Hope Turned Sour:

Assessing the Prospects for Second-Generation Incorporation and Mobility

in U.S. New Immigrant Destinations

by

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Abstract

In this paper, I give a brief overview of migration flows and settlement patterns in new immigrant destinations since the 1990s. I explain two main reasons why there are few studies to date of immigrant and second-generation children there. I overview key findings from the few studies on the second generation that do exist, which in my reading uncovered some evidence for optimism in earlier years but are increasingly highlighting areas of concern, including deepening levels of residential and school segregation by race and immigrant status, and legal and political barriers to higher education, work, and political engagement. To me, these findings highlight two key features I have argued distinguish many new immigrant destinations from traditional ones: first, large percentages of immigrants without authorized legal status and, second, sharp negative turns in institutional and political receiving contexts since 2005-06 (Marrow 2013). Ultimately, I argue that lack of legal status and restrictive legal-political contexts of reception are the two key factors likely to dampen key segments of the second generation’s prospects for successful incorporation and upward economic mobility in the future. They may even be likely to outweigh other positive features of new immigrant destination reception and life, including in schools, where it appears that many new destinations have made improvements and “caught up” to traditional ones despite initial resource disadvantages. Once locales offering “strategic holes” of opportunity for inclusion and upward mobility, even for the most disadvantaged of immigrant families (Marrow 2011a), the prospects for intergenerational incorporation in new destinations today appear more uncertain, and more heavily dependent on legal status.
Introduction: Immigrant Arrivals in New Destinations

At the end of the 20th century, the geographic dispersal of immigrants away from traditional settlement areas toward an array of new and nontraditional ones had become one of the most surprising trends in American immigration patterns (Gozdziak and Martin 2005; Massey 2008a; Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008; Waters and Jiménez 2005; Zúñiga and Hernández-León 2005). By definition, new destinations are places with little prior historical experience receiving immigrants. Some, especially in the West and Midwest, are more accurately classified as reemerging destinations (Singer 2004), since they harbored large shares of immigrants in the early 20th century, but saw those shares dwindle by the 1970s, before the forces of geographic dispersal again began to pick up in the 1990s. Other destinations, especially in the South, had less historical experience receiving European, Asian, or Mexican immigrants (Bankston 2007; Marrow 2011b; but see Weise 2015), and so can be considered true emerging areas of immigrant settlement.

As geographic dispersion was driven both by political factors in the 1980s and 1990s (including increased border enforcement in the Southwest and anti-immigrant sentiment in California) and strong economic “pulls” in several new destination industries (such as agriculture, construction, high- and low-level services, and routine manufacturing), it was initially comprised mainly of adult labor migrants, mostly those of Mexican descent (Durand, Telles, and Flashman 2006; Massey and Capoferro 2008), who were often recruited directly by employers or contractors or indirectly through their own social networks (Donato and Bankston 2008; Griffith 1993; 1995; Johnson-Webb 2003; for summaries, see also Marrow 2011a; 2011b). Accordingly, the literature on new destinations has focused most heavily on “Hispanics/Latinos”, especially Mexicans (e.g., Deeb-Sossa 2013; Dreby 2015; Dreby and Schmalzbauer 2013; Ebert and Ovink 2014; Gill 2010; Gordon 2015; Johnson-Webb 2003; Lattanzi Shutika 2005; 2008; 2011; Lay 2012; Marrow 2011a; Millard and Chapa 2004; Murphy, Blanchard, and Hill 2001; Odem and Lacy 2009; Ribas 2016; Schleef and
Cavalcanti 2009; Schmalzbauer 2014; Smith and Furuseth 2006; Stuesse 2016; Smith 2005; 2014; n.d.; Vaquera, Aranda, and Gonzales 2014; Winders 2013)—though some studies highlight other groups, too, such as Somalis, Ukranians, Vietnamese, Indians, Koreans, Chinese, Brazilians, and Middle Easterners (e.g., Brettell and Reed-Danahay 2012; Datel and Dingemans 2008; Fennelly 2005; Fennelly and Orfield 2008; Fisher Williamson n.d.; Hardwick and Meacham 2008; Joshi and Desai 2013; Williams, Steigenga, and Vásquez 2009; Winders 2009; Zhou and Bankston 2017), or track the settlement of high-skilled professional and entrepreneurial immigrants into urban new destinations (e.g., Kim 2016; Kurotani 2005; Oberle and Li 2008; Reimers 2005; Schmid 2003; Subramanian 2005).1 These Hispanic/Latino populations initially hailed from other parts of the United States (such as California and Texas) and included both U.S.-born individuals of Latin American descent as well as secondary migrants who had first settled somewhere else (e.g., Leach and Bean 2008; Lichter and Johnson 2009; Hernández-León and Zúñiga 2000; 2003; 2005; Zúñiga and Hernández-León 2009). Over time, scholars began to study more first-generation arrivals arriving in new destinations directly from Latin America, primarily Mexico but increasingly other parts of Central and South America, too (e.g., Fink 2003; Ribas 2016).

Also over time, many adult migrants in new destinations began to send for other family members abroad, or to form new families and have U.S.-born children. It is likely that some of this “settlement” was a natural result of maturing migration flows, including the “settling out” of (both undocumented and temporary contract) agricultural workers into local populations and a resultant shift from productive to reproductive labor (e.g., Griffith 2008; 2017; Dunn, Shivers, and Aragones 2005). Another part is likely due to increasing southern border enforcement and opportunities for legalization provided by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which encouraged the geographic diversification of immigration and the transformation of a once cyclical and temporary

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1 In my own research site, North Carolina, the seven most commonly spoken foreign languages reported in the U.S. Census in 2000 were Spanish, French, German, Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean, and Arabic.
stream of predominantly male Mexican laborers into a national one comprised of more women and children (Massey 2008a; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). Indeed, Lattanzi Shutika (2011) not only documented an upsurge in the numbers of Mexican immigrants settling in the new immigrant destination of Kennett Square, Pennsylvania after IRCA, she also noted that more started to settle down permanently and bring wives and children, too. Further, by 2000-05 natural increase (i.e., children born here) already accounted for more than half of all Hispanic population growth in nonmetropolitan America (Johnson and Lichter 2008; Lichter 2012; Lichter, Sanders, and Johnson 2015), a proportion likely to have risen higher following the 2008 global recession and possibly again in the wake of President Trump’s inauguration in 2017.

