or regions marked by parallel trends of internal and international migration. These extended hometown organizations are relatively large with memberships ranging from 100 to the thousands. However, members may not necessarily be born or raised in those places let alone sharing the same dialect. For example, Beijing calls itself a new qiao-xiang, because many new immigrants hailed from there. However, among members of Beijing Tongxiang Hui, most were not even native Beijingese. Many went to Beijing to attend college and then worked there after completing their college education. These extended hometown associations are often recognized by the central and local governments in China and have maintained both formal and informal relationships with the Chinese government.

While many new hometown organizations are extended beyond sending villages and towns, there are still a visible number of associations following the old organizational pattern — village-based. This is particularly prevalent among rural immigrants from the Fuzhou metropolitan region, such as the American Houyu Association and American Yangyu Association, but is no longer common among immigrants from Guangdong Province. Part of the reason is because many of the Fujianese immigrants were undocumented and relied heavily on kinship networks to migrate and to survive harsh circumstances after migration.

**Economic / business organizations.** Unlike merchant guilds and tongs in old Chinatowns, modern economic organizations and business associations depend heavily on transnational networks to operate and expand their businesses. These organizations express a strong desire to integrate into the American economy while promoting co-ethnic solidarity for economic purposes and cultural maintenance in the ethnic community. The chief purposes of economic organizations are: to foster connections among immigrant entrepreneurs, and represent and protect their interests in the U.S.; and to help them build connections with China and the Chinese Diaspora to capture new opportunities from China’s emerging market economy and elsewhere in the world, especially Asia and Southeast Asia. These organizations would organize delegations to visit China, seeking economic cooperation and exploring potential business and investment opportunities. They also position themselves at the forefront of the global economy, acting as transnational agents at the “Gateway to the Pacific Rim” on US shores. Leaders of these organizations are generally received warmly and retreated as distinguished guests by the Chinese government.
Alumni associations. Unlike traditional Chinese organizations that are built on kin, village, or place of origin ties, alumni associations are formed on the basis of colleges and universities, and to a lesser extent, high schools, from which Chinese immigrants had graduated prior to immigration to the United States. Before World War II, most of the Chinese immigrants were low-skilled, uneducated labor from rural areas. So alumni associations were not visible. Of some that exited, most were middle school or high school alumni associations from the migrant sending towns, such as Taishan First Middle School Alumni Association, Kaiping First Middle School Alumni Association, Chungshan Alumni Association of Middle Schools.

Since World War II, three different groups of highly skilled Chinese immigrants have arrived in the United States. The first group is made up of students, scholars, and diplomats who were studying or working in the United States when the Chinese civil war broke out in the mid-1940s as well as political refugees fleeing the civil war and the new communist regime of the PRC in the late 1940s and 1950s. With the passage of the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, approximately 30,000 Chinese were admitted to the United States as refugees and immigrants. About 5,000 were exchange students and visiting scholars who were studying or working in America at the time and the rest were mostly members of the Chinese elite including top military officers, government officials, diplomats, capitalists and large business owners, and members of the Chinese upper classes. The financial resources that the refugees brought with them and the American educational credentials and work experience that they attained in the United States enabled this group to disperse into middle-class communities without ever setting foot on Chinatown.

The second group of highly skilled immigrants consists almost entirely of students and visiting scholars from Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s. Because of the rigorous college entrance examination system and limited opportunities for graduate education, many college graduates heading for the United States to seek advanced training were the top, or the “cream,” of the Taiwanese educated elite. It was estimated that close to 150,000 Taiwanese students entered the United States for graduate education between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s, making them the “largest group of foreign students studying in America,” and that some 70 to 80% of science graduates at National Taiwan University (the best in Taiwan) left for America (Kwong 1987: 60). These students graduated with the highest international standards in their respective fields, science and engineering in particular, and because of career opportunities in the United States, the majority has chosen to stay. Since Taiwanese organizations are not the focus of this study, we have not counted the Taiwanese alumni associations into our inventory list (Professional organizations established by originally established by Taiwanese are included because of their expanded mainland Chinese membership and transnational activities with China).

The third group of highly skilled immigrants consists of students and visiting scholars who have come mainly from mainland China since the 1980s. Between 1978 and 2008, China sent more than 755,000 students to study in more than 100 different countries, about half came to the United States (approximately 375,000), and the rate of return upon completion of education was less than 15%. Like their Taiwanese counterparts of the 1960s and 1970s, most of these Chinese exchange students and visiting scholars were “top of the cream” in higher education in China and came to America to seek advanced training in the country’s best graduate schools and research institutions. For a variety of reasons—greater career opportunities, professional freedom of expression, higher income, and more desirable lifestyle—many Chinese students or scholars decided to stay permanently in the United States upon completion of their degree or research programs. Some even delayed their return by seeking short-term employment opportunities. The
Chinese government crackdown of the pro-democracy student movement in Tiananmen on June 4th 1989 was a significant deterrent. In 1993, over 60,000 Chinese students, scholars, and their families were allowed to apply for permanent residency provided by the U.S. Senate bill (S1216). Educated, well trained, and, for some, willing to be re-trained in more marketable fields, the majority of this group has secured professional jobs in the mainstream economy within a relatively short period of adjustment.

These three main groups of highly skilled Chinese immigrants have now achieved middle- or upper-middle class status and have been considered highly assimilated into mainstream American society measured by levels of education, occupation, income, and residential mobility. Most of these alumni associations have maintained a formal relationship with their corresponding colleges and universities in China.

Professional organizations. Chinese professional organizations generally maintain bilingual websites. Because of the skilled migration from China in the past three decades, these professional organizations are well represented in various fields of science, engineering, medicine, and finance. Organizational membership ranges from a few dozen to several thousands. Some examples include: Chinese Association for Science and Technology USA (New York-based with 15 regional chapters), Silicon Valley Chinese Engineers Association, and Chinese Scholar Association (Southern California).

The Chinese Association for Science and Technology, USA (CAST-USA), founded in 1992, is one of the oldest and most recognized non-political and non-profit professional organizations for Chinese scholars, professionals, entrepreneurs, and students working and studying in the U.S. CAST-USA has been growing at a rapid pace with several thousand members in more than 30 states across the U.S. Its transnational orientation is clearly detected from its mission statement, such as “helping to increase visibility of CAST members in U.S., Chinese, and international professional circles,” “facilitating communications between CAST members and Chinese government agencies, research and educational institutions, and business enterprises for career advancement and business opportunities,” and “advocating and facilitating the understanding of Chinese perspectives among the political leaders and the general public.”

Similarly the mission of the Chicago-Based Association of Chinese Scientists and Engineers, USA (ACSE), founded in 1992 with more than 1,500 regular members, has identified “to promote exchange and cooperation between the United States and China in the areas of science, technology, culture, education and business” as one of its missions.

The Chinese Scholars Association, Southern California (CSA), founded in 1998 by Chinese American (mostly foreign born) university professors in southern California, has 85 life members and hundreds of members from diverse fields, including science, engineering, medicine, business, social sciences, and the humanities. Over 90% of its members hold a doctoral degree. Its mission is “to promote intellectual exchange, collaboration, and amity among Chinese scholars in the United States, China, and the rest of the world,” and it is “dedicated to the development of science, technology and higher education and enhancement of Sino-American friendship and mutual understanding.” One of the activities CSA is engaging on a regular basis is to send delegations to China to attend conferences, symposiums, and job fairs. For example, the CSA delegation attended the 2009 Conference on International Exchange of Professional and set up a booth at the 38th Golden Collar World Job Fair in Shenzhen to showcase the organization’s mission, agenda, and activities.

Many Chinese immigrant professional organizations have been recognized and pursued by the Chinese government with the hope of importing new technology and human capital.
These professional organizations serve multiple purposes. First and foremost is network building among professionals for both social support and information exchange on employment and entrepreneurship opportunities in the US and China. Other important goals include bridging US-China economic relations, fostering greater Chinese diasporic economic exchanges, raising relief funds in the event of natural disasters in the homelands, and protecting the interests of Chinese immigrants in American society. Activities of professional organizations range from annual galas, monthly or quarterly meetings, irregular seminars on special topics, informal socials on a semi-regular basis, and organized hometown visits, but the chief means of communication is through email and the Internet, hence overcoming geographical constraints.

Differences between traditional and modern organizations

Modern Chinese immigrant organizations have proliferated and diversified since the 1980s. They differ from the traditional organizations lodged in Chinatowns in some remarkable ways. First, family, kinship, and rural hometown no longer provide the basis for organization. New hometown associations do emerge, but they are based on a broader concept of the place of origin, such as cities or provinces, and have more diverse memberships. Merchants associations take the form of economic or business associations that are more specialized and globalized, structurally linked to various network hosts among the Chinese both within and outside the ethnic enclave as well as those in the homelands. Second, the level of organizational density in new urban enclaves and ethnoburbs is high, but the organizational structure is horizontal rather than hierarchical and inter-organizational relations are not interdependent, unlike those in old Chinatowns. There is no equivalent overarching ethnic federation like the CCBA to act as a quasi government. Social control is thus relatively weak. Third, new ethnic organizations are oriented more toward incorporation in the host society than toward homeland development. For example, these organizations make special efforts to register naturalized US citizens to vote, mobilize non-citizens to become naturalized, and support pan-Asian political representation.

