Tapping the Indian Diaspora for Indian Development

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INTRODUCTION

According to the Government of India, there are over 20 million people of Indian origin living outside India (GOI 2000). They live in nearly every country of the world, and they span the spectrum of class, profession, and history—ranging from 5th generation descendants of indentured servants in the Caribbean, to 4th generation descendants of mercenaries and traders operating under British colonialism in Africa, to 2nd generation descendants of doctors and engineers in North America. Indians today continue to migrate outside India to work as undocumented construction workers or domestic servants in the Middle East, as taxi drivers in New Jersey, as CEOs of multinational banks in Latin America, and as information technology (IT) entrepreneurs in the Silicon Valley. Given the magnitude and diversity of the Indian diaspora, it is surprising how little we know about their impact on India.

This study examines how Indian immigrants in the US have impacted Indian development—it's ideals, it's policies, and it's practices. The vast majority of Indian immigrants in the US are said to provide individual funds to various causes and family members in India. These linkages are, however, extremely diffuse and informal and, therefore, variable and difficult to study at an empirical level. To explore the more formal, sustained transnational linkages occurring between the Indian diaspora and the US, this study uses US-based organizations that are founded and led by Indians as the primary lens. This study complements similar studies being conducted by Min Zhou (University of California-Los Angeles) on Chinese immigrants, Jennifer Huynh (Princeton University) on Vietnamese immigrants, and Alejandro Portes (Princeton University) on immigrants from Colombia, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic. In all these countries, the impact of diaspora populations on national development has long existed and has been consistently understudied.

The Indian government's linkages with the Indian diaspora, while extant since 1877, have been strengthened fairly recently. After Indian independence in 1947, the Indian government explicitly urged Indian emigrants to identify with their host countries. India was grappling with the aftermath of a bloody partition where hundreds of thousands of people had left present-day Pakistan to enter present-day India, and the Indian government was keen to erase suspicion toward these new migrants. The newly drawn physical boundaries of the Indian state were,

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therefore, used to define the more nebulous boundaries of national identity. Those residing within the borders of India were deemed “Indian,” while those residing outside were deemed “not Indian.” In addition to being welcomed by Indian residents, this message from the Indian government was also welcomed by members of the Indian diaspora who were living in parts of Africa and the Caribbean and were facing a racial backlash against people of Indian origin. Indian immigrants in these countries were keen to convince their host country residents and governments that their loyalties lay in their host country and *not* in India. That the Indian government denied their Indian identity was useful.

Since the mid-1980s, however, Indian diasporic communities and the Government of India have both altered their stance toward one another. In the US, for example, there has been a sudden expansion in the number of organizations that Indian immigrants have launched to foster linkages with India. Concurrently, the Indian Government has initiated a multitude of new policies and institutions to help strengthen the linkages between the Indian diaspora and India. In the mid-1980s, the Indian government created new bank accounts that allowed non-resident Indians (NRIs) to invest money in India under favorable conditions. In 1999, the government launched two new visa status cards for “Persons of Indian Origin (PIO)” and for “Overseas Citizens of India (OCI)” that facilitated Indian emigrants’ ability to travel in and out of India, invest in property, and hold Indian Rupee bank accounts. In 2000, the Indian government commissioned a high profile committee to research and write an extensive report on the Indian diaspora. Based on the recommendations of this report on January 9th 2003, the government inaugurated its first annual conference of overseas Indians, known as the *Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PVD)* or “Overseas Indian Day”. The conference is held every year on January 9th to commemorate the day that Mahatma Gandhi (perhaps India’s most famous emigrant) returned to India from South Africa to launch the Indian independence movement. The PVD conference is designed to facilitate networking opportunities between the Indian diaspora, the Indian government, and Indian organizations; commemorate Indian emigrants who have done something for India; and communicate new policies concerning overseas Indians. At this year’s conference, for example, the government announced that the Indian Parliament had passed a bill to enable overseas Indians to vote. Finally, in 2005, India became one of the few countries to create a cabinet level Ministry for Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA). MOIA serves as the nodal point for investment, business partnerships, academic exchanges, heritage exploration, and philanthropy between India and its diaspora.

This relatively new interest in formalizing and strengthening transnational linkages between India and the US can be explained by several factors. First, it has become difficult to ignore the deep potential that the diaspora offers for Indian development, because its size, as well as its economic and political status in Europe and North America, has exploded in recent decades. Second, the gradual liberalization and globalization of the Indian economy (which informally began on a small scale in the mid-1980s under the leadership of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and then expanded on a formal basis in 1991) has reduced the institutional barriers and

the negative stigma earlier attached to partnering with those living outside India. And finally, the involvement of overseas Chinese in the recent expansion of China's economy has served as a role model that the Indian government is committed to emulating.

In examining the nature of this recent growth in transnational linkages between Indian-Americans and Indians, this study examines the following sets of questions:

1. What is the scope of transnational organizations among Indian immigrants? When and why did these organizations emerge? Who participates in these cross-border activities?
2. How do these transnational organizations affect homeland development? In what areas are they concentrated? What explains this concentration?
3. How do transnational linkages affect power dynamics between the Indian government and the Indian diaspora, and between Indian and U.S. organizations.

To date, my findings suggest that the elite status of Indian-Americans that has greatly influenced the nature of their transnational linkages with India, complicated their relationship with their partners in India, and influenced the power they hold over the Indian government.

US DATA COLLECTION

US Census Analysis

We first conducted an analysis of the Indian population in the US using data from the US Census and the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA) to determine the geographic areas in which foreign-born and US-born Indians are most concentrated. Based on this analysis, we chose to focus on the following four metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs):

1. New York City (including Northern New Jersey, Long Island, and portions of Connecticut and Pennsylvania);
2. Washington D.C.-Baltimore (including parts of Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland);
3. Chicago (including Gary and Kenosha); and
4. San Francisco (including Oakland and San Jose).

Together, these MSAs comprise over 55% of the Indian population in the US. Other significant MSAs of Indians include Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Houston. Due to time and resource constraints, these MSAs have not yet been incorporated into the study at a later date, depending on the availability of time and resources.

Once the interviews began, we expanded the geographic breadth of our project by adding the following 2 categories to better accommodate key organizations that do not operate out of a single location:

1. National: These organizations comprise of members who reside across the US. Because the leadership of these organizations rotates every 2-3 years, their mailing address and location of their annual meeting also rotates. These organizations do not have a fixed office, but operate through cyberspace, newsletters, local representatives, and their annual meeting. Most of the “Ethnic” operations are organized in this manner.
2. Virtual: These organizations represent the younger generation of Indian immigrants who arrived to service the IT sector in the US. Many of the political organizations operate in this manner.

Organization Inventory

We then compiled an inventory of all Indian transnational organizations in our 4 MSAs, as well as all National and Virtual organizations. To qualify for the inventory, organizations had to fulfill the following criteria:

1. Be at least 3 years old,
2. Have had at least one project in India in the last 5 years, and
3. Be founded and led by a person of Indian origin.

This inventory is the first of its kind for the US-based Indian population. The Indian government (including its embassies and consulates) do not currently have an exhaustive list of Indian organizations in the US. Therefore, data for the inventory was collected using a variety of non-government sources including: on-line data bases such as, GuideStar and Melissa DATA; Indian business directories; websites that compile lists of Indian organizations; articles from ethnic Indian newspapers; discussions with editors of Indian newspapers, advertisements for the Annual India Day Parade; and discussions with informants by email, phone, or in-person.

Each organization was then examined (through their website or by phone) to confirm that it fulfilled all 3 of the above criteria. Given the recent growth of Indian organizations, our first criteria ensured that our inventory reflects sustainable efforts that can provide insights into institutionalized patterns. Because the majority of Indian organizations in the US focus on the Indian community in the US, our second criteria helped narrow our inventory to only include the sub-set of organizations that have had at least one transnational project. Finally, our third criteria ensured that the inventory did not include large multi-lateral organization efforts (such as Save the Children, Oxfam, Ford Foundation, Amnesty etc.). Although these organizations yield interesting insights into transnational linkages, particularly because Indian-Americans are increasingly staffing these organizations’ India projects, they are motivated by a different organizational logic than those of diaspora organizations that focus only on US-India relations.