Collecting Data on the Second Generation in New Destinations

Despite these patterns of increasing permanent settlement and family formation in new destinations, to date few scholars have studied the 1.5 or second generation in them, for two key reasons. First, as mentioned, adult labor migrants dominated the early flows, and children were either not born yet, still lived abroad, and/or were still too young to be examined during their newborn, elementary, or even middle school years. Certainly, few had approached their “transitions to adulthood” from high school into college or work, which scholars studying the second generation consider critical. Second, migrant populations in new destinations, especially rural ones, tend to be smaller and/or much more geographically dispersed than those located in major gateway cities. This presents challenges for scholars attempting to construct viable and representative samples not only of migrant adults, but also their children, especially if they want to give adequate attention to other key variables like national origin and gender. The model large-scale studies of the second generation conducted in the 1990s and 2000s, including the CILS, NYSGP, IIMMLA, and even the MASP all had the benefit of being able to sample 1.5 and 2nd-generation children born not only to much larger
national-origin immigrant groups who had arrived earlier (since 1965, or sometimes even earlier) but who are also more densely concentrated in specific metropolitan regions (Bean, Brown, and Bachmeier 2015; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, and Waters 2004; Kasinitz et al. 2008; Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2008; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; 2014; Rumbaut and Portes 2001; Telles and Ortíz 2008; Zhou et al. 2008). In contrast, migration into new destinations peaked in the 1990s, declining somewhat in the 2000s and 2010s (see Marrow 2011b), and so most 1.5 and second-generation children in them either did not arrive, or were not born, until the 1990s at the earliest. That they live in a variety of suburbs, small towns, and rural areas throughout the country means that scholars, understandably attempting to juggle cost constraints with the challenge of “finding needles in a haystack”, have so far resorted to nonrandom and nonrepresentative quantitative and qualitative samples, often in new destination areas where immigrants and their children are visible and/or concentrated (e.g., Gonzales and Ruiz 2014; Hernández-León and Morando Lakhani 2013; Perreira, Fuligni, and Potochnick 2010; Silver 2012; 2015). Of course such studies provide us with very useful information, which I describe further below. Plus, U.S. Census data now show that Hispanic immigration into rural America (arguably the most dispersed and thus hardest to capture representatively) is highly concentrated into a comparatively small percentage of counties dominated by single industries like food processing (Lichter 2012), which could make honing in on them especially promising. Still, Kasinitz et al. (2008) caution that local (even metro-wide) samples do not capture all of the second generation, especially those growing up in areas of low density. Further, local area of settlement may itself be related to various outcome variables of interest in new destinations, as is also the case in gateway cities.

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2 Between 2000 and 2010, just 8 percent of midwestern counties and 10 percent of southern counties accounted for over 50 percent of nonmetropolitan Hispanic population growth in each region, respectively (Lichter 2012).
For these reasons, in my own work I have argued that any discussion of immigrant assimilation in new destinations remains to some degree speculative, because assimilation, whether considered a process or an outcome, occurs over too long a period of time to be assessed accurately in these locales today. Though some researchers have focused on the very young second-generation children of foreign-born immigrants (Cebulko and Silver 2016; Dreby 2015; Gonzales and Ruiz 2014; Gouveia and Powell 2007; Martinez 2014; Hernández-León and Morando Lakhani 2013; Perreira, Fuligni and Potochnick 2010; Schmalzbauer 2014; Silver 2012; 2015; Smith 2005; 2014; n.d.; Tran and Valdez 2016), immigrants have simply not resided in new destinations long enough to allow for a definitive analysis of intergenerational assimilation. Such an analysis will not be possible until the contemporary second generation comes of age and produces a third and fourth generation (Marrow 2013). Nonetheless, we gather together today precisely to lay out the agenda for moving in this direction: to assess the current state of the literature on immigration flows and responses to them in new destinations; to identify key issues and trends relating to incorporation/exclusion in the first generation; and to develop a longer-term research agenda for assessing the positioning of the second generation.

State of Knowledge: Immigrant Positioning, Backlash, and Implications for Youth

My own research has examined broad trends in the social environment of rural and southern new destinations, with an eye toward their implications for Hispanics/Latinos’ economic, racial, institutional, and political incorporation or exclusion (see Marrow 2011a; 2017). Key to my work has been looking at variation in these locales’ economic, demographic, institutional, and even temporal contexts in order to consider what such variation entails for Hispanics/Latinos’ experiences and outcomes in the (early) first generation. While I cannot do justice to my full findings here, I do want to highlight two features that I argue distinguish many new immigrant
destinations from traditional ones, and that are likely to impinge upon the experiences of the second
generation, too.

First, due to spatial-temporal correlations between immigrants’ period of entry, legal status,
and settlement in new destinations, especially among Mexicans, new destinations have higher
proportions of undocumented immigrants among their total foreign-born populations than do
traditional destinations (Passel 2005; Passel and Cohn 2009). In other words, lack of legal status is a
more salient characteristic of new immigrant destination communities not merely at an individual
level but also at a group level. Understood within the segmented assimilation model, this could
represent a forceful interweaving of negative governmental, economic, and social “contexts of
reception” for immigrants in new destinations, particularly rural ones where Latinos tend to be more
heavily Mexican and rural in origin and to have greater experience working in agriculture, yet also be
more disadvantaged in terms of their formal levels of education, English-speaking ability,
occupational and industrial concentration, income levels, and even experience participating in
politics (Kandel and Cromartie 2004; Marrow 2011a; Perreira, Fuligni and Potochnick 2010; Torres,
Popke, and Hapke 2006; Stull and Broadway 2004; Stull, Broadway, and Griffith 1995). Even if
individual migrants have legal status or U.S. citizenship, higher proportions of their families and also
their surrounding coethnic communities will not, effectively weakening their ability to serve as
protective resources (Portes and Bach 1985; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Even if understood within
revised assimilation theory (Alba and Nee 2003), in new destinations lack of legal status—both at
the individual and group level—fundamentally lowers immigrants’ starting points for achieving
economic success, social inclusion, and political representation over time and generations. It not
only changes the proximal causal mechanisms underlying assimilation—by weakening immigrants’
available forms of human, financial, social, and cultural capital—but also the distal ones—by
hardening the formal rules and laws under which immigrants make their everyday decisions about work, education, and civic activity (Marrow 2013).

Second, if we consider new destinations as a whole, and perhaps most especially rural and/or southern ones, they have experienced very sharp and swift negative turns in their institutional and political receiving contexts since 2005-06 (see Marrow 2011a: Conclusion; 2013; 2017). Indeed, a substantial body of literature now documents whites and blacks reacting to Latino newcomers warmly or paternalistically (at best) to neutrally or ambivalently or occasionally negatively (at worst) in the 1980s to early 2000s (e.g., Hernández-León and Zúñiga 2005; Griffith 2005; Lattanzi Shutika 2005; 2008; 2011; Marrow 2011a; Massey 2008b; McDermott 2011a; 2011b; 2016; Rich and Miranda 2005; Winders 2008; Zúñiga and Hernández-León 2001). Immediately after this critical period, however, scholars employing both observational and interview techniques began to document a sharp turn, as U.S.-born natives’ curiosity, confusion, and even uncertainty about who Latino newcomers were, and what impacts their presence would wield, morphed quickly into racialization, resentment, and threat, especially among whites (see López-Sanders 2009; n.d.; McDermott 2011a; 2011b; 2016).

What happened during these two years, and why were they so critical? Broadly speaking, whereas immigration enforcement was relatively lax in new destinations prior to 2005—sometimes even cited as draw for living there—it ramped up nationally through the years following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, ultimately triggering immigrants’ rights marches in spring 2006. This was followed by a nativist backlash of its own (Portes and Rumbaut 2014), which was directed primarily at Latino immigrants and especially harsh in new destinations with small immigrant populations (McDermott 2011b; 2016). Immigration continued to become a more salient issue nationally after 2006, with anti-immigrant rhetoric among politicians and media piquing between 2008 and 2010 (Hopkins 2010), and arguably again since 2015-17. Restrictive laws and policies snowballed, particularly in new
destination states and localities like Arizona, Alabama, Georgia, Hazleton PA, Herndon VA, and Farmers Branch, TX (e.g., Brettell and Nibbs 2010; Flores 2014; Lattanzi Shutika 2011; Luebke 2011; Quiroga, Medina, and Glick 2014), powered largely by white (not black) politicians and legislators (Browne et al. 2013; B. E. Smith 2009). Interior enforcement continued to intensify through the 2010s, with various new destination states and localities among the first to join 287(g) in the late-2000s (Aranda, Menjívar and Donato 2014; Armenta 2012; 2016; 2017a; 2017b; Coleman 2012; Donato and Rodríguez 2014; Furuseth and Smith 2010; Maldonado 2014; Provine et al. 2016; Stuesse and Coleman 2014). Also starting in the mid-2000s, the REAL ID Act eliminated undocumented immigrants’ access to driver’s licenses; several southern states began restricting undocumented immigrants’ access to higher education (Cebulko and Silver 2014; Silver 2012; Stella and Flores 2009; Yablon-Zug and Holley-Walker 2009), and deportations climbed above 250,000 per year. Compounding political developments, the 2008 recession would constrict job opportunities across a number of sectors important to poor and working-class African Americans and Latinos, including food processing, manufacturing, and construction. Indeed, scholars now refer to 2005 as the year when Mexico’s “Great Migration” era (1995-2005) came to a close (Hernández-León and Zúñiga 2016; Hernández-León, Lakhani, and Zúñiga 2017), transitioning to the “Great Expulsion” era, which continues to the present (Rumbaut 2017).