Transnational organizations

The density and diversity of immigrant organizations in Chinese America indicate a high level of institutional completeness in the ethnic community. To what extent do these organizations operate across national borders? Telephone and face-to-face interviews with the leaders of 55 well-established Chinese immigrant organizations cast substantial insight into the phenomenon of transnationalism. Near one-quarter of those interviewed were founded prior to 1980 with the oldest one in 1867, 27% in the 1980s, and the rest after 1990. As Table 2 shows, those reported being entirely US-oriented, or having little or no engagement with China, comprise less than one-third (31%), while the majority reported being either entirely China-oriented (24%) or transnationally oriented (44%). Among the organizations that are entirely China-oriented, none are traditional associations.26

In the old days facing legal and institutional exclusion in the host society, various ethnic organizations emerged to assist the excluded Chinese immigrants, offering tangible and intangible support to help them fulfill their “gold dream,” which entailed a return with gold and glory. The horizontal array of family/clan associations, hometown associations, and merchant guilds gave American Chinatowns a distinct structure, which can be unmistakably discerned by the look of the buildings they own in Chinatowns. Figure 1 provides the images of multi-story buildings in San Francisco’s Chinatown and the CCBA building in Los Angeles’ Chinatown.
At the outset, Chinese immigrant organizations had a natural transnational orientation, aiming to help Chinese immigrants fulfill their “gold mountain dream” — to return home with gold and glory (Zhou 1992). Because of legal exclusion, organization leaders had to carve out an economic niche and invest and reinvest in Chinatown’s enclave economy. In order to keep their businesses afloat, they had to tap into global supply chains and look to their ancestral homeland for consumer products and merchandise imports even though the homeland was poor and underdeveloped. Out of forced choice, the ethnic elite conducted their businesses across the Pacific Ocean while rising as to power as organizational leaders. Ordinary organization members were also engaged in transnational activities, taking the form of remittance-sending because legal exclusion and economic circumstances did not allow them to travel back and forth frequently like the ethnic elite. They remitted to their families and send letters home on a regular basis through their family/clan or hometown associations as they could not access to formal banking in mainstream American society. Thus, the ethnic elite also served as transnational liaisons for their members, bringing news about China to warm the lonely hearts of those sojourning in a foreign land, and news about America to comfort the anxious relatives left behind.

For reasons associated with exclusion, traditional organizations prior to World War II were contained and grew roots in Chinatowns. Most of these organizations have invested in real estate properties in Chinatown, which are now worth millions of dollars. The organizations usually keep a main hall, an altar, and some space for rituals, meetings, and other organizational activities (as well as for temporary lodging in the past) and rent space on the ground floor and/or basement out to ethnic businesses in order to generate a constant flow of income. The rental income, now ranging from $200,000 to $800,000 annually, is used for operation and various activities. These kinds of economic resources are unavailable in modern organizations, including alumni and professional organizations that are rich in individual human capital and family economic resources. More importantly, real estate holdings served to anchor and stabilize organizations, giving the ethnic community a solid physical infrastructure.

At present, this ethnic infrastructure has been transformed by broader structural changes in the United States and China. In the United States, the passage of civil rights legislation and liberal immigration reform legislations have created new opportunities for social mobility in mainstream American society, allowing immigrants to shift their orientation toward permanent settlement in the United States and making their full participation in American life possible. Traditional organizations have renewed their missions of offering mutual aid and helping immigrants to incorporate into American society, preserving cultural heritage, and also contributing to the motherland’s or hometown development. In fact, the removal of legal and social barriers and freedom for immigrants to incorporate into their new homeland help ethnic organizations to become truly transnational, traversing the two homelands with ease.

**Changing Conditions for Transnationalism: The Role of the Sending State**

In China, the end of the Chinese Cultural Revolution has ushered in market reforms and social transformation nationwide while the end of the Cold War has opened up China’s national door to the outside world. Since the early 1980s, the ruling Communist Party China (CPC) has shifted its policy toward the expatriate communities around the world from viewing overseas Chinese as potential spies and traitors to welcoming them to participate in China’s economic reform (Thunø, 2001). The emerging Chinese market has attracted investment of overseas Chinese to China and...
a significant trend of returned migration of highly skilled immigrants (Zweig et al. 2004). While the role of the receiving state in immigrant transnationalism is minimum to none, the role of the sending state is significant. Structural changes in the Chinese polity and the active involvement of the Chinese government greatly influence organizational transnationalism in ways that are both similar and unique in comparison to other immigrant groups in the United States.

State governance in overseas Chinese affairs

The Foreign Ministry of the Chinese state has no jurisdiction over overseas Chinese affairs. Instead, there are two parallel administrative bodies taking charge: Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (known colloquially as qiao-ban) at various levels of government, from the State Council to the provincial and local; and the Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (known colloquially as qiao-lian) under the leadership of various levels of the CPC as indicated in Figure 2.

[Figure 2 about here]

Overseas Chinese Affairs Offices of the State Council (national qiao-ban) is the overarching ministry-level agency overseeing all affairs concerning overseas Chinese, their relatives living in China, and returned overseas Chinese. The organizational structure is top-down, with the national qiao-ban on top followed by the provincial qiao-ban, and each of the lower administrative level—municipality, county, and township—of government. Qiao-ban is on government budget, and its personnel are civil servants.

The All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (national qiao-lian) is publically known as a quasi-governmental organization, but it is under the jurisdiction of the CPC and hence boasts more authoritative. Like qiao-ban, qiao-lian’s organizational structure is also top-down to the lowest administrative level—township and even the village. Qiao-lian works independently from qiao-ban with the following four objectives: 1) to represent and protect the interests and lawful rights of returned overseas Chinese and their families and the relatives of overseas Chinese living in China; 2) to unite returned overseas Chinese and their families and encourage them to participate in China’s modernizing construction; 3) to improve the economic cooperation of technological communication with overseas Chinese; and 4) to encourage overseas Chinese to be good citizens, live harmoniously with local residents, contribute to local prosperity and development, and carry the good Chinese tradition in their respective hostlands, and to enhance communication between China and their hostlands.

While overseas Chinese Affairs was overseen by qiao-ban and qiao-lian, between 1949 and 1979 (after the country launched its open-door policy), these government agencies existed in name and were non-functional. People with overseas Chinese connections were not trusted; some were even considered prime suspects of bourgeois elements, foreign spies, and anti-revolutionaries. During the 1950s, most of the real properties and businesses owned by overseas Chinese and their families were either confiscated or nationalized as state properties. Communications between China and the Chinese Diaspora were minimal. The only form of connection was via mailed letters and packages (containing food and goods for daily necessities), and monetary remittances, which were regulated by the government. For example, the relatives received monetary remittance in a special form of currency issued by government and to be used at designated stores to purchase food and goods for daily necessities.

Besides qiao-ban and qiao-lian, the Zhi Gong Party in China is a public interest party in charge of overseas Chinese Affairs. This Party composes of returned overseas Chinese, their relatives, and noted figures and scholars who have extensive overseas ties. Because of its
historical ties to the Chinese Diaspora, the ruling CPC and the State both incorporate the Zhi Gong Party into the work on overseas Chinese affairs.

With the top-down administrative structures, overseas Chinese affairs are highly controlled by the state and the Party. There are significant structural barriers to the development of non-governmental organization (NGO), including immigrant transnational organizations. Any such development requires the approval by various levels of the Bureau of Civil Affairs and registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the PRC. Other requirements include a significant sum of registered capital, co-sponsorship involving a government agency, non-competition (at a particular locale), ban on public fundraising, and the annual inspection to registration renewal. As a result, the number of state approved NGOs is very small, with no comparison to those in the U.S. and the homeland of other immigrant groups in the U.S., and very few branches of US transnational organizations legally exist in China.

Major changes in government policies

In 1978, the Overseas Chinese Office of the State Council and qiaoban in a few provinces and municipalities were re-activated after lying dormant during the Cultural Revolution. The CPC’s policy toward overseas Chinese affairs changed from watching out for anti-revolutionary forces from the Chinese Diaspora to promoting complete cooperation in economic and technological areas between Mainland China and overseas Chinese. Overseas Chinese were considered “supporters, pioneers, and promoters” of China’s economic reform. In May 1989, the State Council reiterated the important role of overseas Chinese in implementing the state open-door policy and made it clear that the goal of overseas Chinese affairs is to attract overseas Chinese participation in Mainland China’s economic development, especially to attract more investment from overseas Chinese and to import more technology and talented people.