Finally, each organization, once confirmed for our inventory, was categorized in one of the following “types”:

1. Ethnic/linguistic/ caste/identity
2. Arts/cultural
3. Political
4. Development/health/education
5. Human Rights
6. Professional
7. Alumni
8. Religious

While these “type” categories roughly correspond to those used in the other country studies, they have been modified to better reflect the Indian diaspora’s efforts and self-classifications. Once we began the interviews, we added the following breakdown of the religious organizations:

1. Religious
2. Religious and Arts
3. Religious and Development
4. Religious and Ethnic/Language Identity
5. Religious and Human Rights
6. Religious and Political

To date, we have identified **624 transnational organizations** among Indians in 4 US cities. Table 1 and Table 2 provide the breakdown of organizations in the inventory by geographic location and type respectively.

Table 1: Organizations in Inventory by Location

State	Number	Percentage
California	131	21.0%
Connecticut	12	1.9%
DC	33	5.3%
Illinois	81	13.0%
Maryland	56	9.0%
National	46	7.4%
New Jersey	84	13.5%
New York	138	22.1%
Ohio	1	0.2%
unknown	2	0.3%
Virginia	30	4.8%

Virtual	4	0.6%
Washington DC	6	1.0%
Grand Total	624	100.0%

Table 2: Organizations in Inventory by Type

Kind of Organization	Number	Percentage
Arts	50	8.0%
Development/health/ed	119	19.1%
Ethnic/language ID	166	26.6%
Human Rights	17	2.7%
Political	16	2.6%
Professional/Alumni	51	8.2%
Religious	178	28.5%
Religious AND Arts	1	0.2%
Religious AND Development	6	1.0%
Religious AND Ethnic/language ID	5	0.8%
Religious AND Human Rights	11	1.8%
Religious AND Political	3	0.5%
Religious AND Development AND Alumni	1	0.2%
Grand Total	624	100.0%

US Survey and Field Observation

In February 2011, we began our survey of Indian organizations in the US. The survey used a close-ended questionnaire with some open-ended questions (Appendix 1). To date, I have conducted **69 interviews with organization leaders in the US**. These interviews were held in person (either at the organization office, the leader's home, or in a restaurant) or over the phone. Each interview lasted between 1-3 hours. All interviews were held with the Executive Directors and/or the founders of the organizations.

As we began the interviews, it quickly became clear that geographic location in the US did not yield very interesting variation between Indian transnational organizations. We found that greater analytical leverage could be gained from analyzing the variation by organization type. Therefore, we tried to tailor our interview sample to roughly represent the distribution of organizations by type found in the inventory population. Table 3 compares the distribution of organization type in the sample of organizations interviewed versus those in the inventory.

The lower representation of Development, Ethnic, and Religious organizations in our sample is explained by the oversampling of Religious Combination organizations in our sample. Most of these combination organizations include development, ethnic identity, and religious goals. Although Religious Combination organizations only represent 4.3% of all organizations, the *reasons* for such cross-classification are significant, and these organizations yield important insights into the politics and identities of Indian immigrants, especially from the transnational perspective. Therefore we oversampled these organizations in our interviews to engage a more thorough analysis of which religious groups cross-classify themselves and why.

We also oversampled Professional/Alumni organizations in our interview sample, because these organizations represent the primary focus of the Indian government, as well as the source of great power and resources.

The organizations within each type category were not chosen at random. They were chosen based on their representation of organization type. In each type, we tried to ensure inclusion of the largest, most well-known, established organizations.

To date, we have made a handful of site and event visits (such as to meetings, fund-raising events, seminars, holiday celebrations etc.). We expect to make more of such visits and complete 10 more interviews (in Arts, Development, and Ethnic Identity) by May 2012.

Appendix I shows the survey instrument used for the US interviews. It draws from the instruments used in the transnational organization studies of China and Vietnam. In addition, it draws from a survey of Indian organizations in the US conducted by Devesh Kapur (University of Pennsylvania) in 2002. Finally, it has been tailored according to the results of a few pilot interviews.

Table 3: Distribution of Organization Type in Interview Sample vs. Inventory

Organization Type	Number Interviewed	% of Interviewed Organizations	Number in Inventory	% in Inventory Organizations
Arts/cultural	5	7.2%	50	8.0%
Development/health/education	10	14.5%	119	19.1%
Ethnic/caste/linguistic/identity	12	17.4%	166	26.6%
Human Rights	3	4.3%	17	2.7%
Political	2	2.9%	16	2.6%
Professional/Alumni	13	18.8%	51	8.2%
Religious	8	11.6%	178	28.5%
Religious Combination	16	23.2%	27	4.3%
Total	69	100%	624	100%

INDIA DATA COLLECTION

Data collection in India to date has included several site visits and **63 in-person interviews** with government officials in charge of overseas Indians, scholars of Indian migration, and leaders of quasi-governmental and non-governmental organizations involved in overseas Indian philanthropy, and leaders of the partner organizations interviewed in the US. Appendix II shows the survey instrument used for partner organizations in India. Because the range of partner organizations in India was wide, the India Survey primarily uses open-ended questions, with a few close-ended questions.

Interviews and site visits in India were conducted in 4 locations. The first was in the capital city of Delhi, where I met with leaders of key organizations, leaders of Indian political parties who have targeted diaspora communities, and national government officials (including officials at the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Minority Affairs).

In addition, I focused on the three Indian states where most Indian-Americans come from and where most of their activity flows: Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, and Punjab (Kumar 2003). Examining Indian transnational linkages at the state level is essential for several reasons. First, because India is such a multi-ethnic, multi-religious country, state-based examinations better isolate the effects of identity-based connections to the homeland. Indian states are drawn along linguistic lines, but they also roughly correspond to cultural, ethnic, and even religious boundaries. State-based identities and sub-nationalist sentiments within India are extremely strong and are oftentimes even stronger than nation-based identities. While early Indian immigrants to the US created pan-Indian identities to distinguish themselves from other immigrant groups and local Americans, as the Indian diaspora grew, the sub-regional state-based identities were reproduced. Today, the two largest categories of organizations among Indian immigrants in the US (i.e. Ethnic Identity organizations and Religious organizations) are largely state-based.

The second reason to study Indian transnational links at the state level is because India is governed under a federalist structure where state governments have substantial power. Examining the variation in transnational linkages across states helps isolate the impact that government efforts have on fomenting diaspora connections and using them to further development. The three states chosen for this study represent (1) a diverse set of emigrants to the US, and (2) a diverse range of government strategies for fostering transnational linkages. The Gujarat government is launching a concerted effort to draw investments from the large overseas Gujarati business elite. The Punjab government is working on helping overseas Punjabis invest in their ancestral agricultural land. The government of Andhra Pradesh is

working hard to create Software Technology Parks to draw overseas Indian IT entrepreneurs and scientists to invest in local start-ups or even return to India to work.

Gujarat

Interviews and Site Visits: In Gujarat my interviews included leaders of Gujarati organizations, Gujarati academic institutions, and officials from the Gujarat State Government (including the Non-Resident Indian Division of the Government of Gujarat, the Gujarat State Non-Resident Gujarati (NRG) Foundation, and the Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and Industry). In addition, I visited several villages that have diaspora connections and conducted interviews with village leaders (including one that returned to head his village after living abroad for 30 years). Gujarat is one of the few states in India that exhibits the use of homeland associations in the Indian diaspora.

The state of Gujarat in Western India has a population of over 60 million. Today, it is passionately lauded and critiqued for its well-known right-leaning economic and social tendencies. These tendencies are deeply rooted in Gujarat's history and have shaped the Gujarati community in the US in significant ways.

Since its formation in 1960, Gujarat's political leaders have pursued a rigorous agenda of rapid industrial development through public-private partnerships and export-led development. By the 1970s, Gujarat had become an "image of progressive liberalism" according to the national Minister of Industries at the time (Sinha 2005: 136). Until the mid-1990s, Gujarat's economic policies were limited by the national government's strong commitment to Fabian Socialism. After the Government of India initiated its liberalization reforms in 1991, however, Gujarat's economic agenda was allowed to blossom in full force. Today, it has among the fastest growing economies in India, and its per capita GDP is almost twice the national average. The state is responsible for 16% of the nation's industrial production and 22% of its exports, while accounting for only 5% of India's population. The state's economic success has created an enormous sense of pride among Gujaratis in India and Gujarati immigrants in the US, many of whom are from a business/merchant caste and work as entrepreneurs and business owners in the US.