Altogether, this intensifying immigrant marginalization since 2005-06 not only to have activated threat and reaction among whites (e.g., Flores 2014) and blocked Latino youth’s opportunities for intergenerational mobility despite even their white mentors’ supportive efforts (e.g., Silver 2012), as I detail further below, but also to have moved opinion among blacks, especially black elites, who now recognize Latino immigrants as the group “most discriminated against” in public opinion polls and interviews (despite blacks’ own feelings of continued racial discrimination). Several studies show that blacks now appear more likely to see and frame commonalities in experience and opportunities for
coalition-building with Latino immigrants than was the case prior (see Brown, Jones, and Becker 2017; Browne, Deckard, and Rodriguez 2016; Jones 2012; Marrow 2017; Waters, Kasinitz, and Asad 2014; Wilkinson and Bingham 2016; Williams 2016; Williams and Hannon 2016).

In my assessment, the intersection of these two features—first, the depth and prevalence of illegality, and second, an extremely sharp backlash in political/institutional context toward immigrants, especially undocumented ones—has the potential to shape the fates not only of the first but also the second generation of Latinos in new destinations in the near and farther future. Whereas scholarship investigating, for example, new destinations before 2005 was more optimistic, albeit cautiously so, regarding Latinos’ opportunities for upward mobility and integration within southern economic and social life at that time (e.g., see Hernández-León and Zúñiga 2005; Marrow 2011a; Striffler 2005, among others), scholarship conducted in new destinations across the country after 2006 poignantly documents Latinos’ rising levels of fear, sharpening perceptions of institutional and interpersonal mistreatment, and frustration with blocked doors (e.g., Armenta 2017b; Dreby 2015; Fernández-Kelly 2017; Ribas 2016; Schmalzbauer 2014). Indeed, even though many Latino adults in my own new destination sites of rural North Carolina were disadvantaged in the early 2000s by the factors listed above, including lack of legal status as well as what Schmalzbauer (2014) calls rural infrastructure “service gaps” to adapt to and serve them, I found substantial evidence that even many of those working in food processing jobs were at least achieving economic stability, and a few even upward mobility, and had optimistic hopes for their children. I even argued that living in rural new destinations, where rural host populations also have relatively low educational levels, work in agriculture at high rates, work in high-skilled professional and technical jobs at low rates, earn relatively low wages, and often live in poverty, could theoretically decrease the distance newcomers have to travel to “assimilate” to local norms and status positioning,
compared to how far they would have to move to approach the mainstream “norm” in more sophisticated urban and suburban settings (Marrow 2011a).

Public schools, too, I found were among the best and first (though certainly not perfect; Hernandez-León and Zúñiga 2005 even call them “reluctant”) responders to these Latino newcomers and their children’s needs. Indeed, K-12 teachers and administrators in both of the counties I studied in rural eastern North Carolina were already voicing concerns that some Hispanic youth were, instead of falling behind, beginning to outpace the local historically disadvantaged black populations in educational attainment. This was the case even as they noted other Latino students were struggling to adapt to life and school in the U.S. (especially if they arrived during high school) or dropping out. Many of these educators, and even some health and law enforcement officials, espoused and invoked what I termed inclusive professional missions to reach, educate, serve, and protect all members/residents of their communities, immigrants and their children included (see also Jones-Correa 2008 in the Washington, D.C. suburbs). More than anything, I argued, it was restrictive national-level immigration law and policy that impeded Latinos’ incorporation and progress in these rural southern counties in the early 2000s, not necessarily local-level barriers (Marrow 2009; 2011a). I painted K-12 schools here, like elsewhere, as often serving as incorporative agents, protective havens, and nurturing environments even for undocumented youth, who research shows will likely begin to experience greater anxiety, fear, apprehension, and exclusion as they approach graduation and begin to think about how to navigate their transition into other realms (Abrego 2006; Gleeson

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3 See also Griffith (2008) and Winders (2015: Chapters 5-6) on schools’ ambivalent and contested responses to new immigration-driven diversity.

4 Educational responsiveness to new immigrant populations in new destinations is a fruitful area. Inquiry could include transformations and responses not simply among typical K-12 public schools and universities, but also Migrant Education Programs, community colleges, and other vocational and GED programs that are prevalent in rural areas. As the nation’s political landscape changes, it may also need to pay attention to charter schools, private schools, and even home schooling too. In my own research, I found few bilingual or dual immersion programs in rural eastern North Carolina.

Data among second-generation populations in other new destinations support these cautiously optimistic interpretations in the pre-2005 period. In 2004-05 in Omaha, Nebraska Gouveia and Powell (2007) found that second-generation immigrants, including Mexicans, had made substantial educational progress over the positions of their parents. Their findings offered significant reason to be optimistic that these youth can potentially translate this educational progress into upward economic mobility in the future, in a city lacking segregation and crime levels characteristic of many established gateways. Still, they pointed out that 55 percent of first-generation high school students, and 38 percent of second-generation ones, reported needing to work to help their parents out financially; that 70 percent of Latino children surveyed said they would need a scholarship to be able to attend college; and that the youth were also unable to benefit from parental help with their studies because their parents were working long hours. So too were they concerned about a “growing climate of rejection toward Hispanics”, state and local policies that are producing de jure or de facto residential and school segregation within the city, “real or perceived barriers to [higher] education”, including the ability to pay and, for undocumented youth, attend at all.

In Dalton, Georgia—the “carpet capital of the world”—Hernández-León and Morando Lakhani (2013) also found that second-generation Mexican Americans were making significant occupational progress by 2008-09. Roughly ten years after entering the labor market, these young adults had been able to deploy their human capital (e.g., high school degrees, some college education, and/or bicultural and bilingual language skills) to access better jobs than their parents. Sometimes this was in white-collar positions in insurance firms and banks, where their bilingual skills were valuable to employers looking to expand client bases or communicate with customers; sometimes they were for supervisor and trainer positions within the immigrant-heavy carpet
manufacturing niche, where bilingual skills were also valuable to employers, but more for negotiating and controlling workforce needs. Either way, both groups earned higher wages per hour than their parents, or than they had initially earned in their first jobs, which many had begun in high school to help contribute to their families’ finances.