Since the turn of the 21st century, the official policy regarding overseas Chinese has shifted from attracting remittances and capital investment to fostering ties. The policy also emphasizes helping overseas Chinese become naturalized citizens, participating in the mainstream society of their countries of residence, and growing roots in their new homelands. For example, in the 2006-07 strategic plan of the qiao-ban of the City of Guangzhou (a municipal government), several main tasks were specified:

- To continue to support and help new overseas Chinese associations to grow and to blend into their host mainstream society;
- To train a group of young to middle-aged leaders, helping them to gradually become leaders of local overseas Chinese communities;
- To invite 20-30 key persons from overseas Chinese communities abroad to come to Guangzhou to attend activities aimed at establishing friendships every year with public funds;
- To invite 10-15 capable, influential young to middle aged association leaders to visit Guangzhou with public funds;
- To organize summer camps for youth and teenagers from around the world, including Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, with public funds.

Policies regarding Chinese students studying abroad emphasized “return” in the 1980s and 1990s. Starting from the late 1990s, the policy has also shifted, recognizing that returning to China is not the only way to “serve the country.” Instead, the state now encourages those graduates who decide to stay in their host countries to assimilate into the mainstream society and actively participate in politics in their countries of residence.
However, the PRC does not recognize nor promote dual citizenship. Based on the PRC Nationality Law, China will not admit the dual nationality of a Chinese citizen (article 3); as soon as a Chinese becomes a naturalized citizen of another country, he or she will automatically lose his/her Chinese citizenship (article 9). The main reason is historical for the purpose of protecting interests of overseas Chinese and normalizing relations between China and the countries in which overseas China are resettled. It is also quite hard to apply for an Aliens’ Permanent Residence in China if one does not intend to live there permanently. Chinese immigrants who have become naturalized U.S. citizens would face a bureaucratic hurdle when they attempt to conduct regular transnational activities—temporary non-immigrant visas. Chinese government has started to consider drafting the country's first immigration law only since May 2010 to better manage international migration and transnational flows, but the issue of dual citizenship appears to remain off-limits.

Transnationalism in Motion: Reaching out to the Diaspora

The Chinese state not only creates an open and welcoming environment but is also proactively involved in the transnational field. Local qiao-ban in migrant sending communities at the county or township level would set aside a substantial amount (at as high as one million yuan) in their operating budget, and raise funds from other government units and corporate sponsors, to facilitate transnational activities with or for overseas Chinese. The Chinese state does not involved in organizational formation abroad. However, in recent years, some local government from traditional and new qiao-xiang support the establishment of new immigrant organizations abroad, and even provide state-up funds for some organizations, but do so strategically. For example, if a visible number of Chinese immigrants are settling in a new locale, the local government of the hometown of these new immigrants would support efforts of these immigrants to form extended hometown associations. State-sponsored activities may be grouped in the following categories: foreign capital investment and economic cooperation; training and relationship building; philanthropic work and disaster relief; cultural promotion; scientific, technological, and scholarly exchange; and qiao-xiang publications.

Foreign capital investment and economic cooperation

At the end of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1978, China’s national economy almost collapsed with a GDP of only US$148.00 (much lower than that of Pakistan at $260 and India at $248 then). China was one of the poorest countries in the world. In the late 1970s and 1980s, China was capital-poor and desperately in need of foreign capital investment to implement its ambitious modernization goals. The state, under the leadership of the CPC, aggressively sought support from the Chinese Diaspora, exploiting the immense financial, cultural, and social capital of the Chinese overseas, as well as their ethnic affinity and pride. The policy regarding overseas Chinese affairs made a 180 degree turn, making overseas Chinese and people living in China with overseas Chinese connections important contributors of the nation’s economic reform.

In 1980, the Chinese government set up four special economic zones (SEZ), permitting the maneuver of foreign capital. These initial SEZs served as “bridges for introducing foreign capital, advanced technology and equipment and as classrooms for training personnel capable of mastering advanced technology.” Because of the need to tap long-standing oversea Chinese resources, all four SEZs were located in Guangdong (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou) and Fujian (Xiamen), hometowns to the majority of the people of Chinese descent all over the world. Indeed,
between 1979 and 1987, 90% of foreign investments in SEZs from the Chinese Diaspora, especially Chinese investors and entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. By the end of 2000, there were over 200,000 foreign-funded enterprises in China, two-thirds had been launched and owned or co-owned by ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia. Successful investments in China, in turn, showed the value of guanxi (social and political connections), which further stimulated investments by overseas Chinese.

From 1978 to 2006, China’s GDP increased 58 times with an average growth rate of nearly 10% (more than three times the rate of the US). The Chinese state acknowledged the contribution of overseas Chinese for bringing about such “miracle.” Of the foreign investments, enterprises set up by overseas Chinese and investors from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan accounted for 70%, and their total investments to over 60% of the total foreign investment in China. It was the China Diaspora that helped build economic ties between China and the rest of the world and to help China’s economy take off by attracting foreign investment. In my site visits to various qiao-xiang, my interviewees from the local governments Guangdong and Fujian repeatedly said that substantial overseas Chinese contribution can be traced to every landmark structure and every major development project in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Since 2000, IT and bio-tech developments have brought about a new era of innovation around the world. Overseas Chinese investors and entrepreneurs have been at the forefront of this development, launching hi-tech industries in China, including electronics and electric machinery manufacture, biological technology and manufacture, rare metallurgical industries. This new generation of high-tech investors and entrepreneurs has been disproportionately from the US. Provincial and municipal governments on coastal and inland regions and inland have opened up more free trade zones, economic and technological development zones, and high-tech industrial development zones in large and medium-sized cities. These new development zones play the dual roles of “windows” in developing the foreign-oriented economy, generating foreign exchanges through exporting products and importing advanced technologies and of “radiators” in accelerating inland economic development.

Training and relationship building

Since 2000, the Chinese government has shifted its policy, moving from attracting foreign capital to nurturing social relations and assisting overseas Chinese to explore potential opportunities in China. The state, provincial, and municipal governments sponsored or co-sponsored annual conventions, including symposia, fairs, training sessions for overseas Chinese interested in investing in or doing business in China. The primary goal is for relationship building. For example, the Training Sessions for Leaders of Overseas Chinese Communities is a state-sponsored program to offer advanced “custom-made” training for young generation overseas Chinese entrepreneurs, including classes on interpersonal relationships, management of personnel, international political analysis, foreign affairs policies and rules, etiquette in business, quality for community leaders and community management. There are also classes introducing the economic development in particular locales in China. The students attending the training session all assume important roles in overseas Chinese associations in their respective host countries, and most of them are children of renowned Chinese businessmen or leaders of these associations. In Wenzhou, one of such training sessions, a 3-day session with 37 overseas Chinese business leaders in 2007, would cost more than 100,000 yuan from the local Qiao-ban’s
budget. The Chinese government considers hosting such training sessions “an innovative strategy” to do effective work on overseas Chinese affairs.38

In addition, the Chinese state also helps established transnational organizations to reach out to entrepreneurs and aspiring ones in the Chinese Diaspora. For example, the World Chinese Entrepreneur Association (known as WEA) was established in the early 1990s in China by the collaboration of several provincial and municipal governments. Its mission is to build a network of Chinese entrepreneurs around the world, ensuring the world Chinese entrepreneur interests, and assisting home and abroad entrepreneur to invest in or financing businesses in China, or to discuss and explore business opportunities. Over the years, WEA makes friends from all over the world, enlarges the scope of cooperation and promotes communication among Chinese entrepreneurs and others, and has been making contribution to the modernization and to economic, social, and cultural developments in China.39

The provincial government of Guangdong helped established the World Guangdong Community Federation (WGCF). The director of Guangdong Qiao-ban is on the executive board and WGCF’s secretariat office operates from Guangdong Qiao-ban. WGCF held its first convention in Singapore in 2000 in order to strengthen ties among Guangdong associations in different parts of the world, to seek economic opportunities and/or cooperation, to facilitate civil society participation, to promote mutual support and mutual benefits. The confederation holds a convention every other year. The second World Confederation of Guangdong Associations in 2002 was the largest in scale. Held in Guangzhou and sponsored by the Chinese government, the convention attracted 2,800 Chinese organizations leaders and members from more than 70 countries. Officials of various levels of qiao-ban and qiao-lian attended the conference and made keynote speeches. The conference also includes a photography exhibit of overseas Chinese photographer, a trade show, discussion panels, and sightseeing activities.40

Philanthropic work and disaster relief

The Chinese government believes that it can count on the support of the Chinese Diaspora when China encounters natural disasters. Qiao-ban is one of the government agencies in charge of managing philanthropic donations from overseas Chinese communities. On May 12, 2008, a 7.9-magnitude earthquake hit Sichuan Province, killing about 70,000 people and leaving over 18,000 missing. Over 15 million people lived in the affected area, including almost 4 million in the capital city of Chengdu. On the next day (May 13), the national qiao-ban launched an emergency disaster-relief “Qiao-ai Project” (Love from the Chinese Diaspora) to coordinate and manage monetary and material donations from concerned overseas Chinese. On the same day, about 68.5 million yuan in cash or material poured in from overseas Chinese in the name of individual or organization. In June, at a press conference of national qiao-ban announced a “Two-100-Goal”—to build 100 qiao-ai schools and 100 Qiao-ai health clinics in the earthquake affected areas—using donations from overseas Chinese.41 The provincial qiao-ban and 13 municipal qiao-ban in Guangdong Province jointly established a Qiao-xin (the heart of the overseas Chinese) Foundation in 2006 and raised 41.1 million yuan in the first five months to build houses, which would benefit 2,300 rural earthquake victims. The project was planned to complete in 16 months.42

Cultural promotion

Overseas Chinese take great pride in their five thousand years of history and heritage. State sponsored-cultural activities aim to assist its expatriates and their offspring in preserving
Chinese cultural tradition, heritage, and language and nurturing a sense of Chineseness and cultural pride. Several state-sponsored activities are noteworthy.