Although Gujarat has produced a plethora of grassroots-level social movements, village based cottage industries, and cooperatives—many of which were inspired by Mahatma Gandhi, who was Gujarati—there has been a striking absence of opposition to the state's economic policies. Some scholars argue that this is due to the lack of "alternative political voice" available to those who may not have benefited from the pro-growth strategy (Sinha 2005: 161). Indeed, the state has long been dominated by upper caste Hindu groups. For decades, they ruled the state through India's first and largest political party—Indian National Congress (INC). In 1995, India's Hindu nationalist party--the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)--won control of the state

parliament (toppling INC for the first time) and has been ruling since. At the helm of BJP's rule in Gujarat has been the immensely popular and deeply controversial Chief Minister, Narendra Modi. Modi is the longest-running, democratically elected Chief Minister in Gujarat's history. While some praise Modi for his brilliant economic decisions and his ability to "put Gujarat on the global map", others detest him for inciting the communal riots of 2002 that left thousands of poor Muslim Gujaratis tortured and dead. These events have created deep fissures within the Indian diaspora. In 2005, a small group of Indian-Americans fought to have the US Government deny Modi an entry visa to the US on the ground that he violated human rights by inciting anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat. The vast majority of Gujaratis in the US, however, are deeply loyal to Modi and have fought hard to reverse the US Government's decision (unsuccessfully).

Andhra Pradesh

Interviews and Site Visits: In Andhra Pradesh, my interviews and site visits included academics, leaders of partner organizations in the US, and officials from the Andhra Pradesh State Government (including the Department of Industries and Commerce, The Overseas Manpower Company of the Department of Employment and Training, and the Special Secretary of Non-Resident Indian Affairs).

The state of Andhra Pradesh in Southern India has a population of nearly 85 million. It was one of the first states in independent India to be drawn along linguistic boundaries. Like Gujarat, it is a prosperous state that has embraced the liberalization reforms of 1991. The GDP of Andhra Pradesh exceeds \$100 billion, ranking it third among the states of India. On the political and social side, however, the state differs from Gujarat in several ways that have been significant for the nature of transnational linkages with the diaspora.

Politics in Andhra Pradesh has been dominated by the upper-middle agricultural castes of the Kammas and Reddys. Unlike Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh has not been dominated by Hindus alone. Because the state's capital is the previously Princely State of Hyderabad, where Muslims comprised 10%, Muslims have been a dominant group in the state, especially in the police and military services. In 1926, the Majlis Ittihad-ul-Muslimin (Council of the Union of Muslims) was founded as a "cultural-religious organization with the object of uniting Muslims in the state of Hyderabad...and reducing the Hindu majority in the state by large-scale conversions" (Gray 1968: 402). Today, more than 8% of the state population speaks Urdu.

As in Gujarat, the Indian National Congress (INC) dominated the state for the first few decades after independence. In 1983, N.T. Rama Rao (known as NTR), a former film actor, formed a local party-- the Telugu Desam Party (TDP). Since then, state power has shifted back and forth between the two parties (with TDP representing the Kammas and INC representing the Reddys). In addition, the Communist Parties of India (CPI and CPI-M), the Majlis Ittehadul

Muslimeen (MIM) and BJP play a smaller but significant role in the state's electoral politics by forming alliances with either TDP or INC.

In addition to contesting voices expressed through the formal electoral sphere, Andhra Pradesh has managed several contesting movements at the grassroots level. Perhaps the largest has been the Telangana Separatist Movement, which spiked in the late 1960s and again more recently. INC managed to squelch the movement in the 1960s by incorporating many Telangana leaders into high-ranking posts in INC. The 1999 state elections and the formation of 3 new states in India in 2001 reinvigorated the movement in the early 2000s, where it formed a new political party—the Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS). This recent movement has benefited from transnational linkages with the Telangana diaspora in the US—see Findings). In 2009, the Minister of Home Affairs (GOI), Palaniappan Chidambaram announced that the Government of India would take steps towards the formation of Telangana as a separate state. But to date, no actions have been taken. In addition to the separatist movement, there has been an armed insurgency in Telangana that was supported by left groups and the rural poor.

In the economic sphere, Andhra Pradesh lagged behind other Indian states in terms of economic and human development indicators (such as literacy and health care) for years. During the 1980s, the populist strategies of the TDP that resulted in agricultural subsidies and rural development programs, strained the state's fiscal records, but helped catapult the state into a first place ranking on rural poverty reduction (Minhas, Jain and Tendulkar 1991).

Since the 1991 liberalization reforms, Andhra Pradesh has moved away from trying to attract the rural poor through populist rural subsidies and tried instead to attract urban entrepreneurs and foreign capital through fiscal incentives, tax exemptions, project financing schemes, and subsidies for land, water, and electricity. The state has been considered “the most pro-active among south Indian states in creating a business-friendly atmosphere, particularly with respect to regulatory transparency” (Kennedy 2004: 37). Leading these efforts was the state's Chief Minister from 1995 to 2004, Chandrababu Naidu of TDP. In addition to embracing liberalization, Naidu encouraged greater integration into the global economy as an economic growth and development strategy, believing that “global forces are creating unprecedented opportunities for growth” (Kennedy 2004: 45).

Naidu's commitment to liberalization and globalization earned him great praise in the West. Tony Blair, Bill Clinton, and Bill Gates all visited Hyderabad city. The governor of Illinois created a Naidu Day in his honor. Naidu also won numerous awards including 'IT Indian of the Millenium' by *India Today*, Business Person of the Year by *Economic Times*, member of the World Economic Forum's Dream Cabinet and South Asian of the Year by *Time Asia* (Monbiot 2004; Singh 1999). He was described as one of the “hidden seven working wonders around the world” by *Profit*, a monthly magazine published by Oracle Corporation in the US (Special Correspondent 2001). And he was often referred to as the “CEO of Andhra Pradesh.”

Underlying much of the West's interest and praise of Naidu were his investments in the IT sector. For example, he created the Hyderabad Information Technology Engineering Consultancy City (known as "HITEC City") in 1995 as a joint public-private sector project 15 km from Hyderabad city. To attract capital, he provided investors with exemption from statutory power cuts, exemption from labor inspections under a regime of self-certification, and permission for three-shift operations. Under Naidu, Microsoft chose Hyderabad to be the site of its first research and development center outside of the US. In trying to make Hyderabad a modern, dynamic, sparkling Indian version of Silicon Valley, Naidu aimed to not only generate revenue and growth from the private sector, but also transform and improve the functioning of public sector development programs. Naidu was the first Chief Minister in India to computerise State Government activities and maintain a State Government portal. CNN said about Naidu, "In just five years, he has turned an impoverished, rural backwater place into India's new information technology hub."^[16] Naidu also invested heavily in building private IT colleges in Andhra Pradesh. In the year 2000 alone, INR 420-680 crores of private money is said to have been spent on IT education in Andhra Pradesh (Xiang 2002)

Naidu's faith in modern technology was expected to enable him to achieve ambitious development goals within one generation (Bandyopadhyay 2001). But the results of his efforts have been mixed. On one hand, from 1995 to 2002, exports from Andhra Pradesh increased from INR 60 crore to INR 3500 crore, the number of companies registered with the Hyderabad branch of the Software Tech Parks of India (STPI) increased from 31 to 820, and 71,445 jobs are said to have been created (Kennedy 2004). On the other hand, public sector labor unions and the rural poor have opposed these efforts for ignoring their needs. The opposition managed to cost Naidu the elections, and TDP has been out of power since 2005.

Punjab

*****Interviews and Site Visits:*** My interviews and site visits in Punjab are scheduled to take place in March 2012.

Punjab's economy, social structure, and politics have differed from that of Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh. These differences are reflected in the nature of the state's transnational linkages with its diaspora.

Like most Indian states, Punjab's boundaries are drawn along linguistic lines. In 2001, more than 92% of the state spoke Punjabi, while the remaining 7% spoke Hindi (GOI 2001). Unlike Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh, Punjab is home to a sizable population of one of India's religious minority groups—i.e. Sikhs. In 2001, 60% of the state was Sikh, while 37% was Hindu (GOI 2001). Despite the common linguistic bonds, the state has long managed tensions between the differing religious communities, including a Sikh separatist movement. These tensions in India have been intricately connected to the diaspora community abroad.