Still, it may be worth noting that Mexican immigration in Dalton, much like its counterparts into Kennett Square, PA (see Lattanzi-Shutika 2005; 2008; 2011) and New York City (see Smith 2005a; 2005b; 2014; n.d.) began relatively early, with first arrivals coming in the 1980s and early 1990s, and later flows continuing into the present. This means that members of the first second-generation cohort (and/or their parents) may be more likely to have had the opportunity to legalize their status through IRCA in 1986 or to have U.S. citizenship themselves, compared to children of later arrivals, who are more likely to be undocumented (Lattanzi Shutika 2011: 26; Smith n.d.). Hernández-León and Morando Lakhani also point out that these youth’s bilingual skills prove especially valuable in Dalton today precisely because they are members of this first second-generation cohort to come of age, unencumbered by serious competition from other coethnics, at least yet. Additionally, it is worth noting that Hernández-León and Morando Lakhani document heavily gendered educational and economic opportunity ladders and paths. Not only had a higher proportion of second-generation men than women dropped out of high school, and far fewer men than women completed at least one semester of college education. Second-generation women were also eschewing the carpet industry where many of their mothers labor, often because of sexual discrimination, for “pink-collar” service occupations such as health aides, insurance agents, or sales associates. Their male counterparts, by contrast, were much more likely to make use of internal mobility ladders within the carpet industry, which began to decline in the 2000s, even before the 2008 global recession. Thus, while Hernández-León and Morando Lakhani document evidence of what revised assimilation scholars would call “short-distance” (Alba and Nee 2003; Waldinger and
Feliciano 2004; Waldinger, Lim, and Cort 2007) educational and occupational mobility for this second generation of working-class Mexicans in Dalton, they suggest that in the future, women may be better positioned to withstand the region’s continuing transition to a deindustrialized economy where opportunities in carpet manufacturing may not be as plentiful as they were in decades prior. Some of these young adult males already speak of perhaps becoming police officers or nurses, though most remain in the carpet plants for now.

Robert C. Smith’s (2005a; 2005b; 2014) analysis of Mexican youth in the new (Mexican) destination of New York City show some parallels and differences with the situation in Dalton. A long-standing immigrant gateway, but nonetheless one where the category “Mexican” has no readily-defined mental categories and stereotypes like it does in the historically-Mexican U.S. Southwest. Smith finds that some Mexican American youth, especially females, are exhibiting signs of “ethnicization” instead of “racialization” as they move up the educational and occupational ladders. In college, they work part-time in private-sector jobs, where their Mexican ethnicity is cool and chic rather than stigmatized. As they begin to transition into the labor market, they too enter a host of “pink-collar” service sector jobs (e.g., medical or legal secretaries, travel agents) that offer benefits and “clean work” (2005a). On the other hand, a larger proportion of Mexican American youth, especially males, are not upwardly mobile, but rather are getting stuck in the same types of jobs as their parents, often in factories, and their Mexican ethnicity is more strongly racialized. In between these two paths—upward mobility and ethnicization, versus either stagnation or downward mobility and racialization—Smith also documents small proportions of Mexican American youth following what he calls upwardly-mobile “cosmopolitan” (especially for women), “black Mexican”, and “nerd” pathways. Fleshing out the “black Mexican” pathway in more detail, Smith (2014) shows how

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5 See also Marrow (2011a; 2011b); McDermott (2011a; 2011b) on this in early stages of migration in the South. Increasingly since 2005-06, Hispanics/Latinos and Mexicans in the South have been framed as racialized criminals (see also Brown, Jones, and Becker 2017).
identifying as black at strategic points in the life course is a way for some Mexican Americans in New York to avoid the increasing nation-wide association of Mexican-ness (especially phenotype) with illegality and downward mobility by drawing on a black pan-minority and middle-class culture of mobility prevalent there instead. While these results suggest optimistically that a Mexican culture of mobility is indeed developing in New York City (2014: 541), and while Mexican Americans in New York, both in the first and second generations, often distance themselves from the city’s historic racial minorities, Puerto Ricans and African Americans, Smith (2005a) also notes rising indicators of social distress in Mexican communities there, including their increasing residential overlap with these same racialized minority populations and rising rates of teenage pregnancy and gang activity, especially in zoned “Mexican” high schools. He also worries, as does Lattanzi Shutika (2011), that newer arrivals, more likely to lack legal status, will be more likely to fall victim to what he calls the country’s 30+-year natural experiment in cruelty, as viable pathways to legalization have been virtually closed off since 1986 (n.d.). In short, pathways toward upward mobility among his respondents are dependent on context, including gender, economy, and legal status.

Taking a different tack to examine K-12 educational institutions’ responses to new immigrants from the 1980s to mid-2000s, Marschall (2017) gathered quantitative data on (a) English language and subject matter instruction, (b) staffing to accommodate limited English proficient (LEP) students, and (c) school outreach to LEP parents from the National Center for Educational Statistics Schools and Staffing Surveys between 1987 and 2007. Surprisingly, she finds “no difference” in the type of instructional programs offered between new destination and other types of K-12 schools, once covariates are controlled for. Instead, schools in new destinations engage in significantly more outreach (i.e., providing translation, interpreters, and general outreach) to LEP parents than do schools in established gateway cities, and schools with smaller shares of Hispanic teachers and Asian or Latino principals offer significantly more outreach programs for LEP parents.
These findings lead Marschall to suggest that, at least before 2007, shortages in ESL/bilingual education in new destinations were “no worse” than in other parts of the country, and that they appeared to be are easily filled through recruitment efforts. She even surmises that newcomers’ novelty, and/or the fact that new destination schools know they cannot rely on an extensive coethnic community to do such outreach informally (due to language and cultural barriers), could provide impetus for schools to respond proactively, and through formal routes, to immigrant children despite their initial resource disadvantages.

Of course, the situation in higher education policy and responsiveness may be different. While several traditional immigrant receiving states and even some midwestern and western new destination ones have passed policies since 2001 to allow undocumented residents to attend at in-state tuition rates, some even passing additional policies to grant state-appropriated funds to provide them financial aid (Abrego 2008; Gonzales and Ruiz 2014), so far southern new destinations stand out for having state legislatures who have blocked the undocumented’s access to in-state tuition, as sometimes even their access to college wholesale (Flores and Chapa 2009; Gonzales 2017). New quantitative research shows that Latino youth who are likely to be undocumented do indeed enroll in college at higher rates, and do better once they are there, in states that have in-state tuition policies, especially if these students live in metropolitan areas (Flores 2010; Flores and Chapa 2009; Flores and Horn 2009). My own fieldwork in North Carolina suggests that much of this restriction happens in the realm of southern state and local politics, whereas many educational bureaucrats in universities, community colleges, and other programs often work harder to be more inclusive, sometimes coming direct conflict with their political directives (Marrow 2009; 2011a).