**Summer or winter camps for overseas Chinese youths and teenagers.** The national qiao-ban collaborated with qiao-ban at the provincial and municipal level to hold annual summer camps of varying themes, such as “Root-Seeking Summer Camps in China” organized by Beijing Qiao-lian and Winter Root-Search Program organized by Guangdong provincial Qiao-ban. These root search camps and programs target teenagers of Chinese ancestry living outside China to ensure that succeeding generations of overseas Chinese understand and appreciate their heritage and ancestral history. Activities include visiting qiao-xiang, taking classes in Chinese language, calligraphy, kongfu, folk music/dance, and sightseeing (see Figure 3). The Chinese government would pay for all expenses and travel costs once these participants arrive in China. For example, between 1980 and 2007, the provincial qiao-ban of Guangdong, in collaboration of local qiao-ban, organized more than 100 different youth camps, attracting more than 5,000 participants from 30 different countries.

**Chinese language programs.** Starting in 2001, the national qiao-ban implemented a state policy of Chinese language education. The government regards Chinese language education as “a highly strategically significant, basic job” for strengthening the work of overseas Chinese affairs. It aims to cultivate the bilingual or multilingual ability in the next-generation of leaders of overseas Chinese organizations. Since 2005, the Chinese government has increased its annual special funding by 20,000,000 yuan to support the development of overseas Chinese language education. Guangdong Provincial government allocated an annual special fund of 2,200,000 yuan for holding “overseas Chinese language education.” The Chinese government, under the Office of Chinese Language Council International (known colloquially as han-ban) has sponsored the establishment of Confucius Institutes (CI) around the world to promote Chinese language teaching and support existing Chinese language teaching programs in host institutions. Since the first establishment of a CI in Seoul in 2004, 282 CI have been established in more than 88 countries as of December 2009. There are now 61 CI in the U.S., including UCLA, as of January 2011.

**Cultural visits overseas.** Various levels of qiao-ban and Qiao-lian pay for annual visits to the Chinese Diaspora. Many bring with them music/dance troupes to stage performing art shows, featuring Chinese folk music, dances, and Peking opera shows. It costs at least half a million yuan for each visit. Many of these shows and performances are either sponsored by transnational Chinese immigrant organizations or by the Chinese government. They are open to the public and were held in main theaters and civic centers with filled seats.

**Consulate receptions in celebrating the Chinese National Day (October 1).** In the U.S., the Chinese Embassy in Washington D.C. and each of the Consulate General of the PRC (San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, and Houston) hold large receptions and parties, where leaders of Chinese immigrant organizations, prominent Chinese Americans, US government officials, local community leaders and business elite, and foreign diplomats, are distinguished guests of honor. Some receptions are fairly large in scale and extravagant. For example, the Chinese Consulate General in Los Angeles hold the annual “October 1st National Day” reception at Hilton Universal City Hotel where between 1,500 and 2,000 people would be in attendance, including California state officials, council members, overseas Chinese, Chinese students abroad and representatives of China funded companies.
Scientific, technological, and scholarly exchange

Talent work. Talent work targets Chinese exchange students and visiting scholars studying or doing research abroad. China has sent students and scholars studying abroad since the turn of the 20th century. The work related to students and scholars studying abroad after 1978 has been in the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education (MOE). From 1978 to 2003, a total number of 700,200 Chinese students and scholars studied in 108 countries and regions all over the world, covering almost all disciplines, about a quarter of them returned to China and another quarter stayed permanently in the countries of study upon completion of their training (about half were still studying, doing researches or visiting as scholars in foreign higher education institutions). As for the geographic distribution of the overseas Chinese students and scholars, the statistics for destination in 2003 showed 50% to Europe and 15% to North America and Latin America. The Chinese government considers returned students and scholars a leading force in areas like education, science and technology, high-tech industries, finance, insurance, trade and management and a driving force for the country’s economic and social development. The government also support students and scholars staying abroad to take initiatives to make contributions to China through various ways, such as giving lectures during short-term visit to China, having academic exchanges, conducting joint researches, bringing in projects and investments and providing information and technical consultancy.49

Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese government has launched a variety of programs to lure the permanent or temporary return of highly-skilled migrants in the fields of science and engineering at universities and research institutes, as well as business development and investment in high-tech industries. For example, the MOE alone has implemented several exemplary programs to attract students and scholars to return as well as to facilitate their careers in their countries of residence:

- “The Fund for Returnees to Launch S&T Researches”: Since its inception in 1990, the fund has provided financial support to 10,926 returnees, with an amount of more than 350 million yuan.
- “Program for Training Talents toward the 21st Century”: This program targets the outstanding young teachers who have returned from overseas studies. Since its inception in 1993, the program supported 922 people with the total amount of more than 180 million yuan.
- “The Chunhui (literally, Spring Bud) Program”: The program targets those returnees with doctoral degree and with outstanding achievements in their respective fields. Since its inception in 1996, the program has funded more than 8,000 individuals and 90 groups of scholars and researchers to serve the country on short-term visit.
- “Changjiang Scholar Incentive Program”: The program provides financial support to young and middle-aged leading scholars of certain disciplines who have studied abroad and are invited by Chinese higher education institutions as Special Professors or Lecture Professors.
- “Program of Academic Short-return for Scholars and Research Overseas”: This program finances those outstanding Chinese scholars studying or doing researches abroad to give lectures or do researches in 28 key higher education institutions during their short holidays or returns to China. Since its reception in 2001, the program has aided 104 such scholars.50

State-sponsore/d organizations and programs: The state and local governments also sponsor and support activities by organizations related to highly skilled overseas Chinese. The
Western Returned Scholars Association (WRSA), for example, is an association of returned scholars (was renamed the Chinese Overseas Returned Scholars Association by Party leader Jiang Zemin in 2003). The association was originally founded in 1913 in Beijing and was one of the 21 mass organizations led by the Secretariat of the CPC. The association has now grown into 16 sections (each section is for returned scholars trained in major Western countries or regions) and a WRSA Entrepreneur Association. The mission of the association is to link overseas Chinese scholars and students all over the world and build bridges between Chinese returned scholars and scholars abroad. One of the main activities is to organize intellectual exchange tours and thematic symposia.\(^5\) The Teng Fei Award is an award that aims to encourage western return scholars to take their responsibilities of showing their intelligence, serving, and contributing to their motherland, awarding the top 50 leaders of enterprises who are return scholars from Western countries.\(^5\)

**International conferences, symposia, and workshops.** The China Conference on International Exchange of Professionals (CIEP) was founded by the China State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs in 2001, which is the only national and international conference of professionals and intellectual exchange especially designed for organizations of experts outside China (or China Mainland), training institutions and professionals with the largest scale and highest level at present. It is also a comprehensive conference which integrating professional, intelligence, projects, technology, and management. All CIEP conferences are approved by the State Council and co-sponsored by the China State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs and the Municipal Government of Shenzhen. Since 2001, it has held more than 2,500 projects, professional recruitment of over 3,000 positions, and more than 70,000 person-times came to visit the Conference and participated in the professional forum during the 2 days.\(^5\)

Working with the Chinese Association for Science and Technology in China, CAST-USA became a main co-sponsor of the Chinese state sponsored Wuhan International Conference on the Environment (WICE, June 27-30, 2009). This conference served as an interdisciplinary scientific forum to present the most recent advances in environmental science and technology. It aimed to foster integration of the latest scientific developments into practical applications for the improvement of human health, environmental protection, eco-system restoration, and green-city development.\(^5\)

**Qiao-xiang publications**

Qiao-ban and Qiao-lian (from national to local levels) and most other government or non-governmental organizations dealing with overseas Chinese affairs would maintain their own websites (some are Chinese-English bilingual) offering information exchange and facilitating network building and maintenance.\(^5\)