Unlike Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh, INC has always faced strong competition in Punjab from other parties. Prior to independence, INC had little power in Punjab, and the Unionist Party (established in 1923) was dominant. It represented the landed rural classes across different faiths. It was not a mass party and it supported British rule. After independence, INC won state power, but faced strong competition from another local party, Akali Dal, which represented the Hindu and Sikh population, and actively fought for the Punjabi Suba--a separate Punjabi-speaking state. Akali Dal leaders sometimes fight for the separate state on linguistic grounds (the underlying logic of other Indian state boundaries) and sometimes on religious grounds. Underlying the linguistic argument is a claim that Punjabi in the Gurmukhi script is a distinct language--a claim that is refuted by some Punjabi Hindus who consider Punjabi a dialect of Hindi and Gurmukhi a religious medium of Sikhs. Underlying the religious argument for a separate state is a desire to establish a state in which Sikhs can hold more political power—a claim that the Central Government opposes as a threat to the secular state ideal of India (Nayar 1968).

While the movement for a separate Sikh state (which has been consistently denied by the Government of India) has remained strong in Punjab, it has evolved and changed over time. In the 1980s, a more militant form of the movement emerged to fight for an explicitly Sikh state called Khalistan (i.e. not a state based on linguistic boundaries). This movement represented rural Sikhs. Some argue that it was led by a small but powerful class of capitalist farmers, called *kulaks*, and it asserted a “*anti-Hindu identity*”, as opposed to the “*non-Hindu identity*” of the earlier movements that were led by upper caste urban Sikhs (Purewal 2000). Others argue that it was supported by marginalized middle-caste Sikh farmers (of the *jat* caste), a majority of whom were illiterate (Jeffrey 1994; Judge, Puri and Shekhon 1999). The Khalistan movement sought support from the Akali Dal Party in India and the Punjabi diaspora abroad. It resulted in a decade of violence and over 30,000 deaths (the majority of whom were Sikh). As Jodhka (2001: 1311) writes, the state went from one of brightest success stories of economic development to a “crisis-ridden region with serious problems of law and order and political unrest.”

In the economic sphere, Punjab has historically been a wealthy state that has relied primarily on a modernized agricultural sector (in contrast to Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh). To this day, Punjab has relatively low levels of industrialization. Under British rule, the state invested heavily in advanced irrigation systems. During the Green Revolution of the 1970s, the state benefitted from a major influx of subsidized High-Yield Variety (HYV) seeds and mechanization. The agricultural sector accounted for more than half of Punjab’s gross state product in 1961 (Day and Singh 1977). Punjab’s agricultural growth not only lifted many Punjabis above the poverty line, but also provided food security to the rest of the nation (Singh 2010). To this extent, Punjab’s economy did well under the import substitution policies of the 1950s to 1990s, with the highest growth taking place during the 1980s. SDP grew at 5.4% per year and real income grew at 3.4% per year from 1980-1991, and dropped to 4.7% and 2.7% (respectively) from 1991-1998 (Singh and Singh 2002).

In contrast to Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh, Punjab saw a decrease in its per capita income and net SDP growth rates after the liberalization reforms. In particular, the agricultural sector has suffered under the reforms, and the industrial sector has not grown to make up for the windfall. In addition, Punjab is said to have one of the highest fiscal deficits among India's 14 major states. The state government has financed its deficit by borrowing from the central government and increasingly through commercial loans. Thus, much of the revenue earned from state taxes is diverted to interest payments on these loans, which in turn has undermined the state's capacity to participate in development activities (Singh 2010).

FINDINGS

Indian immigrants in the US: New and Elite

Indian immigrants in the US are a fairly recent phenomenon, and they occupy a strikingly elite socio-economic status relative to other Americans and the global Indian diaspora. This study aims to examine the impact of these characteristics on Indians' transnational activities.

Large-scale migration out of India has occurred in three broad waves. The first began in the 1830s when slavery was outlawed in the British colonies. The vast majority of Indians at this time emigrated to other British colonies, such as Burma (present-day Myanmar), Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka), Malaya (present-day Malaysia), Trinidad, Tobago, Guyana, and Fiji, to serve as indentured laborers in agriculture. They were primarily unskilled and members of lower castes. A small minority of Sikh men migrated in the late 1800s to California to serve as agricultural laborers. Aside from this group, however, Indians did not enter the US until the mid-1960s.

At the turn of the century, the second large wave of Indian migration took place. This wave, known as the "free" or "passage" migration, drew traders, clerks, bureaucrats, and professionals to the areas where indentured laborers had earlier gone. The vast majority of these migrants settled in Kenya, Uganda, Ghana and South Africa. In addition, the demand for labor to reconstruct Europe after WWII drew several unskilled and semi-skilled Indian laborers from India and East Africa to the United Kingdom.

In the 1960s, Indians participated in the third major wave of emigration into two new areas of the globe—the Middle East and the US. First, the rise in oil prices created a large demand for unskilled and semiskilled labor in the Middle East that many Indians were able to fulfill. Second, the liberalization of US immigration law in 1965 explicitly targeted highly skilled professionals and students. The USSR's launching of the Soviet spaceship *Sputnik* spurred the US government to boost its investment into science and research and development with skilled labor from overseas. It is widely believed that Indians' knowledge of the English language and their rigorous training in science and engineering positioned them to take

advantage of these shifts in US immigration laws. In the 1950s, the Indian government launched seven “Indian Institutes of Technology” (IIT) throughout the country to create a cadre of engineers and scientists who could lead the newly independent nation’s efforts toward industrialization and modernization. From the mid-1960s onward, however, studies repeatedly discussed the deleterious impact of the “brain drain” that was affecting Indian development as IIT graduates migrated to attain higher paying jobs in the US. Today, a sizeable proportion of IIT graduates live outside India, and a vast majority of them live in the US. Although IITs have gained the most international recognition, India also nurtured 100s of other high quality engineering colleges, which have also graduated emigrants to the US.

As shown in Table 4, by the end of the 1960s, there were 12,000 Indians in the US. While the Indian population crept along for a few decades, it grew exponentially after the 1990s due to the expansion of the IT sector. IIT graduates were once again tapped by US employers in the late 1990s, when there was an enormous demand for IT workers. As a result of their skill set, Indians have consistently attained 35-55% of the H-1B visas given by the US government so US employers can temporarily hire an overseas employee that has a “body of specialized knowledge and at least a bachelor’s degree or equivalent.” As a result of the IT boom in the US, the size of the Indian immigrant population more than doubled in 10 states between 2000 and 2008 (Terrazas and Batog 2010). Today, nearly 1.7 million Indian immigrants live in the US, making them the third-largest immigrant group in the United States after Mexican and Filipino immigrants. Between 2007 and 2008, the number of Indian immigrants surpassed the number of Chinese and Hong Kong-born immigrants for the first time since 1960. Over 40% of the foreign born Indians in the US today arrived *after 2000*. The US is now home to the second largest concentration of Indians, after Myanmar.

In addition to being one of the largest nations of Indians, *the US is also host to the most elite concentration of Indians*. As shown in Table 7, 70% of Indian-Americans over the age of 25 (including foreign and US-born) are college graduates, 67% over the age of 16 are professionals, their median household income is over \$90,000, and their poverty rate is as low as 4.6%. Nearly 80% of Indians in the US report being able to speak English “very well” (American Community Survey 2009). These figures place Indian-Americans in a socio-economic status that is much higher than that of average Americans, other Asian immigrants in the US, Indians in India, and the global Indian diaspora.

Table 4: Indian American Residence 1960-2009

Year	Number	Sex Ratio (males per 100 female)	Percent in study's cities
1960	12,296*		
1970	51,000*		
1980	206,087*		29.6
1990	815,447*		
2000	1,678,765	117.1	20.7 [†]
2009	2,602,676	110.4	27.9

*These figures are for Indians who are foreign-born. US-born population is only included in figures drawn from the 2000 Census and 2009 American Community Survey.

[†]This is a preliminary estimate. The database has to be examined more carefully.

Sources: American Community Survey and US Census <http://www.census.gov/>

My preliminary findings suggest that it is this elite status of Indian-Americans that has greatly influenced the nature of their transnational linkages with India, complicated their relationship with their partners in India, and influenced the power they hold over the Indian government.