Nevertheless, perhaps these kinds of “catch up” strategies on the part of K-12 actors and institutions in new destinations help to explain two other sanguine sets of findings regarding Latino youth’s educational and economic trajectories. First, Dondero and Muller (2012) use the 1999-2000
Schools and Staffing Survey and the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 to compare public high schools in new and established Latino destinations. On one hand, they find that schools in new destinations do offer fewer linguistic support services than schools in established destinations, and that there appears to be a larger within-school Latino white gap in advanced math course taking in new than established destinations. However, they also find that schools in new destinations display more favorable educational contexts according to a number of measures of quality of education and teacher, including higher levels of SES, higher graduation and college-going rates, and lower perceived problems than schools. Second, drawing on nationally-representative 2008-2012 Current Population Survey data, Tran and Valdez (2015) find no statistically significant difference in the mobility paths of second-generation Mexicans (the only national origin group large enough to compare) living in new destinations versus those living in traditional gateways by the late 2010s. While they find second-generation Mexican Americans in new destinations are indeed economically disadvantaged compared to white and black natives, and also to Mexican Americans in established gateways, there are no statistical differences in mobility outcomes by immigrant generation. Instead, it appears that all second-generation residents of new immigrant destinations (white, black, and Mexican American alike) are worse off socioeconomically than comparable second-generation residents of the same race in established gateways, and that opportunities for second-generation Mexican Americans’ economic mobility over the positions of the first generation are statistically similar in both sets of locales. In other words, Tran and Valdez argue that economic opportunity in new destinations does reflect these areas’ distinctive occupational structures, which are often heavily oriented around one industry alone (see Lichter 2012), but not merely for second-generation Mexican Americans. The second generation’s opportunities for upward mobility, they imply, are relatively similar in both types of destination.
Studies of immigrant youth in new destinations conducted after 2005-06 still exhibit similarities with those above, but as nativist backlash and immigration enforcement have expanded and deepened, as did Lattanzi-Shutika (2011) and Smith (2014; n.d.) they increasingly voice concern. In comparable academic adaptation surveys of the academic aspirations of Latino 9th graders attending nine high-growth, Latino-heavy high schools in NC in 2006-07, versus Latino-dominant schools in the traditional gateway city of Los Angeles, Perreira, Fuligni, and Potochnick (2010) find that Latino youth in North Carolina display higher academic motivation than do those in Los Angeles. Regression analysis and mediation tests show that part of this is due to the fact that more Latino youth in North Carolina are first-generation immigrants, as opposed to second- and later-generation Latino Americans, with stronger senses of both ethnic identification and family obligation that derive from that new migrant status. Not only do these senses of ethnic identity and family obligation bolster the North Carolina youth’s academic aspirations directly; they also bolster them indirectly by producing more positive reports of school experiences, including daily positive experiences with and treatment by peers and encouragement by teachers and other adults. Importantly, Perreira, Fuligni, and Potochnick find that all of these factors counterbalance the North Carolina youth’s higher reports of personal discrimination and stronger worry about the likelihood of discrimination. So while their findings are largely positive, it is not difficult to infer that heightened perceptions of discrimination in the current context are likely. According to their data, such perceptions were already high in 2006-07 and served to lower Latino youth’s academic aspirations, only counterbalanced by a multitude of other protective factors at the individual, family, and institutional (school) levels.

Examining somewhat older Latino youth’s transition to adulthood in “Allen Creek”, a small town community in central North Carolina, between 2007 and 2011, Silver (2012) also shows that even in spite of an increasingly reactive state political climate, intensifying immigration enforcement,
and national inertia over immigration reform, Latino youth have benefitted from extremely supportive teachers, coaches, family employers, and community members—precisely the kind of “very significant others” who Portes and Fernández Kelly (2008) argue are crucial for the incorporation of disadvantaged immigrant youth (see also Fernández Kelly 2017; Gonzales 2015; Schmalzbauer 2014; Smith 2008). Ultimately, Silver argues that the geographic and social features of small-town new destination contexts—their high levels of social cohesion, strong social ties, strong community solidarity, and high densities of acquaintance—facilitate the development of social networks and social capital between these Latino youth and their (mainly white) hosts, helping them to leverage educational opportunities and lead the youth, even undocumented ones, to develop a strong sense of belonging in the local community. Paradoxically, Silver (2015) points out that it is white hosts’ vision and understanding of Latinos as more “foreign” and structurally disenfranchised than “insider” African American students that makes them not only more supportive of Latinos’ development of ethnic affinity groups at the high school, but also more likely to reach out and develop supportive social network ties with Latinos than with blacks, in school and church contexts.6

The major impediment to these youth’s incorporation and mobility, Silver found, is not local-level hostility, but rather national-level immigration laws that classify them as undocumented and restrict their ability to attend college, pay for college if and when they can go, work, drive, and more. The undocumented youth she studied, paradoxically, feel very closely connected to their local communities but excluded from the national polity (see also Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, and Waters 2004; Kasinitz et al. 2008 on the second-generation’s stronger local attachment to New York than national

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6 See Deeb-Sossa (2013) for a similar argument among white health personnel in a North Carolina community clinic, who construct adult Latino clients as “needier” and more deserving of care than African American ones. However, the findings do not match those of Lash (2017), who reports staff and teachers in a diversified school on the West coast effectively incorporating African Americans as true “insiders”, yet excluding both Latinos and Asian Americans, despite their professed desires to include them.
attachment to the United States). Silver argues that some experienced positive educational and economic outcomes because of the close cross-group connections they developed with natives than would have been possible in larger, less dense gateways—in a sense making the transition to adulthood more varied than scholars have documented thus far. Nonetheless, many undocumented youth still had to join their parents in manufacturing plants after graduation, or work in food and domestic service jobs, like their parents. Thus, despite their connection to native hosts, who tried their best to help them but often found their “hands tied” (on how restrictive government policies handcuff even inclusive-oriented public bureaucrats, see Marrow 2009; 2012), lack of legal status flattened their mobility pathways in higher education and the labor market much like it has been found to do in traditional destinations (see Abrego 2006; Gonzales 2011; 2015; Gonzales, Terriquez, and Ruszczyk 2014). The youth reported feeling “stuck”, uncertain, “missing”, “transparent”—frozen in time and space without a sense of belonging.

In the rural Midwest and West, similar themes emerge. Schmalzbauer (2014) found many 1.5 and second-generation Mexican youth in southwestern Montana creating “special bonds” with their native high school teachers and mentors, who in turn often helped them navigate educational and other decisions as well as urged them toward college. Many of these youth view schools as welcoming places or safe havens, yet at the same time “do not live freely” (p. 116) because of the limitations that unauthorized status places on their opportunities and range of movement, particularly in a rural and predominantly white state where Mexican children are becoming increasingly aware of their “hypervisibility” (i.e., racialized as nonwhites) and “hyperaudibility” (i.e., when they speak Spanish) as immigration enforcement has intensified over time, and as anti-immigrant sentiment has deepened.\footnote{For more on this argument among first-generation adults, see Maldonado (2014) in Perry, Iowa. There, she found that intensifying immigration enforcement and anti-immigrant sentiment had elevated fear and anxiety levels among adult Latinos in 2006-08. They reported receiving “hate stares” not just from authority figures...} According to Schmalzbauer, many of the issues that shape
immigrant children’s lives in rural Montana are similar to those that shape immigrant children’s lives elsewhere—illegality, social marginalization, fear, and extraordinary familial responsibilities. But this new destination area’s rurality, its expansive geography, and its racial and cultural homogeneity “magnify” these children’s experiences in a multitude of ways, such as by intensifying the need for them to act as their parents’ school, medical, and legal brokers and interpreters (due to institutional “service gaps” or long geographic distances to what services are available), which in turn increases the potential for dissonant acculturation, or their need to serve as teachers and tutors for their siblings (at school) or even parents (in learning English). Many of the youth she studied worked to assist the family’s finances, often with their parents at their parents’ jobs. Lack of legal status (whether among parents or children) produces a range of “chilling effects” for them, decreasing children’s access to and usage of benefits and service to which they are legally entitled, including free and reduced lunches.