Local governments have actively launch networking activities with overseas Chinese not only by organizing or sponsoring networking conferences for overseas Chinese organizations, such as the world conventions of hometown associations, and hosting home-coming visits and tours of overseas Chinese organization leaders, but also by publications in print and/or online to share news about what happens in hometowns and keep up-to-date information flow. In qiao-xiang in Guangdong and Fujian, most municipal- or county-level qiao-ban and qiao-lian publish qiao-kan (overseas Chinese journals). Even village and towns would publish qiao-kan irregularly (see Figure 4). For example, Zhongshan Overseas Chinese Edition, first published in 1981 bi-annually or tri-annually (quarterly between 1999 and 2007), has now published 84 issues and has
Transnationalism in Motion: Engaging the Ancestral Homeland

Traveling back and forth and remittances sending between China and receiving states has been an indispensable part of Chinese immigrant life in the Diaspora. The founding of the PRC disrupted this life for near thirty years from 1949 to 1978. Responding to rapid changes in China and the concerted effort made by the Chinese state, overseas Chinese have renewed ties to and engaged their ancestral homeland both as individuals and via organizations. Most traditional organizations have now abandoned the mission of overthrowing the CPC ruled regime and reoriented themselves toward integrating into mainstream America while engaging China. For example, the CCBA, which has remained loyal to the government of the Republic of China (Taiwan), no longer prohibits its leaders and members from having contact with China and have paid frequent official visits to China. San Francisco’s CCBA initiated a signature campaign among Chinese American organizations to welcome the Beijing Olympic Torch in March 2008.

San Francisco’s Suey Sing Association (founded in 1867) was one of the few traditional organizations in Chinatown that supported the PRC despite strong opposition from the community prior to 1970. It played a crucial role in promoting the entry of the PRC into the United Nations and the normalization of sino-US diplomatic relations in the 1970s. It was the very first organization in the Chinese community in the U.S. to fly the flag of the PRC in 1994. Its organizational plaque and photos of one of its prominent leaders, Mr. Honghu Chi (a Changle native), his son, and grandson, were permanently on display in the Hall of Fame at Overseas Chinese Museum in Changle, Fujian Province, shown in Figure 5. Regarding the association’s renewed mission, Mr. Chi made the following remark at the 13th Suey Sing Association Convention in Guangzhou in 2007:

“The American Suey Sing Association is moving in tandem with changing times. We continue to foster stronger fellowship and mutual assistance among our members, to cultivate stronger coalition with other ethnic organizations in and out of the Chinese American community, to help build stronger ties between China and the US, to promote a more balance sino-US trade, and to unequivocally oppose the notion of “two Chinas” and support a peaceful China’s reunification.”

Chinese immigrant organizations have engaged their ancestral homeland by four main types of transnational activities: 1) hometown projects; 2) philanthropic work; 3) association conventions and professional conferences; and 4) cultural events. The first two types are oriented mainly toward the ancestral homeland and the other two transnationally.

Hometown projects
Hometown projects are usually place-specific. In the past and present, these projects have typically been based on a sending village or a township that an immigrant organization represents. These projects are typically pragmatic, such as repairing or upgrading a road, a school, an ancestral hall, and a clinic or building a new temple, park, library, and elderly activity center. But they can be symbolic as well, such as building a new village gate, a statue, or a roadside altar. Accordingly, organizational fund-raising has been project-specific, Traditional family and hometown associations have played a central role in this type of activity. It is interesting to note two different trends in this type of development. In the historical sending region of Wuyi, Guangdong, many villages experience visible decline because of depopulation and lack of village-level investment. Villagers either live on remittances, or speculate on potential earnings from land acquisition for near-future real estate development, or wait in queue to migrant to the U.S. via family sponsorship. In new sending region of Fuzhou, Fujian, hometown of the majority of post-1990 undocumented Chinese immigrants in the U.S., many villages witness new constructions everywhere, ranging from extravagant buildings and public facilities that rarely fill to capacity to new homes built by overseas Chinese that are mostly empty. Figure 6 illustrates a cultural center (top) and a public park in two different villages in Fuzhou.

Overseas Chinese donations for village-level hometown projects are usually managed by committees consisting of village elders. Because of rapid urbanization, many traditional migrant sending villages have been incorporated into large towns and cities. In this case, extended hometown associations play a larger role than the village-based hometown associations. They usually work on bigger projects, such as schools, hospitals, universities, public libraries, museums, and parks, which are developed in collaboration with local governments. Wuyi University, for example, is a regional university located in Jiangmen, a key hometown of early Chinese immigrants to the United States. Established in 1985, with substantial overseas Chinese donations, roughly at US$26 million, in the form of 50 buildings, a museum, a library, faculty and student dormitories, an athletic facility, an exhibition hall, and equipment.

At the national level, the largest single structure built by donations from the Chinese Diaspora is the Beijing National Aquatics Center, known as the Olympic Water Cube, which was completed in January 2008 for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games. The total cost of construction was 1.03 billion yuan, 900 million yuan from 350,000 overseas Chinese from 103 countries.

Modern immigrant organizations are unlikely to contribute to these types of development projects because they have no affiliation with a particular sending village or local hometown.

Philanthropy

Philanthropic work includes fund raising for major disaster relief mostly in, but not limited to, such severe floods and earthquakes. For example, immediately after the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in Sichuan Province (measured at 8.0 Ms, and claimed 68,000 lives), the CCBA in New York established the Sichuan
Earthquake Relief Program and raised a total of $1.32 million (with the largest single donation of $50,000) donation money and delivered it to the American Red Cross within a 4-month period. Within a week after Typhoon Morakot hit Taiwan in August 2009 (which passed over Taiwan with heavy rains and wind speeds of more than 100 mph and devastated much of the southern region), the CCBA in New York raised nearly $90,000 from its member organizations and members.60

Regular donations would also provide aid to families in poverty and educational funds and scholarship for children from poor families in the sending village as well as in the Chinese immigrant community here. For example, the Baisha Village Association in New York practices le-juan (happiness donation) and xi-juan (wedding donation) to raise funds for philanthropic work, scholarships, and aid to poor families. Le-juan is a type of freewill donations, ranging from a small amount (USDS15 or 100 yuan) to a substantial amount (USD $7,500 or 50,000 yuan), and xi-juan is for newly-wed couples who are members of the hometown association to donate a lump sum of money, usually in the amount of $500. Both types of donations are deposited into a village fund, bulletin boards at the conspicuous place to acknowledge donors’ names and the amounts donated, as illustrated in Figure 7.

[Figure 7 about here]

It should be noted that making direct financial contributions to specific sending villages is less common today than in the past, even among traditional clan/family or district associations. Since many sending villages are themselves being urbanized and villagers have migrated to cities or abroad, the notion of the hometown is more extends beyond sending villages and towns. Modern organizations are also active in fund-raising activities for disaster relief and poverty reduction initiatives and do so without considering a particular hometown. Regardless of the type of organization, philanthropic donations are commonly made via organizations.

Association conventions and professional conferences

Conventions and conferences are important organizational activities, which may be held regularly in the U.S., China, or somewhere in the greater Chinese Diaspora. Traditional family, hometown, or merchants associations hold these conventions globally, reflecting organizational efforts to connect to other Chinese communities in the diaspora. For example, worldwide clansman/hometown association conventions have become more and more visible in recent years (mostly since the early 1990s); some of these conventions are held in China with significant materialist support from the Chinese government. These events are published in conference proceedings or commemorative editions, in Chinese or bilingually, that are circulated in the U.S., China, and the Chinese Diaspora worldwide. In contrast, modern organizations, professional organizations in particular, usually hold annual conventions in the U.S with distinguished keynote speakers and relevant themes in the profession, such as “Semiconductor — Embracing Our Life, Leading our Future” (the theme of the 2011 convention of the Silicon Valley Chinese Engineers Association). The chief purpose of these regular conventions, initiated and organized by both traditional
and modern Chinese immigrant organizations, is for information exchange, social networking, relationship building, and achievement recognition.

In recent years, the Chinese state has taken various proactive measures to promote interactions with diasporic communities through immigrant organizations. The central government and provincial or local governments have also initiated and sponsored high-profile business fairs, as well as science, technology, and innovation expositions and conventions to help overseas Chinese seek better economic opportunities and build partnerships with businesses in China or in the Chinese Diaspora (Thunø 2001). Immigrant organizations send delegates to participate in these events in China. Calls for these conventions are widely advertised in the ethnic media in diasporic communities. Information and reports about these transnational events are briefed or detailed in various overseas Chinese editions, or qiao-kan, which are published in China and circulated abroad.