It is important to note that approximately 6% of Indians in the US are estimated to be working as taxi drivers, factory workers, newsstand workers and farmers (many of whom are estimated to come from two the states in this study—Gujarat and Punjab) (American Community Survey 2009). Moreover, a few hundred thousand are unofficially estimated to enter the US illegally through Mexico, and Indians are said to comprise 2% (about 200,000) of all unauthorized immigrants in the US (GOI 2000; Terrazas and Batog 2010). My interviews to date, however, have not yet yielded much insight into this population's transnational linkages. The set of questions in our survey that inquire about education level, English proficiency, and occupation have been extremely sensitive, and it has been difficult to capture much representation from lower class groups of Indian immigrants. We are currently examining whether this is due to (1) the demographic absence of lower class groups among the Indian immigrant population in the US; (2) the lack of organization among lower class Indian immigrants, and/or (3) the unwillingness of organization leaders to talk about lower class members of their organization. The latter may reflect the elitist (and proud) ideals of the Indian community in the US, as well as a fear (especially since September 2011) of losing the “model minority” status that Indian immigrants in the US have enjoyed since the 1970s. As a result of our inability to access the working class minority of Indian immigrants, my analysis below focuses on the elite majority of Indian immigrants in the US.

Table 5: Select Characteristics of Indian Americans

Country of Origin – India		
Population, 2001 Indian Census		1,028,737,436
Urban Population (%), 2009		28
GDP per capita, 2008		3,354
Gini Index of Inequality (UN), 2010		0.368
Educational Attainment (%)		
College or more		
Secondary School, 2000		31.4
Middle School, 2000		46.3
Primary School, 2000		59.3
Mean years of schooling, 2010		4.4
Unemployment Rate (%), 2010		2.7
Work Participation Rate (%), 2001 Indian Census		39%
Capital City	New Delhi	
Immigrants in the U.S.		
Number of foreign born, 2009		1,876,391
Percent of total immigrants to the US, 2008		4.3
Total foreign-born who are naturalized citizens, 2009		884,516
Percent of total lawful-permanent residents (LPR) in the US, 2008		4.1
Rank in total legal immigration, 2008	3rd largest group of LPR	
Occupations (%), 2009		
a) Management, professional and related occupations		66.8
b) Service occupations		6.6
c) Sales and office occupations		18.6
d) Production, transportation, and material moving occupations		6.2
e) Construction, extraction, maintenance, and repair occupations		1.7
f) Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations		0.1
College Graduates (Bachelor's degree or higher), 2009		70.7
Median Household Income (\$), 2009		90,429
Poverty Rate (%), 2009		4.6
Types of Immigration, 2008	Multiple: Family-based immigrants, academic-student admissions, asylum, employment-based immigrants, and unauthorized immigrants	
Principal Cities of Destination, 2008	New York-New Jersey-Long Island (17.1%), Chicago (7.2%), San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara (4.8%)	
Sources:		
1) 2001 Census of India : http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Tables_Published/A-Series/A-Series_links/t_00_003.aspx		
2) India Urban Poverty Report 2009 : www.data.undp.org.in/poverty_reduction/IUPR_Summary.pdf		
3) Human Development Report, 2010: http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/IND.html		
4) Government of India: Report of Selected Educational Statistics (2000-2001)		
5) 2009 American Community Survey		
6) Terrazas, Arron Matteo and Batog, Cristina. 2008. "Indian Immigrants in the United States" Migration Information Source.		
http://www.migrationinformation.org/usfocus/display.cfm?id=685		

Before turning to the details of Indian transnational organizations, let me introduce the diaspora communities from the 3 states of interest in the study.

Gujarati Diaspora

In 2000, the Gujarati population in the US was 150,000, about one-third of the Indian immigrant population in the US (GOI 2000). The first major migration of Gujaratis to the US occurred at the turn of the twentieth century, and (as with other Indian groups) many more migrated after the 1965 reforms to US immigration laws that opened doors to immigrants on employer-sponsored visas (Assar 2000; Kapur, Mehta and Dutt 2004; Sahoo 2006).

By the 1970s, however, Gujaratis had distinguished themselves from other Indian groups by entering small businesses and becoming employers themselves. The largest sub-group of Gujarati immigrants, known as Patels (an agricultural caste belonging to the Patidar ethnic group), famously entered the US hotel industry. As oil prices rose and road travel fell due to the 1973 oil crisis, Patels purchased the motels that were going out of business. In Gujarat, Patels comprise 18% of the population and occupy a dominant role in the social and economic hierarchy of Western India. When they first arrived in the US, however, they had little capital and few skills of value to the US labor market. Therefore, they had difficulties accessing formal financial capital to start their motel businesses and instead relied almost entirely on interest-free loans from their friends and family (Assar 2000). Today, approximately 65% of budget motels and 40% of all motels in the US are run by Patels, a business which is estimated to have a market value of over \$26 billion (Assar 2000). Patels are often considered to be the “most affluent and successful of South Asian settlers” (Sahoo 2006: 91), having achieved the “‘American Dream’ of economic success within one generation” (Assar 2000: 1-2).

Beginning in the 1980s, the number of Gujarati immigrants on employer-sponsored visas decreased and those entering the US on family-sponsorship programs increased. Gujaratis benefited from the US family reunification policies, which “favor immigrant groups in which all members of the family can contribute and improve their family situation” (Assar 2000: 18). This shift from employer-based to family-based sponsorship diversified the occupational backgrounds of Gujaratis in the US, from professionals to small business owners and taxi drivers.

Telegu Diaspora (from Andhra Pradesh)

In the US, the Telegu community has been marked by a strong presence of professionals. The first immigrants from Andhra Pradesh arrived to take advantage of the scholarships, fellowships, and faculty positions that became available after the 1965 US immigration law reforms. Others came as engineers to work in power projects. After the Vietnam War, in the late 1970s and 1980s, many more came as doctors (Bhaskar and Bhat 2003). During the 1990s, a new wave of Telegu IT professionals and students came to the US. Part of this influx was due to the 1990 Immigration Act in the US, which “linked the admission criteria [of immigrants] to the

enhancement of a country's capacity to effectively compete in the international marketplace." Naidu's efforts to build a world class IT sector in Andhra Pradesh highlighted the state as a secure source for IT professionals. Telugus have become the majority group within the Indian software professional community in the US, and they represent 23% of Indian IT professionals worldwide (Xiang 2002).

Punjabi Diaspora

Punjabi Sikhs represent the very first set of Indian immigrants in the US. These early immigrants were male farmers from Punjab, who settled in California in the early 20th century. They identified more along linguistic lines than along religious lines and were commonly referred to (by other non-Indian Americans as well as by themselves) as "Hindus", to signify that they hailed from Hindustan. Due to the US legal restrictions on marriage across race at the time, these migrants married Mexican women, and their children were known as "Mexican Hindus" (Leonard 2007). Nearly 2,000 of these migrants participated in the Ghadar Movement, where they left the US to fight British Colonial rule in India.

As with all Indians, a second wave of Punjabi professionals came to the US in the late 1960s. A majority of those emigrating from Punjab in this period came from Doaba and Malwa, where they left with "a heightened consciousness of a truncated Punjabi-speaking state with a history of Akali Dal as the political party representative of Sikh 'nationalist' aspirations (Tatla 2009: 50).

The most recent emigration of Sikhs from India occurred during the incidents of 1984. These migrants were more diverse and included the Punjabi elite, those with nearly no education, and those who declared themselves Khalistani government officials in exile. The second group represents part of the 6% of working class Indian immigrants, many of whom seek representation and community through US-based gurdwaras. The last group (Khalistani exiled leaders) became the "face of the diaspora during the [Khalistan] separatist movement" (Dhillon 2007:6). By the 1990s, the Punjabi diaspora had been "recast" as the Sikh diaspora since the majority of those emigrating from Punjab were Sikh.