Interestingly, the emotional and health burdens she found that these children experience appear related to the intersection of illegality and political/institutional context of reception. Some children had become “hyperaware” of either their own or their parents’ legal statuses at very early ages, often taking on their stress, chronic anxiety, and fear of immigration enforcement—including while driving, as there is little public transportation infrastructure to speak of in rural Montana. While many children characterized rural Montana as “safe” in comparison to inner-city urban gateway life, they nonetheless harbored a keen understanding of it as “unsafe” from the threat of but by local natives in public spaces, such as grocery stores and walking down the street, in that predominantly white small town. Several began withdrawing from public life and opportunities for intergroup contact, doing their grocery shopping late at night, leaving their houses only when absolutely necessary for work or to see the doctor, or even avoiding highway travel to steer clear of the police. Others began practicing noise regulation when around Anglos, aware of how the latter react not only to their visible but also audible presence. Maldonado suggests that these patterns not only create stronger temporal as well as geographic segregation between Latinos and nonLatinos at the micro level (see also Hiemstra 2008 on micro-level temporal segregation in Leadville, Colorado), but also encourage intraethnic competition and distrust among Latinos themselves. While she does not speculate on the impacts for the second generation, one might infer negative outcomes.
enforcement, deportation, and family separation by the early 2010s. Despite “liking” the area, several of these children felt alone and isolated due to a combination of illegality, racialization, and small coethnic community size. Some were even physical targets of ICE raids during Schmalzbauer’s interviews with them (see pp. 129-30).

Overall, Schmalzbauer’s findings appear to concur with those of Silver (2012), Perreira, Fuligni, and Potochnick (2010) and even Gouveia and Powell (2007); despite the fact that many of these youth like rural Montana, like their schools, report generally positive relations with their classmates at school, and feel like valued members of their school communities, they also feel excluded, alienated, and frustrated in their lives more generally. Rural new destination schools, Schmalzbauer writes, are overall doing quite well to make Mexican youth feel worthy and at home; they structure their lives, and generate intergroup contact and friendships with natives (especially when there is only one shared high school, for example), but the youth’s financial and legal constraints, combined with long geographic distances, depress their participation in extracurricular activities beyond the classroom and divide their lives from those of native youth during summers when school is not in session. Particularly in schools with high levels of economic inequality, she finds, Mexican youth are the targets of taunts and epithets for “being Mexican”, their skin color, speaking Spanish, and their alleged legal status (e.g., “you skipped the border”). And educational and economic pathways among the children appear to be diverging by nativity, citizenship, and legal status as well as gender (Bean, Brown, and Bachmeier 2015; Hernández-León and Morando Lakhani 2013; Smith 2005a; 2005b; 2014; n.d.). Those born in the U.S. or who have legal status are thriving, whereas thought without legal status are encountering more barriers to completing their education, continuing with higher education, or securing good jobs. Boys are reporting more problems with bullying and stereotyping, dropping out of school, and working in the same industries (construction or agriculture) as their parents.
Schmalzbauer’s findings are also similar to, yet notably more optimistic than, those of Gonzales and Ruiz (2014), who analyzed Latino high school and college students of various backgrounds in rural central and western Washington state in 2009-11. There, Gonzales and Ruiz also found evidence of chronic anxiety, stress, and fear among the youth in regards to heightened immigration enforcement and deportations, some of which the youth had even experienced personally, already throwing their educational trajectories off kilter and straining their emotional well-being. Further, Gonzales and Ruiz found evidence that rural geography “accentuated” the kinds of barriers and challenges other undocumented youth in large cities also face, resulting in what they call a “constellation of rural disadvantage”. For one, the youth’s high poverty levels and proximity to agricultural work (where many of their parents were employed) meant many were growing up with minimal parental supervision or mentoring, or often even reducing school time to join their parents in the fields at a young age. Watching their parents perform agricultural work dampened many of their feelings of belonging, and even gave some serious health problems. Together, growing fear about immigration enforcement and exposure to agricultural work heightened the youth’s awareness of their own and/or their parents’ legal status at very early ages, such that many began to develop narrowly circumscribed understandings of their future options as early as elementary and middle school. Those who are unauthorized began to disengage from peers and lower their academic aspirations.

Moreover, in contrast to larger cities or even well-off suburbs, and also in contrast to what Schmalzbauer (2014) and Silver (2012) seem to suggest, Gonzales and Ruiz point out that the rural schools these youth attended are underfunded and underresourced, offering few AP classes, supplemental educational programs, tutoring services, or college readiness programs, and even housing few teachers or administrators with any knowledge at all about the kinds of opportunities they can potentially direct unauthorized students toward—including state-level policy in Washington.
that allows undocumented students to attend public universities at in-state tuition rates or, as of the Real Hope Act of 2014, allows them to make use of state-appropriated funds as financial aid. The youth were keenly aware of their schools’ “knowledge vacuum”; few felt confident in existing support structures to even ask for assistance, and some recalled negative interpersonal treatment not only by peers but also teachers and guidance counselors that further dampened their aspirations and outlooks. One student, for example, went to her counselor seeking information on her options for college admission and, contrary to relatively inclusive state-level policy, was simply told “well because of your status students like you do not deserve to go to college. So just do not bother applying” (p. 208). All respondents who had made it to college credited Washington state’s policy to allow undocumented immigrants to qualify for in-state tuition as making it possible; still, few even learned about this policy until the very end of high school, some not even until after they had graduated. Once in college, they continued to struggle both financially and educationally, many “stopping out” for extended periods of time along the way (see also Gonzales 2015). For Gonzales and Ruiz, intense immigration enforcement and the contextual features of rural schools and community service infrastructures, which they argue offer little to no assistance to promote Latino youth’s educational success, interact with Latinos’ levels of poverty and unauthorized status to heighten disadvantages and depress outcomes among Latino youth in rural areas compared to what is the case urban and suburban ones.

Indeed, like Gonzales and Ruiz, other scholars are increasingly emphasizing how different geographic and educational contexts can mediate 1.5 and second-generation children’s transitions to adulthood—particularly their educational experiences, aspirations, and emotional and physical wellbeing as they begin to look toward college or work, and especially in the wake of national-level passage of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals in 2012. For example, in the re-emerging destination of Colorado, Martínez (2014) shows how DACA combined with an incorporative state-
level policy—passage of the Advancing Students for a Stronger Economy Tomorrow (ASSET) bill in 2013, which approved undocumented students’ eligibility for in-state tuition—to promote some undocumented youth’s access to higher education there. Still, she shows how eligibility requirements for DACA have limited the reach of these inclusive programs, and how youth who are not college bound or who had aged out of eligibility requirements could not benefit from them (see also Gonzales, Terríquez, and Ruszczyk 2014; Wong and García 2015). Moreover, even among beneficiaries of the programs, responses were both hopeful but also ambivalent and cynical. Many undocumented still struggled to afford college even if they could get in, since DACA makes no provision at the federal level for undocumented students to receive federal or state financial aid, and ended up “stopping out” of college several times as they tried to combine work and studies to afford to complete their degrees (see also Gonzales 2015). Further, students without deferral from deportation know they still cannot transfer their education into good jobs and upward economic mobility. Martínez concludes by implying that illegality, because it is structured by federal immigration policy, structures the mobility paths of children of immigrants in Colorado much like it does in traditional destinations, even if state and local policies and conditions do serve as “mediators” and create some variation within.