Cultural events

Cultural events, including major holiday celebrations, are an integral part of ethnic community life in the United States. Chinese immigrant organizations, especially those in Chinatowns or in Chinese ethnoburbs, take the lead in planning and organizing the cultural events in the form of parades, street fairs, or banquets. During major traditional Chinese holidays, such as the Chinese New Year (on lunar calendar), the Lantern Festival (January 15th on lunar calendar), and the Mid-Autumn Festival (the Chinese Thanksgiving Day in September when the moon is full), Chinatowns in major American cities hold parades, blending together typical American marching processions and the traditional ritual and festive celebrations of China. For example, the Chinese New Year celebrations begin with controlled firecrackers and lion, dragon, or unicorn dances intended to ward off evil spirits. They are followed by beauty pageants with elaborate costumes, floats, and marching bands. Local politicians and community leaders make their presence in parades or on center stages at street fairs before cultural performances by traditional and contemporary Chinese singers and dancers. These cultural events and street fairs attract Chinese Americans who live elsewhere and other non-Chinese tourists.

Some of the modern organizations, utilizing their transnational ties with high level cultural institutions in China, usually organize and sponsor artists and other cultural workers to tour and perform in the Chinese communities around the US. Many Chinese immigrant organizations also participate in major international and domestic cultural events in Beijing as well as in local areas in China. For example, there was a section in Tiananmen Square in Beijing reserved for distinguished guests and leaders of overseas Chinese organizations to view the National Parade. The banners of overseas Chinese organizations from all over the world would be visible in the annual Charity Parade of Zhongshan, one of the main sending communities in Guangdong Province.

How Organizational Transnationalism Matters
So far, we have shown how Chinese immigrant organizations in the US have developed across time and space, how the Chinese state and Chinese immigrant transnational organizations interact with and engage each other in the transnational field. Next, we address how organizational transnationalism matters for the individual, the ethnic community, and the ancestral homeland. Before delving into this issue, we should emphasize that transnationalism only involves a relatively small proportion of the ethnic population while the majority is locally based and strives to move on and up in their new homeland and that the intensity of transnational engagement differ not only from one individual to the next, but also from one organization to the next. Our case study reveals some significant ways in which organizational transnationalism matters.

Effects on the individual

At the individual level, ethnic organizations serve as actual or virtual sites in which members, regardless of where they live, find opportunities to meet in person or on cyberspace, and transnationalism helps expand these opportunities. Interpersonal relations among coethnics beyond ethnic enclaves or ethnoburbs, in turn, strengthen network building across professions and/or class lines. Another organization leader said in an interview,

“In my hometown association, we no longer have members from villages. Our members are so diverse that they we don’t even speak to the same dialect anymore. And we have experts in just about any major professional fields.”

Second, ethnic organizations function as a symbolic stage for members to validate or legitimize an ethnic or cultural identity, which may be marginalized in the host society, and to gain social status recognition or compensate for lost social status in the process of international migration (Min 2008; Li and Zhou 2011). In our field observation, we found that organizational leaders used their symbolic organizational affiliations to assert their status in the community and in the transnational field. Our interviews with both organizational leaders and Chinese officials indicated such functionality. On the one hand, organizational affiliations validated transnational migrants’ identities and allowed them to go beyond their closely-knit family or friendship networks in China, as many potential economic opportunities there were away from sending villages or towns. On the other hand, an official position in an organization carried prestige and power in the ethnic community in the US and in China. Mr. Wang, the president of an alumni association, explained,

“The Chinese are very status-conscious. People’s ranks in their work unit or organizations are important status symbols. In business or in contact with government officials, you must use proper titles, never the first name, to address yourself and people you are interacting. Mr. or Mrs., even Prof. or Dr., would sound too generic and anonymous to carry any weight. So you need to print business cards with your name and some sort of titles in Chinese, such president, director... This not only allows the Chinese to address you properly and comfortably but also shows that you are somebody. You will notice that a business card from a Chinese would have multiple titles to signify the status of the individual.”

This quote points to the symbolic and functional importance of organizations in transnational practices, which is also highly relevant to the economic and social life in the Chinese immigrant community. Moreover, taking up leadership role in transnational
organizations enable leaders to meet officials of vary ranks in China and gain access to material (business opportunities) and symbolic resources (guanxi and honor) from the Chinese government.

Third, ethnic organizations offer an alternative means for civic participation. Because of the language and cultural barriers, Chinese immigrants often find themselves detached from civic organizations in their local community and well as mainstream American society. Hence, they are stereotyped as hard-working individuals with little enthusiasm and interest in civic affairs. A Chinese immigrant man, the leader of a professional organization, said in an interview,

“I have lived in this [white middleclass suburban] neighborhood for 15 years. Never once had I attended the homeowners association meeting and voted there, and never once had I been to a neighborhood picnic or party. I don’t know how to make small talks with my neighbors and don’t them well enough to have a good time ... I rarely went to my kids’ school...”

Yet, the same man would drive 45 miles one way from home to the Chinese ethnoburb to be regularly engaged in activities of his professional organization and ethnic events, whether it was a formal or informal gathering. Many immigrants, especially those who are well-educated, fluent bilingual, and socioeconomic mobile, look to ethnic organizations as a “natural space” or “comfort zone” in which they felt connected and useful.

Four, ethnic organizations serve as incubators for leaders. The president of an alumni association offered insight,

“One cannot just claim to be a leader, s/he must act like one. Folks elected me to be the president of the association, and I didn’t want to do it in the beginning. I never imagined I would be a leader of any sort because I was shy and because I didn’t know how to make a good public speech. Even though my role in this [alumni] organization is purely voluntary, I do have to take initiative and responsibility for planning, organizing, and improvising activities for our members. So the more I got involved, the better I became at it. Now, folks even tease me that I talk too much and that I’m too bossy.”

These organizational leaders are actively involved in domestic politics and community affairs, supporting local politicians by making campaign donations and sponsoring community events, which in turn, add more credibility to the organizations.

However, despite of these positive functions of immigrant organizations, individuals show varied degree of organizational involvement and hence receive unequal benefits from such involvement. Our field observation shows that the male, married, well-educated, and with strong bilingual and bicultural skills are more likely than others to participate and take leadership role in immigrant organizations, transnational or not. Also successful entrepreneurs or established professionals aspiring to become entrepreneurs are more actively involved. In both traditional and modern organizations, serving the survival needs of members is no longer a primary goal and obligation as was for traditional organizations in the past. Leaders, rather than members, are using organization as a mean of building transnational business partnerships or acting as “go-betweens” to better capitalize on economic opportunities in China and the US. In many cases, leaders voluntarily form nonprofit civic organizations and claim leadership roles in order
to advance self-interests, such as building up identity and credibility. Once they firmly establish a foothold or reputation in the community and earn the trust of Chinese government officials and entrepreneurs, they enter into partnerships with businesses on both shores or offer their services as consultants or brokers to promote transnational trade and investment. They travel back and forth between China and the U.S. to establish guanxi with government officials and business people in China and serve as bridges to facilitate Chinese companies to enter the US market and vice versa. They also organize delegations to visit China, seeking economic cooperation and exploring potential business and investment opportunities. Leaders of these organizations are generally received warmly and treated as distinguished guests by the Chinese government and Chinese businesses.

A member of an alumni association said it cynically,

*You think they [the leaders] spend so much time and money for nothing? Oh no. An organizational leadership is a short-cut to power in China. With an organizational title and some legwork, you can get to meet high ranking Chinese officials up close and personal when they visit here or when you go to China. Otherwise, you cannot even make an appointment with the secretary of a local official.*

*Effects on the ethnic community*

At the level of the ethnic community, organizational development and transnationalism contributes to community building. We have argued elsewhere that ethnic organizing is a key mechanism for community building (Zhou and Lee, forthcoming). The Chinese case illustrates how this works. First, immigrant organizations are intrinsically linked to an ethnic enclave or ethnoburb — the physical or symbolic location of the ethnic community. The proliferation of organizations provides building blocks to reinforce the ethnic community’s foundation and reaffirm a sense of identity and symbolism among Chinese immigrants, who may or may not live within the physical confines of the community. For example, San Francisco’s Chinatown, located in a low-income immigrant neighborhood, has continued to serve as a focus point for coethnic interorganizational and interpersonal interactions and transnational engagement because of its long-standing institutional basis; this is true even as the Chinese immigrant population is dispersing into the suburbs. When the Chinese government sends delegations to the US, immigrant organizations in Chinatown serve as local hosts to the Chinese guests by holding welcoming banquets that draw organizations and their members in or outside Chinatown. In turn, leaders of these organizations are treated as distinguished guests by the Chinese government when visiting China.