Indian Transnational Organizations in the US

To date, we have identified 624 transnational organizations among Indians in 4 US cities. As shown in Table 2, more than one-third (33%) of them are religious. Eighty-seven percent of the religious organizations identify as solely religious, while 13% of them combine religion with another aim (such as "faith-based development" or "human rights for Hindus"). The second largest category of organizations include ethnic identity organizations (27%) and organizations

that focus on some area of development (including poverty alleviation, orphaned children, health, or education) (19%). Next are the professional and alumni organizations (8%) and the arts organizations (8%). Last (in number) are the human rights organizations (2.7%) and the political organizations (2.6%). Particularly striking, especially when compared to other diaspora groups such as the Chinese and Vietnamese, is the near absence of hometown associations among the Indian diaspora. This, again, may reflect the professional, urban, and elite nature of the Indian diaspora. Gujaratis and Punjabis have a handful of hometown associations (see below); not surprisingly, these groups also encompass the largest share of the small minority of working class Indian immigrants with little education.

As a group, Indian transnational organizations are incredibly diverse, ranging from small, informal groups to large, high-profile wealthy organizations. Politically, there are a few organizations that identify as leftist, but the vast majority range from center-left to extreme right. This is note-worthy, given the large number of leftist NGOs and social movements in India.

The majority of Indian transnational organizations in the US are standalone organizations operating in one location, while approximately one-third are national (in some cases international) with local chapters. Approximately 10% serve as umbrella organizations for other organizations. Approximately 70% of Indian transnational organizations in the US have less than 1,000 members, and approximately one quarter have an annual budget over US\$1,000,000.² Over 70% of them have no paid staff and operate solely through volunteers. While most of them appeal only to ethnic Indians, approximately 25% try to recruit non-Indian members, volunteers, staff, donors, and/or board members.

The vast majority of Indian transnational organizations have emerged since the 1980s. Since then, there have been 2 spikes in terms of new organizations emerging. The first was spurred by events in India and the second by events in the US. The first spike came during the early 1990s, just after the end of the Cold War, when India (1) ended its participation in the non-aligned movement and began to thaw relations with the US, (2) enacted its version of neoliberal reforms and began opening its economy to a global market, and (3) witnessed the rise of Hindu fundamentalism at the social and electoral level. The second spike came in the early 2000s, when (1) the September, 11, 2001 attacks suddenly made Indian immigrants uncomfortable and their loyalties to the US suspect, and (2) the IT boom brought in an unprecedented number of young, educated, high earning, often temporary Indian IT workers to the US. There was also a smaller, but significant jump in the mid-1980s, just after the anti-Sikh riots in India and the arrival of a new Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi—who was pro-West and pro-business.

To date, I have found that men are more active in Indian transnational organizations than women. Women's participation is found to be higher in ethnic identity organizations, where membership is family-based. However, women are nearly absent from leadership positions

² Note many organizations do not have members per se. In those cases we have used the number of volunteers or the donor base as an approximation of "membership".

(across all organizations). In my 69 interviews, I encountered 2 women leaders. As well, I have found that 1st generation Indians are more active in transnational activities than 2nd generation Indians, although exceptions can be found in religious and some development organizations. Of the 1st generation Indian immigrants, the younger cohort (of largely IT professionals ages 25-40) is very active and has more trust in NGOs than the older cohort (of traditional professionals ages 50+). The organizations target both age groups nevertheless, and a vast majority of the organizations interviewed said that their primary goal was to figure out how to attract the 2nd generation of Indian-Americans.

Below, I examine each of the organization types with particular attention to:

- (1) The ideas that flow with these organizations to India and the structures of Indian development, and
- (2) The relational patterns that these organizations create between the Indian diaspora, the Indian population, and the Indian government.

Religious Organizations

Although India is a secular state, Indians are well-known for their deep and heterogeneous religious identities. It is, therefore, not surprising that the largest category of Indian transnational organizations identity as “religious” (28.5%). An additional 4% identify as religious *and* something else (such as a faith-based development organization or a human rights group protecting a vulnerable religious group). As shown in Table 6, Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians have the largest share of religious transnational organizations in the US. It is striking that the share of organizations for each of these three religious groups is nearly equal, given the significant population difference between Hindus versus Sikhs and Christians (in the US and in India). Moreover, it is striking to note the low share of Indian Muslim organizations in the US (2.5%), especially given their sizeable population in India and the US.

Table 6: Religious Organizations

Kind	Number of Organizations^(a)	Share of Religious Organizations^(a)	Share of US Population (%)^(b)	Share of Indian Population (%)^(c)
Buddhist	3	1.5%	0	0.77
Christian	61	29.9%	4.8	2.33
Hindu	70	34.3%	72	80.5
Jain	2	1.0%	1.8	0.41
Muslim	5	2.5%	10	13.4
Sikh	62	30.4%	5.1	1.85
Spiritual	1	0.5%		
Grand Total	204	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

(a) From Inventory. Includes religious combination organizations

(b) From Kapur, Devesh. 2010. *Diaspora, Development, Democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

(c) From Census of India, 2001

A large group of Indian religious organizations are intricately tied to a highly organized religious body in India (such as an ashram, guru, or diocese). Some focus on raising awareness (especially amongst the 2nd generation), support, and funds for the Indian institution. Others are more focused on propagating a particular faith or practice in the US. Although most of these organizations began informally, operating from someone’s home, by the 1970s, many of them were able to purchase physical structures (a temple, gurudwara, or church), where religious rituals could be more formally and publically practiced. These structures also serve as “safe” spaces for community gatherings, education seminars, and individual religious practice.

Religious organizations (across faiths) express their missions in terms of “the need to preserve” their identities—thereby highlighting their minority status in the US (and sometimes in

the world) and framing their minority experience as one that is under threat. Although Hindus are a majority religion in India, they present themselves as under attack by the larger global religions of Islam and Christianity. Sikhs present themselves as under threat in the US (especially due to mistaken identity) and in India (due to the historically tense relations with the Government of India). Christians present themselves as under attack in India due to the rise of Hindu fundamentalists. And Muslims (more tentatively and subtly) present themselves as under attack by the war on terror (in India and the US).

More than other organizations, religious organizations have been most successful at attracting 2nd generation Indian-Americans. Part of this is due to their ability to acknowledge the 2nd generation's loyalties to the U.S. Religion is presented as something that can span geographic identities and encompass multiple locations. Religion is also presented as something that can span class boundaries. Although the leadership and the majority of members of religious organizations was similar to other Indian transnational organizations (i.e. elite), religious organizations showed the largest participation of the minority of working class Indians.

Many of these organizations are extremely large, and enjoy substantial budgets. Funding was rarely mentioned as a challenge for religious organizations. The suspicion that diaspora members expressed for development or alumni organizations is virtually absent for religious organizations.

Sikh Organizations

By far the most studied group of religious transnational organizations among Indians has been the Sikh groups.³ Because of the religious calling for service in the Sikh religion, Sikh

³ See for example: Dhesi, A.S. (2010). Diaspora, social entrepreneurs and community development. *International Journal of Social Economics*, 37 (9), 703-716; Dusenbery, V.A., and Darsham, S.T. (2009). *Sikh Diaspora Philanthropy In Punjab: Global Giving for Local Good*. London, UK: Oxford University Press; Gayer, L. (2002). The globalization of identity politics: The Sikh experience. *International Journal of Punjab Studies*, 7 (2), 223-262; Helweg, A. (1983). Emigrant remittances: Their nature and impact on a Punjabi village. *New Community*, 10, 435-443; Kumar, G. (2003). *Indian diaspora and giving patterns of Indian Americans in the USA*. New Delhi, India: Charities Aid Foundation India; Singh, G., and S. Singh. (2007). Diaspora philanthropy in action: An evaluation of modernization in Punjab villages. *Journal of Punjab Studies*, 14(2), 225-248; Taylor, S., Singh, M., and Booth, D. (2007). Migration, development and inequality: Eastern Punjabi transnationalism. *Global Networks*, 7 (3), 328-347; Thandi, Shinder. (2000). Vilayati Paisa: Some reflections on the potential of diaspora finance in the socio-economic development of Indian Punjab. *International Journal of Punjab Studies*, 7 (2), 323-41; Thandi, S. (1994). Strengthening capitalist agriculture: The impact of overseas remittances in rural central Punjab in the 1970s. *International Journal of Punjab Studies*, 1 (2); Voigt-Graf, C. (2004). Towards a geography of transnational spaces: Indian transnational communities in Australia. *Global Networks*, 4 (1), 25-49; Walton-Roberts, M. (2005). Transnational educational fundraising in Punjab: Old practices, new readings. *Journal of Punjab Studies*, 12 (1), 129-52; Walton-Roberts, M. (2004). Globalization, national autonomy and Non-Resident Indians. *Contemporary South Asia*, 13 (1), 53-69; Walton-Roberts, M. (2004). Returning, remitting, and reshaping: Non-resident Indians and the transformation of society and space in Punjab, India. In P. Crang, C. Dwyer, and P. Jackson (Eds), *Transnational spaces* (pp. 78-103). London: Routledge;

politics in India (the movement for a separate state, the government's crushing of this movement in 1984 etc.), and the worldwide racism that Sikhs have faced since September 11th, 2001, Sikh organizations in the US span the spectrum of operating as a solely religious organization to combining religion with another mission, such as "development," "political/advocacy," or "human rights."