Similarly, Cebulko and Silver (2014) compare the experiences and outcomes of DACA beneficiaries in a more and less restrictive state contexts toward immigrants after 2012. In Massachusetts, undocumented youth without DACA do not qualify for in-state tuition, but those with DACA do. DACA beneficiaries were also granted access to driver’s licenses (as they were in 45 other states). In North Carolina, by contrast, DACA recipients were denied access to in-state tuition and issued special driver’s licenses that clearly say “LEGAL PRESENCE NO LAWFUL STATUS.” Cebulko and Silver document how these two different contexts produced distinct

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8 Only Arizona and Nebraska denied driver’s licenses to DACA recipients outright.
educational and work opportunity paths, but also changes in undocumented youth’s own feelings of belonging vs. exclusion and assessments of how the United States thinks about immigrants. Those in North Carolina felt excluded and were disappointed that their state chose to stymie their ability, as DACA recipients, to pursue higher education. Many stayed fearful of interactions with the police, especially while driving, and some even became actively resentful of North Carolina as they began to learn how other states offered DACA beneficiaries more opportunity and resources to go to school, drive, and work. In Massachusetts, youth experienced greater ability to go to state universities, drive and work, and developed stronger feelings of belonging and legitimacy within, and attachment to, Massachusetts, which they perceived as doing “more” to include them than national policy. They became less fearful of local police, and one even began to describe herself as the “poster child for Massachusetts”—willing to advertise for and support her state even as she rejects a national American identity, because the U.S. “doesn’t want me”.

Consistent with the findings of the other studies presented above, Cebulko and Silver conclude by arguing that while undocumented youth experience acute feelings of exclusion as they transition out of high school throughout the country, both state and local contexts and policies can mediate this transition in ways that have both material and symbolic consequences (Flores 2010; Flores and Chapa 2009; Flores and Horn 2009). Specifically, they argue that the increasingly restrictive policies and immigration enforcement regimes prevalent in new destinations and rural areas may make this transition for many youth harder, even as social and organizational connections at the local level can help mitigate against the most negative impacts (Silver 2012; Wong and Garcia 2015). This is consistent with Vaquera, Aranda, and Gonzales’ (2014) worry about increasing structural discrimination toward and racialization of Latinos nationwide, especially in key institutional arenas of new destinations where immigrants and Latinos have quickly moved from “invisible” to “hypervisible” since 2005.
Dreby’s (2015) research provides further insight into how immigration enforcement has intensified since the 1990s and early 2000s, in turn solidifying the closure of any potential pathway to legalization for undocumented immigrants today (Gonzales 2015; R. C. Smith n.d.) and turning “illegal” into an increasingly consequentially axis of social, not merely legal, stratification in U.S. society (see also Abrego 2014; Cebulko 2014; Massey 2007; NASEM 2015). In a followup to her first book (Dreby 2010), which had examined Mexican immigrants’ temporary strategies of family separation in the early 2000s in the (then) new Mexican destination of New Jersey, Dreby returned to conduct followup fieldwork there in 2011, coupled with fieldwork in another new destination, Ohio, in 2009-10. In some ways, she found that geography did mediate the experience of illegality for both immigrant and U.S.-born children of unauthorized Mexican immigrants in the new study. For example, perhaps paradoxically, in the more immigrant-heavy New Jersey site, Mexican American children had even begun drawing lines among themselves by legal status, wielding it as a stigma such that it became something “private”, not to be shared with other peers, even close friends. In Ohio, where there were fewer other immigrant children, legal status mattered less in peer interactions, as it was superceded by race and the more salient boundary between Latinos and whites.

However, overall, Dreby was surprised to find that the intensification of enforcement and immigrant marginalization since the early 2000s had made the experience of illegality, for both parents and children, similar across the two destinations, and qualitatively different in the 2010s compared to 2003. Even in the relatively protective community of central New Jersey, she found, children now lived more “hyperaware” of their own legal status or that of their parents or siblings, often years before social structures begin to make it prohibitive. In both locations, she describes the growth and consolidation of a “culture of fear”, what she calls now deep enough to constitute a public health concern (see also Dreby 2012; Gonzales 2015; Gonzales, Suárez-Orozco and Dedios-Sanguineti 2013; Suárez-Orozco et al. 2011). Immigrants and their children in both locations show
signs of severe physical and emotional anxiety, stress, and sickness; deportation and family separations wreak financial havoc, create burdens in intrafamilial relations, and like Schmalzbauer (2014) also found, necessitate gendered and generational brokering among children. Legal status begins stratifying children’s lives well before their transitions to adulthood; it structures children’s day-to-day activities, access to activities outside the family, contributions to household labor, relations to the family migration project, experience of separation from their families, school performance, opportunities for future mobility and even identity, with unauthorized children feeling the most excluded from the U.S. as well as Mexico.

Conclusion and Ideas for Future Research

In this paper, I have provided a brief overview of migration flows and settlement patterns in new immigrant destinations since the 1990s, and offered two main reasons for why there are few studies to date of immigrant and second-generation children. Clearly, it is time for scholars to create more and larger samples of 1.5, second, and (eventually) third-generation children in new destinations. Ideally, such samples will be reasonably representative; include populations living across a range of urban, suburban, and rural and dispersed areas reflective of the great diversity of new destinations today; be designed to follow children longitudinally as they grow up, enter adulthood, and have children of their own; and perhaps even include the children of growing numbers of temporary nonimmigrants, who are once again becoming an integral feature of U.S. immigration flows (Griffith 2006; Massey 2011; NASEM 2015).

Of course, key lessons from the literature on the second generation in traditional gateways should be integrated into this project. Several ideas for doing so effectively are:

- First, research should ideally include comparable native control groups that are carefully selected to match each area’s context (Kasinitz et al. 2008). At the least, research should
pay attention not only to immigrant newcomers and their children, but also “host” populations and key “mediating” institutions like schools, courts, and health care facilities (Marrow 2009; 2011a), since adjustment to immigration is often felt and perceived as a “new” and “unsettling” dislocation in new destinations for both (Lattanzi-Shutika 2011; Winders 2015). Perhaps very creative studies could even examine multiple cohorts of native-born populations in order to examine how their attitudes and responses to immigrants may change over time, how they may adapt and change from their end to immigration-driven diversity, and to better integrate host and immigrant perspectives in immigrant incorporation research more generally.

- Second, research should examine immigrants’ intergenerational incorporation paths both as outcome (in comparison to designated host groups) and process (in comparison to prior generations of immigrants), since consensus about immigrants’ progress over time and generations depends on both (Waters and Jiménez 2005; Marrow 2013). In so doing, very creative studies could even include both objective and subjective measures of immigrants’ well-being (Marrow 2013). Standard objective measures in the larger literature from gateway cities include educational attainment, occupational specialization, earnings, suburbanization and dissimilarity in spatial distribution, English language ability and loss of mother tongue; and social networks and intermarriage rates (by either race or generation); some of that literature also tracks the “softer” side of assimilation by measuring expressions of ethnic and racial identification, cultural attitudes, and even political attitudes or religious practices. Still, some scholars have even called for a more explicitly “subject centered” stance moving forward—one that could privilege the second generation’s own lived experiences and perceptions, definitions, and measures of
mobility and success over, or at least alongside, the standard scholarly measures and analysis (Fernández-Kelly and Konczal 2005; Zhou et al. 2008).

- Third, research could include inquiry into youth’s physical and mental health, since scholars increasingly visualize health as both an outcome and an institutional domain of immigrants’ incorporation/exclusion (Gonzales, Suárez-Orozco and Díos-Sanguineti 2013; Joseph and Marrow n.d.; Suárez-Orozco et al. 2011). Research on immigrant health in new destinations is still incipient (e.g., Monnat 2017), but variation in state and local policies regarding immigration, health, and other areas will no doubt shape the outcomes of immigrant youth across them.