Second, immigrant organizations are well-connected to or a part of the enclave economy. As we have discussed, most of the leaders of the organizations are entrepreneurs or aspiring entrepreneurs. Organizational transnationalism leads to better economic opportunities for immigrant entrepreneurs and contributes to local economic development by expanding existing businesses. It also facilitates the influx of Chinese capital in the enclave and mainstream economies, making the enclave economy both local (linking to regional and national economies in the US) and global (linking to the Chinese economy beyond). The development of the enclave economy attracts middleclass coethnics living elsewhere (and non-coethnics as well) to support ethnic businesses and participate in community events. This, in turn, promotes cross-class relations and reduces the risk of social isolation in ethnic enclaves or ethnoburbs (Zhou 2009;
As shown in Figure 8, organizational development via transnationalism strengthen the ties between ethnic enclaves and ethoburbs and, by implication, between the sending and receiving countries, transforming the ethnic Chinese community beyond geographic boundaries. An ethnic community with increasing level of institutional completeness has the capacity to generate tangible and intangible resources conducive to immigrant incorporation (Zhou and Lee forthcoming).

Effects on the ancestral homeland

There are multiple ways in which Chinese immigrants engage with their ancestral homeland. In the past, families of overseas Chinese depended on migrant remittances for survival. Today, the familiar and persistent forms of transnational engagement continue to include sending remittances to support family members’ daily needs and/or to build homes, as well as maintaining regular long-distance communications and networking with families and friends. These activities often reflect individual rather than organizational behavior, which fit the characterization of grass-roots transnationalism from below with the intended goals of improving the socioeconomic standing of migrant families left behind. The effects are predictable: Families with incomes from overseas remittances enjoy more material goods beyond the survival threshold and higher socioeconomic status than those with out in the same village or town. In this case, Chinese immigrants are not doing something unique.

What is interesting is the use of remittances for extravagant consumption in newer qiao-xiang (migrant-sending villages). Performing family or holiday rituals, such as weddings and funerals, and building large ancestral homes have become big family events that consume hundreds and thousands of dollars. Migrant families often find themselves in the race to become the best of something—the most extravagant wedding, the most expensive funeral, the tallest/largest house—as a way to display family honor and “face” or to regain loss social status, especially in new migrant villages in Fujian (less so in old sending villages in Guangdong). Meanwhile, signs of depopulation and underdevelopment are visible. In old qiao-xiang in Guangdong, villagers became unproductive and idle because many are in queue to migrate via family sponsorship. In qiao-xiang in the Fuzhou region of Fujian, place of origin for the majority of undocumented Chinese immigrants to the U.S., many young people are finding means, legal or illegal, to migrate abroad.

Also remarkable are social welfare and charitable donations for improvement in public works (roads, bridges, drainage, water supply, and other infrastructure), gates, ancestral halls, and schools, assistance to the elderly and the poor, and scholarship to young people. There are new uses of donation funds, which were rare in the past. These include the construction of office buildings for qiao-lian, public parks, libraries, museums, cultural centers, elderly activity centers, as well as temples and churches. There are also investments in symbolism (statues and monuments) and beautification projects (tree planting) in cities and towns. Unlike remittances, these kinds of donations are usually done via organizations. Both remittances and donations have both direct and indirect effects on local economic development in local industries or small entrepreneurship in retail and on local culture (in consumer behavior, spending patterns, and
culture values). They also in turn compensate for immigrants’ status loss or inconsistency in the host country.

At the early stages of economic reform in China during the 1980s and 1990s, China also relied on its compatriots from the Diaspora to promote and facilitate economic development. In recent years, involvement through transnational organizations has become one of the main patterns among Chinese immigrants. However, effects of organizational transnationalism on the homeland are less clear-cut. One reason is that notions of “hometowns” or “sending villages” have acquired new meanings because of rapid urbanization and economic development in China. Another reason is that that immigrants from China today are of diverse origins; many hail from urban middle-class backgrounds with little attachment to particular rural villages or towns. So impacts on hometown development are minimum or indirect at best.

In lieu of rapid globalization and economic development in China, homeland development, which has long been locally based, has now expanded beyond sending villages or towns and beyond small scale manufacturing and entrepreneurship in the retail trade. New patterns of homeland development impacted by transnationalism include family or clan-based entrepreneurship or investment in lucrative businesses in other regions all over the country, such as direct investments in real estate in major cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Guangzhou), investments in mining and other heavy industries in other regions off coast, including the privatization of state enterprises. Other new forms of activities in which transnational Chinese immigrants are engaged include S&T investment in government-designated zones and parks, in high tech industries such as telecom, bio-tech and “green” engineering, pharmaceuticals and health-related dietary products, film and television production, R&D in higher education and research institutions, investment in education (supplementary schools and language schools for preparing exchange students and emigrants going abroad).

The attitude of Chinese qiaoban or qiaolian officials toward leaders of immigrant organizations (qiaoling) is generally warm and without discrimination. But the officials usually have a good sense who these people are and the nature and significance of their organizations, and they would try to preserve “face” of those opportunist leaders of “fake” organizations. In practice, however, qiao-ban or qiaolian officials tend to know organization leaders who are business people because they can actually see their organizational sites and business establishments when they visit the U.S.

Conclusion

Prior research on Latin American immigrant transnationalism in the United States show that governments of many sending countries have quickly learned the significance of their compatriots’ contributions to the homelands and sought to expand these transnational ties through a series of state-sponsored policies and activities including matching funds for migrant donations to development projects and granting dual nationality, dual citizenship and/or voting rights in national elections to migrants. China, being a one-Party communist country, is unique in its own light. So a systematic study of Chinese immigrant transnational organizations in the U.S. and their effects on homeland development further supplements knowledge gained from Latin American immigrant experiences and offers a clearer picture of the extent, nature, and effects of immigrant transnationalism.

Like other Latin American sending countries, the Chinese government in Beijing and local governments perceives transnational communities in terms of sources of untapped
resources for homeland development (potential sources of financial, human, and social capital for development and investment; philanthropic work). But the Chinese government is also concerned with the national image building and compatriots’ loyalty and commitment to the homeland. While immigrant transnationalism is enthusiastically endorsed and supported by the Chinese government, immigrant transnational organizations tend to operate independently of the Chinese state with dual purposes of immigrant incorporation into the new homeland and development in the ancestral homeland. Traversing the two homelands smoothly entails constant interaction and negotiation between transnationals and the sending state via organizations.
**Table 1: Select Characteristics of China and Chinese America**

**Ancestral Homeland: China**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population, 2012 (million)</td>
<td>1,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent urban population, 2010</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, 2011 ($)</td>
<td>8,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini index of inequality (CIA), 2009</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational attainment, 2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent college graduate or more (aged 25 or over)</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent secondary / technical school graduate</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent unemployment, 2010</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent labor force participation, 2009</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital city</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**New Homeland: Chinese Americans in the U.S.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of Chinese American population, 2009</td>
<td>3,796,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent foreign born, 2009</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Asian American population, 2009</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of legal immigrants admitted to the US, 2000-09</td>
<td>741,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of total legal immigration to the US, 2000-09</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank in total legal immigration, 2009</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent college graduates, 2009 (age 25+)</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent in professional specialty occupations, 2010 (age 16+)</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median household income, 2009 ($)</td>
<td>$69,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent persons living poverty, 2009</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of immigration</td>
<td>Mostly legal, some unauthorized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal cities of immigrant destination</td>
<td>New York (32%); Los Angeles (11%); San Francisco (10%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

- **c** US Census Bureau, 2009 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates.
- **e** Portes and Rumbaut (2006), *Immigrant America*.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Subtotal</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Traditional Organizations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family / clan associations</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hometown associations</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>127</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchant guilds / tong</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modern Organizations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic organizations</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural organizations</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational organizations</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music/arts organizations</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports organizations</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health organizations</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social service organizations</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious organizations</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political organizations</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic / business organizations</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Alumni associations</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>10.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>114</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional associations</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1371</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the authors, 2010.
Table 3: Select Ethnic Chinese Organizations by Orientations, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Entirely US-Oriented</th>
<th>Entirely China Oriented</th>
<th>Transnational</th>
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<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(31%)</td>
<td>(25%)</td>
<td>(44%)</td>
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Source: Phone or face-to-face interviews, conducted by the authors, 2010.
Figure 1: Traditional Chinese Immigrant Organizations

Buildings owned by Traditional Chinese Organizations in San Francisco’s Chinatown (Photo by Min Zhou)

The CCBA building in Los Angeles’ Chinatown (Photo by Min Zhou)
Figure 2: Organizational Structure of the Chinese State in Charge of Overseas Chinese Affairs

Figure 3: Select Photos of Overseas Chinese Youth Root-Search Programs in China
Figure 4: Photos of Select Publications for Overseas Chinese (qiao-kan)

Source: Photos by Min Zhou.
Figure 5: Photos of Mr. Chi in Overseas Chinese Museum of Changle, Fujian

Source: Photos by Min Zhou.
Figure 6: Select Hometown Development Projects

Cultural Center, Houyu Village, Changle, Fuzhou, Fujian (Phone by Min Zhou)

Xiangshan Square, Village Park, Fujian (Photo by Min Zhou)
Figure 7: Overseas Chinese Donations in Baisha Village, Lianjian, Fujian Province

Boards on the wall of the village meeting hall (left: le-juan—freewill donations; right: xi-juan wedding donations) (Photo by Min Zhou)
Figure 8. Transnationalism, Organizational Development, and Community Building: An Analytical Framework

References


Notes

1 This project was supported by the Center for Migration and Development, Princeton University as part of the CIOP, supplemented by funds from Walter & Shirley Wang Endowed Chair at UCLA Asian American Studies Center, UCLA Faculty Research Grants, and Chang Jiang Scholar Chair Professorship at Sun Yat-sen University, China. Dr. Junxiu Wang, Senior Research Scientist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Visiting Scholar at UCLA (2008-09), and Rennie Lee, a doctoral student of sociology at UCLA, offered instrumental research assistance. UCLA undergraduate students Sallie Lin and Lu Xu also provided invaluable assistance in online bilingual data collection and media-archival research. We also benefited from the generous support and cooperation from Chinese immigrant organizations in the U.S. and from the Fujian Academy of Social Sciences and local Qiao-ban, Qiao-lian, and relevant non-governmental organizations in Guangzhou, Jiangmen, Shunde, Zhongshan, and Fuzhou, China. We thank the comments of Alejandro Portes and Roger Waldinger.