Diaspora philanthropy for the development of the homeland has been a major subject of conversation among Sikh scholars. Charity is an important, clear, and often articulated part of the Sikh religion. Moreover, the gurudwara (the Sikh place of worship) provides a physical meeting place (both in India and the US) through which Sikhs share information about community needs and collect contributions. In 2004, remittances from Punjabis totaled 2-3 billion (US) dollars per year (World Bank 2004). In addition to highlighting the volume of diaspora philanthropy, scholars have analyzed the transformation in its nature. In the past remittances were often used for large-scale projects such as building hospitals, marbled memorial archways, and schools, but more recently they have gone toward basic civic amenities and improving sanitation. Dusenbery and Tatla (2009) argue that this change is a function of both the improved political and economic status of the diaspora, as well as the deterioration of state and economic conditions in Punjab. Although the role of *sants* ("spiritual middlemen" who act as vehicles for philanthropy) continues to be of importance for Sikh philanthropy, more professional approaches to giving through formal trusts and charities have increased since the 1990s.

Scholars have also critiqued Sikh philanthropy to Punjab. Some argue that efforts to build private schools, which offer English instruction and follow the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) curriculum, has widened the quality gap between public and private schools and undermined teacher morale in public schools. Autar Dhesi (2009: 223) critiques the diaspora's role in Punjab's rural development, arguing that diaspora interventions often ignore cultural sensitivities and may give "further impetus to caste-based political and social divides by institutionalizing communalism."

Perhaps the most discussed and significant transnational linkage the Sikh diaspora has made with the homeland is through its support for the Khalistan movement for a separate Sikh state in the 1980s. Diaspora Sikhs raised substantial funds to support the militant activities of Khalistan groups in India and to assist Sikh refugees fleeing Punjab. At first this came as a shock to the Government of India, given the earlier support from the Sikh Diaspora in the Gadar movement for Indian independence.

Some scholars argue that diaspora interest in Khalistan began as early as the 1940s, when Pakistan became an independent nation and inspired the idea of territoriality in Sikh identity (Oberoi 1987; Shani 2005). Since then, Sikh nationalists have worked with Pakistan for support. By the 1970s, Sikh nationalists in India began to recognize the potential to mobilize support from the diaspora. Dr. Jagjit Singh Chohan, a former minister in the government of Punjab, organized

Sikhs in the UK to raise the Khalistan flag at the Indian High Commission in London and placed a call for support for Khalistan in the *New York Times* (Fair 2005).

Other scholars argue that the majority of diaspora support came after Operation Blue Star in 1984, when then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered the Indian military to occupy the Golden Temple in Amritsar (the spiritual and cultural center of the Sikh community) to remove Sikh separatists suspected of hiding in the Temple. The occupation resulted in hundreds of civilian and military deaths, and it sparked enormous anger among Sikhs all over the world. Four months after the occupation, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her two Sikh body guards, which led to thousands of anti-Sikh pogroms throughout the country. Not surprisingly, these incidents increased Sikh insecurities throughout the world and strengthened the desire for an independent homeland even among moderate Sikhs (Biswas 2004). Many of the philanthropic projects the Sikh diaspora have initiated in Punjab since 1984 have aimed at “promoting a Sikh vision of ethno-national history and relations with the Indian state” (Fair 2005: 137).

Still others argue that Sikh diaspora involvement in Khalistan can be attributed to the political struggles taking place between different Indian immigrant groups in the US during the 1980s and 1990s. The earliest Sikh immigrants (who came to California in the early 30th century) were active in leftist pan-Asian groups that focused on workers’ rights, racism and immigration laws. Later, when Hindu immigration to the US increased, Sikh leaders felt the need to create a forum to address Sikh-specific issues and mobilize Sikh-only organizations. The insecurities Sikhs were feeling in the US, therefore, coincided with the events taking place in India, and support for the Khalistan movement enabled Sikh leaders in the diaspora to claim legitimacy and enhance their standing in the community (Biswas 2004).

Just as gurdwaras have been instrumental in fostering Sikh diaspora philanthropy, they played a significant role in mobilizing diaspora support for Khalistan. For example, after Operation Blue Star, many gurdwaras exhibited pictures of those who lost their lives in the conflict—depicting them as contemporary Sikh martyrs—and placed them alongside pictures of historical Sikh martyrs to “visually establish a seamless line of Sikh oppression stemming from the 17th century to the modern period” (Fair 2005: 132). Sikh leaders also organized international meetings to mobilize global support for Khalistan during the 1980s. The (first) International Convention of Sikhs was held in 1981 in New York City. In 1987, the third International Convention was held in Slough, UK, where “building unity in the Khalistan movement” was the stated objective of the meeting (Fair 2005, 133).

A number of organizations emerged during the 1980s to represent the Sikh Diaspora’s support of Khalistan. These include the Khalistan Council, Babar Khalsa International, and the Khalistan Commando Force—all of which are focused on the military and armed-conflict aspects of the Khalistan movement. Although these groups still exist and were included in our interviews, we found through our interviews with other Sikh organizations that there is little overt support for Khalistan today.

Some of the waning interest in Khalistan coincided with the aftermath of September 11th, where Sikhs in the US were violently attacked by Americans who mistook them for Muslim terrorists. These attacks forced some Sikhs to give up certain religious symbols (such as the beard and the turban) and others to prove their loyalties to the US while simultaneously reasserting their Sikhism. These attacks invigorated a burgeoning group of organizations that aimed to protect victims of anti-Sikh violence and discrimination (often using legal channels), and retain Sikh practice and expression among youth. While the first of these organizations emerged in the late 1970s, a larger number emerged in the late 1990s, and the 9/11 attacks further boosted the need for such organizations. Second-generation Sikh Americans are particularly active in this group of organizations.

Despite the wide variety of Sikh organizations, the community has worked hard to create a common voice, a common identity, and thus a stronger voice in India and the US. The World Sikh Council, for example, formed in 1995 to create a federation of gurudwaras and Sikh organizations. Sikh leaders expressed a need to not only preserve their identity and raise awareness of their culture in the US, but also to fight the dilution of their religion in India, where they feel Sikhs are getting “Hinduized.”

Hindu Organizations

Hindu organizations in the US have become extremely organized in recent years. In addition to conducting religious rituals and ceremonies, these organizations are heavily vested in education. They hold weekly *bal vihars* (roughly equivalent to a Sunday Schools). They also hold popular Hindu Heritage camps in the summer, where 2nd generation Indian youth go away to learn yoga, prayers, Hindu history, and Hindu texts. “We want to give them a feeling of who they are and where they come from, so when they go to college they can speak with a degree of confidence,” explained Abhaya Asthana, General Secretary of VHP.⁴ The camps and *bal vihars* also serve to socialize Hindu youth with one another as a way to increase their confidence. “We try to give young people clear tips on how they can get the guts to practice their own religion in their dorm or on a class trip, but also how to explain it to their peers and answer derogatory questions,” explained Yogi Trivedi Communications Director of BAPS Swaminarayan Sanstha.⁵

⁴ Interview April 7, 2011.

⁵ Interview May 29, 2011

Some Hindu organizations have been heavily highlighted in the popular and academic press as catalysts for Hindu fundamentalist movements in India. In recent years, scholars have tried to correct this perception by highlighting the multitude of non-fundamentalist poverty-alleviation efforts in which transnational religious movements engage (Anand 2004). Because of the negative attention received by Hindu organizations (many of whom were accused of illegally raising money to support violence against religious minorities in India), many Hindu organizations now self-classify themselves as “development” organizations. Other Hindu organizations call themselves “Indian” as a right-wing political statement against India’s particular model of state secularism. Since the controversies, many Hindu organizations have begun to highlight more their involvement in community service not just in India, but also here in the US.