- Fourth, if possible this research modeling mobility and assimilation paths should also take into account more seriously local in- and out-migration flows among natives and immigrants. The former is important because selective native population flows shape the profile of the local “mainstream” to which an immigrant group and their descendants is understood and measured to incorporate (Bean et al. 2013; Park, Dowell, and Jiménez 2014). Such flows are likely to look very different between, say, fast-growing urban and suburban destinations and rural midwestern and southern counties witnessing population and human capital decline. The latter—immigrant-group flows—are also dynamic. Not only do the foreign-born come “into” many destinations; they also exit them at surprisingly high rates, going both to other U.S. destinations (Kritz, Gurak, and Lee 2011; Lichter 2012) and, increasingly, both voluntarily and involuntarily, back to origin countries, too (Hagan, Hernández-León and Demonsant 2015; Hernández-León, Lakhani, and Zúñiga 2017; Hernández-León and Zúñiga 2016). On one hand, immigrants’ geographic mobility across U.S. destinations has the potential not only to blur lines between new/traditional and rural/urban locales (Lichter and Brown 2011;
but also to shape our understanding of intergenerational economic mobility paths. On the other, return migration from new destinations to origin countries will offer new opportunities to track the relationships between assimilation, transnationalism, and “dissimilation” of migrants and their children from different comparable “non-migrant” populations (Jiménez and Fitzgerald 2007) in both directions. For example, there are now Mexican-born and U.S.-born children moving back to Mexico, where they are now expected to “assimilate” into Mexican schools and life, not American ones, even as they may still profess a desire to return to the U.S. eventually. Many are experiencing great difficulty there, especially those without U.S. citizenship; others, especially those who are U.S.-born and whose families have sufficient class resources, are beginning to show evidence of leading transnational lives. In short, dynamic population flows within new destinations not only call our attention to ways that U.S. citizenship, class, and gender structure migrant youth’s outcomes abroad as well as here within our national borders. They also complicate our standard models of assimilation and incorporation, empirically and theoretically, by demanding that we now conceptualize intergenerational incorporation processes and outcomes multi-directionally and transnationally (Hernández-León, Lakhani, and Zúñiga 2017; Hernández-León and Zúñiga 2016).

Fifth, given their great diversity we need more comparisons across new destinations, and not just between new and traditional destinations. This is especially important because new studies (e.g., Marshall 2017; Schmalzbauer 2014; Provine et al. 2016; Tran and Valdez 2015) suggest that it is not the new/old destination distinction itself, but rather the underlying contextual features of life in both types of places, that may matter most to immigrants’ experiences and outcomes.
Finally, in this paper I have provided an overview of key findings from the few studies on the second generation that do exist, which in my reading uncovered some evidence for optimism in earlier years but are increasingly highlighting areas of concern, including deepening levels of residential and school segregation by race and immigrant status, and legal and political barriers to higher education, work, and political engagement. For example, various scholars have found that up until recently, about the time of the Great Recession in 2008-09, adult Hispanic and/or Mexican immigrants living in new rural destinations generally exhibited high labor force participation rates, wages, and/or homeownership rates, and were less residentially segregated from natives, than their counterparts living in urban or Southwestern traditional gateways (see Crowley, Lichter, and Qian 2006; Ellis, Wright, and Townley 2013; Fisher and Tienda 2006; Kandel et al. 2011; Koball et al. 2008a; Lichter 2012). Now, however, some of these same scholars increasingly see signs of stress and “social disorganization” developing in new destinations among Latino residents, as jobs close and rural communities “decline”; these include deepening levels of residential and educational segregation, even at the micro level (Lichter 2012; Lichter et al. 2010; Lichter, Parisi, and Taquino 2016; Massey 2017; Winders 2015), rising rates of unemployment and poverty (among both individuals and adults with children), and/or stagnating incomes (see also Crowley and Lichter 2009; Crowley, Lichter, and Turner 2015; Koball et al. 2008; Lichter 2013; Lichter, Sanders, and Johnson 2015). For example, using Census data Crowley, Lichter, and Turner (2015) find that whereas new rural destinations provided clear economic benefits to Latinos in the 1990s, and that they even surpassed African Americans on some economic indicators, in the 2000s Latinos’ rates of poverty and economic circumstances deteriorated more rapidly in new vis-à-vis traditional destinations. By 2010, Latino individual and family poverty rates in new destinations were even significantly higher among Latinos than African Americans, despite Latinos’ higher labor force participation and lower

9 Though, for a discussion of alternate perspectives on “social disorganization” in rural boomtown communities, see Carr, Lichter, and Kefalas (2012).
levels of unemployment. So too do Ellis, Wright, and Townley (2013) provide evidence suggesting that any benefits Latinos saw from living in new rural destinations at the beginning of the 21st century may have eroded or vanished just a decade later, perhaps prompting some to consider moving to other established destinations instead.

To me, these findings highlight not just the detrimental impact of the Great Recession and ongoing economic restructuring in new destination industries on Latinos’ lives and prospects in new destinations. They intersect with two key features I have argued distinguish many new immigrant destinations from traditional ones: first, large percentages of immigrants without authorized legal status and, second, sharp negative turns in institutional and political receiving contexts since 2005-06 (Marrow 2013). Ultimately, I argue that lack of legal status and restrictive legal-political contexts of reception are two key factors likely to dampen key segments of the second generation’s prospects for successful incorporation and upward economic mobility in the future, even as the early studies summarized here suggest a mixed, if not more optimistic, picture up to the current moment. Indeed, these two features appear likely to outweigh other positive features of new immigrant destination reception and life in the future, perhaps including in schools, where research shows that many new destinations made improvements and “caught up” to traditional ones fairly quickly in the 1990s, despite initial resource disadvantages.

Overall, then, while once locales offering “strategic holes” of opportunity for inclusion and upward mobility, even for the most disadvantaged of immigrant families (Marrow 2011a), the prospects for intergenerational incorporation beyond the first generation in new destinations today appear more uncertain, and more heavily dependent on legal status. In other words, youth’s prospects appear stratified or “segmented” in many of the same ways they do among immigrant populations in traditional urban gateways (i.e., primarily by human capital, race, gender, and legal status), with perhaps some mediating or magnifying effects played by rural or new destination
context. While children of highly-skilled professional migrants, many of them Asian Americans, appear well poised for short-distance or long-distance upward mobility and inclusion in new destinations (Oberle and Li 2008; Zhou and Bankston 2016: Chapter 7; 2017), a nasty combination of prolonged illegality, native backlash, immigrant marginalization, and “hypervisibility” and “hyperaudibility” (Maldonado 2014; Vaquera, Aranda, and Gonzales 2015) appear to have increased the prospects for racialization, structural discrimination, and blocked or downward mobility for many Hispanics/Latinos living in new destinations by the late-2010s (especially Mexicans and Central Americans living in the South and the nation’s most rural areas) compared to what was even the case just a decade ago. For this reason, research on this second generation should also, to the extent possible, take into account variation not just in geographic context and generation-since-immigration but also temporal context (Jiménez 2010; Telles and Ortiz 2008) and historical cohort (both of entry for immigrants, and of birth for their children). By doing so, we will no doubt produce evidence supporting a range of policy proposals that will be highly contentious in today’s political environment but perhaps more needed than ever, including passing comprehensive immigration reform, reducing racial and class segregation, expanding educational and social service supports to disadvantaged youth in local communities, and diminishing legal status as an axis of social stratification.

10 Indeed, Hernández-León and Zúñiga (2016) and Hernández-León, Lakhani and Zúñiga (2017) suggest we may even need to reformulate generation-since-immigration multi-directionally, if we are to effectively consider migrant youth’s assimilation both into the U.S. and into their “home” countries, either separately or together.

11 Suárez-Orozco et al. (2011) call this the temporal “chronosystem” in their model of contextual effects operating to shape the developmental pathways of unauthorized children.
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