2 To fill this gap, three Asian-origin groups—Chinese, Vietnamese, Indian—were selected to supplement the existing Comparative Immigrant Organizations Project (CIOP) spearheaded by Alejandro Portes at the Center for Migration and Development, Princeton University, to compare known patterns of Latin American transnational organizations with patterns of Asian immigrant transnational organizations.

3 Each of these three metropolises publishes an annual edition of Chinese language telephone directories. For example, the 2010 Chinese Consumer Yellow Pages of Southern California contained 2,790 pages.

4 The 2010 census reports that more than half of the Chinese in the U.S. concentrate in the states of California and New York. Each of the three metropolitan areas has maintained a fairly extensive Chinese language telephone directory (the 2010 Chinese Consumer Yellow Pages of Southern California contains 2,790 pages). Even though the ethnic population has grown rapidly in every state since the turn of the 21st century, there are familiar settlement patterns of community development that resemble those in the traditional immigrant gateway cities. Indeed, obtaining a complete national inventory of Chinese immigrant organizations was an impossible task.

5 All interviews were conducted by myself and my research assistant Rennie Lee with the assistance of Junxiu Wang, Lu Xu, and Sallie Lin. Junxiu Wang and Lu Xu also provide valuable assistance in bilingual data collection and transcription between July 2009 and January 2010.

6 All interviews and fieldwork in China were conducted by myself with the assistance of Junxiu Wang between July 2009 and September 2010.

7 Guangdong Province had a population of 83 million as of 2010, the second most populous province in China. It has been one of the two major sources of emigration to Southeast Asia since the 12th century (the other being Fujian Province) and the major source of immigrants to North America since the mid-19th century. More than 30 million people of Chinese ancestry in the world (probably more than half of Chinese Americans) can find their roots in Guangdong Province. The provincial capital city is Guangzhou with a population of 10.2 million.

8 Twenty-five interviews were conducted in Guangdong Province, including interviews various levels of qiao-ban and qiao-lian of Guangdong Province, Guangzhou, Jingmen, Shunde (an administrative district of Foshan City, and Zhongshan City; Guangdong Museum of Overseas

Compared to Guangdong, Fujian Province is much smaller with a population of 35 million as of 2010. Nonetheless, it has been a major source of emigration to Southeast Asia since the 12th century, but to America only since the late 1980s (with a significant number of undocumented migrants, or the “snake people”). The provincial capital city is Fuzhou with a population of 6 million.

Twenty-five interviews were conducted in Fujian Province, including interviews with officials of various levels of Returned Overseas Chinese Association (qiao-lian) of Fujian Province, Fuzhou City, Changle City, Fuqing City, Lianjiang County, Aojiang Town, Guantou Town, Jiangjing Town, Sanshan Town, and Tingjiang Town; Institute for the Study of Chinese Overseas of the Fujian Academy of Social Sciences, Changle Association of New York’s Changle Branch Office, Changle Museum of Overseas Chinese, Baisha Village, Changxi Village, Gongyu Village, Houyu Village, Xiaqi Village, Yangyu Village, and Zelang Village.

Twelve face-to-face interviews were conducted with officials at Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, National Central Committee of Zhi Gong Party, and Western Returned Scholars Association; a focus group discussion with officials at Beijing Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese; and site visits to the Zhongguancun Science and Technology Park.


See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html?countryName=China&countryCode=ch&regionCode=eas&rank=119#ch, viewed on May 2, 2012. By CIA estimates, GDP per capital (PPP) in China was at $8,400, ranked 119th; Mexico was at $15,100, ranked 81st; Colombia at $10,100, ranked 109th; Dominican Republic at $9,300, ranked 115th; India at $3,700, ranked 162nd; and Vietnam, at $3,400, ranked 167th.


The number was 314,896 between 1960 and 1979, 993,679 between 1980 and 1999, and 741,951 between 2000 and 2009. In comparison, the total number of Chinese immigrants legal admitted into the U.S. was 424,034 from 1851 to 1960.

Many of these organizations maintain a Chinese language website: YeongWo (Zhongshan and three other counties) http://www.yeongwo.com/; NingYeung (Taishan), Hainan (Hainan Island which became a province in 1988) http://www.hainamsca.com/.

See http://www.ccbanye.org/, viewed on December 5, 2009.

Ng 2009; see also http://www.ccbala.org.

Village-based hometown association are no longer common since 1990, except for the Fujianese. Because most of the undocumented Fujianese hailed from rural villages, many
established hometown associations based on the village of origin, such as Houyu Village Association.

20 The number of students from Taiwan continued to be high. During the 1980s and 1990s, economic development in Taiwan and the Pacific Rim created many opportunities for American trained students and the trend of return migration was noticeable. However, the number of Taiwanese students who chose to stay continued to be substantial.

21 Calculated from statistics of Chinese exchange students and scholars published in *Chinese Education*, August 23, 1997, p. 1. The number of 95,000 U.S.-bound students/scholars between 1978 and 1991 was not far off the track. According to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 62,000 student visas were issued to the Chinese between 1979 and 1987 fiscal years. Among these exchange students, slightly over half were privately sponsored - not nominated nor supported by the Chinese government. The privately sponsored students were granted F-1 student visas, later adjustment from F-1 non-immigrant status to permanent residency was relatively easy. In contrast, government sponsored students were on J-1 visas. All J-1 visa holders are subject to two year home residence restriction before they can apply for immigration to the United States.

22 The U.S. Senate passed the bill S1216 on May 21, 1992 and the House Judiciary Committee approved it on July 22, 1992. This legislation would allow Chinese nationals who have been afraid to return home after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre to convert their temporary protected status to permanent U.S. residency.


26 We should caution here that a much higher proportion of Chinese immigrant organizations in the ethnic community are entirely US-oriented, but our data collection focuses only on the ones that are sizeable and well-established and have the capacity to be transnational if chosen to do so.


30 After the founding of the PRC in 1949, many nation-states, especially those in Southeast Asia where people of Chinese ancestry are concentrated, cast doubts on the national loyalty and allegiance among overseas Chinese with dual nationality as these countries severed ties with the PRC. See [http://www.zaobao.com/special/newspapers/2005/03/homeway130305.html](http://www.zaobao.com/special/newspapers/2005/03/homeway130305.html) (in Chinese), viewed on February 9, 2011.


See http://www.gdoverseaschn.com.cn/qw2index/sylh/, viewed on January 25, 2010. As of 2009, it held six conventions in Singapore, Guangzhou, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, respectively.


Ibid.


My own participant observation in September 28, 2009. Also see
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-09/30/content_1430365.htm and


Ibid.


Wuhan is the first experimental city for the development of a “Resource-Saving and Environment-Friendly” Civil Society in China (a new Chinese state policy).

Examples can be seen: China Qiao-wang (Overseas Chinese Network):
http://www.chinaqw.com/; World Chinese Business Network:
http://faob.zsnews.cn/QiaoKan_index.asp.
The former president of the CCBA in Los Angeles, Mr. Peter Ng, paid 7 visits to China in 2009, including the one invited by the Chinese government to attend the celebration of the PRC’s 60th birthday parade at Tiananmen Square in Beijing.

The 13th Suey Sing Association Convention and 140th Birthday Celebration Special Issue, Guangzhou, December 3, 2007, p. 6, translated by Zhou.


Interviewed with Mr. Huang, President of Guangdong Tongxiang Hui, Washington D.C., October 2009 in Chinese, translated by Zhou.

Interviewed with Mr. Wang in Los Angeles, January 2010 in Chinese, translated by Zhou.


Interviewed with Ms. Xu in Silicon Valley, Ca., December 2009 in Chinese, translated by Zhou.

Interviewed with Mr. Wang in Los Angeles, January 2010 in Chinese, translated by Zhou.