Hindu organizations are especially prevalent among Gujaratis immigrants. The Swaminarayan and Vallabhacharya traditions of Hinduism both originated and developed in Gujarat. The Patidars, who occupy a predominant role within the diaspora in the US, played an important role in the Gandhian strand of the nationalist movement after independence, and they have since become a “major powerbase” for the BJP in Gujarat (Bhatt and Mukta 2000: 424).

Christian Organizations

Christian Indian churches emerged in the US during the late 1970s to provide Christian Indian immigrants with a community, as well as services conducted in 2 languages (English and a local Indian language).

In the 1990s, a new group of Christian transnational organizations began to grow. Some of these organizations operate primarily as social organizations to help people connect across ethnic and religious lines. Leaders said this was necessary, because Indian ethnic organizations (even at the regional level) are usually Hindu dominated, and Christians can feel left out. Others are more focused on religious practices, working to bring different churches together under one voice and identity. Doing so is said to help make the US-based church operations more efficient and coordinated (especially when receiving pastors from India). Some even support missionaries in India and elsewhere. Given the recent rise in anti-Christian violence in India, however, organizations were sometimes reluctant to talk in their interviews about their mission work, conversions or evangelical activities. Some organizations are very involved in raising awareness on anti-Christian violence in India. “When a church in India is burned by Hindutva, we tell the State Department. We want Hindutva to know that these actions will make India poorer,” explained Nehemiah Johnson, General Secretary of National Association of Asian Indian Christians of the USA.⁶ Others lobby the Ministry of Education and the Prime Minister in India. As in India, nearly all Christian Indian organizations in the US are heavily involved in

⁶ Interview April 29, 2011

development, charity, and education efforts in India. Christian Indian organizations also expressed a confidence in attracting 2nd generation youth to their activities. However, the 2nd generation youth are not necessarily tied to the transnational work with India. Rather, they join the activities that focus on creating a unique identity here in the US.

The rise in the more broad-based Christian organizations during the 1990s was likely linked to the rise in Hindu nationalism (both in India and the US) and related anti-Christian violence that occurred in India during the 1990s. The anti-Christian violence and the Hindu nationalist rhetoric in India was/is largely focused on “forced” conversions made on a mass scale. Much of this is said to be done by evangelical groups that receive substantial support from churches in the West (which in turn adds to the resentment in India). Christian groups are, therefore, sensitive to the topic of conversions. Most of the violence is targeted at churches in India.

The other major topic of discussion in India with regard to Christians revolves around Dalit Christians. Dalits (or members of the lowest caste in India) actively converted to Christianity (starting in the 1920s and continuing to this day) under the promise that Christianity would offer them a faith where they would be equal to all others. The promise that Christianity is a casteless religion was so deep that early Christian leaders fought to exclude Dalit Christians (and Dalit Muslims) from the reservation quotas (or affirmative action efforts) provided in the Indian constitution to secure Dalits in government jobs and educational institutions. In practice, however, this promise has not played out. Caste hierarchies are deeply entrenched in Indian society and they remain extant in churches and mosques. As a result, Dalits, human rights groups, and some Christian organizations have begun fighting to include Dalit Christians in the reservation quotas for Dalits. The Government of India, however, has not been very responsive. In 2006, the Government of India launched a new Ministry of Minority Affairs. It has a small budget and primarily focuses on Muslims. As BP Sharma, Joint Secretary in the Ministry said, “Christians are absolutely fine; they are above the national average on most indicators!”⁷ Despite the intense focus on this issue among Christian groups in India, I have found little attention to this issue among Christian Indian organizations in the US.

Muslim Organizations

Indian Muslim organizations are entirely built around combination identities (such as development, human rights etc.). Part of the reason for this is built into the religion where Islam is considered a “global brother/sister hood” that is not geographically defined. Therefore, Indian Muslims who want to create a cultural support group must turn to “religion plus” approaches. In addition, due to the “War on Terror” in the US, and the rise of Hindu fundamentalists in India

⁷ Interview May 26, 2011

(who have framed Muslims as the enemy), Indian Muslims are weary of being misperceived as disloyal (to either India or the US).

I argue that this position has given Indian Muslims an extraordinary opportunity to affect change in India. Unlike Indian Christian organizations, Indian Muslim organizations are extremely focused on the effect of poverty on Muslims in India. As a result, they have worked with Indian Muslim organizations in India to reframe the anti-Muslim rhetoric in India from identity and religion to *class*. They engage in strong advocacy work with the Indian government, and have enjoyed several successes (alongside their partners in India). Of all transnational Indian organizations, Indian Muslims are unique in their focus on the intersection of culture with class.

Indian Muslim organizations in the US try to articulate their distinct and delicate identity. “When we are in professional groups, we are counted as Indians, when we are in mosques we are counted as Muslims. This was fine for a while. With 9/11, Muslims in general became very conscious of their need to explain their religion. They were working on stuff before 9/11—working on media and archiving. But 9/11 catalyzed the urgency of it. But the massacre in Gujarat pushed Indian Muslims to become more active. It really disturbed us,” explained Shaheen Khateeb, Founding Member and ex-General Secretary of the Indian American Muslim Coalition.⁸

** This is an extremely understudied group, and the issues they address are noteworthy. I am presently in the midst of expanding on the analysis of Indian Muslim organizations.

Ethnic/Linguistic Identity Organizations

The second largest category of organizations among the Indian diaspora revolve around ethnic and linguistic identities. These organizations primarily aim to provide a cultural space for a home away from home. Most were started (and continue to be used) to ensure that the 2nd generation does not lose their language, identity, and rituals. While some organize around a pan-Indian identity, the growth of the Indian diaspora in the US has enabled Indians to divide themselves into sub-regional identity groups, which better reflects the identities they grew up with in India. These organizations host celebrations of local Indian holidays and social gatherings. They provide community health training, financial assistance, and education sessions to members—especially to newly sponsored family members who may not have English language and/or much education. They assist in the assimilation of senior citizens who have just arrived, and they serve as a ready marriage market for 2nd generation Indians. Because they have managed to attain trust from their own community members, and are often the target of diaspora

⁸ Interview April 27, 2011

contributions, development organizations often partner with these identity organizations to channel funds to a particular area in India.

While to date, the Indian government has formed relatively few connections with this group of organizations, in recent years, the Indian government has started to increase their interest in these cultural identity groups. As the Secretary of MOIA, Dr. Didaar Singh explained, “The global Indian is a tool of “soft power”. When the diaspora brings Bollywood and Indian fashion, music, culture, food etc. to their neighbors, we are converting people to see India.”⁹ Recently, the Indian government purchased its first Indian cultural center in the US as part of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, under the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. In addition to fostering social and cultural links, Indian identity organizations have been instrumental in shaping India-US foreign policy agreements (see below for more detail). “We would like to work more with the US and Canada. If the diaspora assists us in making bridges, than India benefits,” said MOIA Secretary, Dr. Singh.¹⁰ Since 2005, MOIA has initiated several programs to foster links with Indian identity groups throughout the world. They include:

- Study India Program: host 35 people of Indian origin (PIOs), ages 18-26 who have never been to India. They have run this program for 4 years. The Indian government pays all expenses (except 10% of the air ticket).
- Know Your Roots Program: assists PIOs in tracing their roots in India.
- Scholarship Program for children of Indian diaspora to study in India
- Indian Community Welfare: provides emergency funds for diaspora, student emergencies through embassies and consular offices.

As detailed below, state governments are also now starting to connect with these organizations to draw more targeted aid to their own states.

Pan-Indian Identity Organizations

Pan-Indian identity organizations emerged in the early years of Indian immigration to the US, because there were too few Indians to divide into sub-regional identities (such as Gujarati, Punjabi etc.). These organizations provided new immigrants with familiar cultural space where they could perform important rituals (around marriage, birth, death), speak their language, discuss their concerns about raising their children in a new cultural context, and simply eat their own food.

In addition, these organizations aimed to assist Indians fight discrimination in the US. As Munish Gupta, President of NFIA India Council, said, “Color also put these early Indians

⁹ Interview, January 19, 2011.

¹⁰ Interview, January 19, 2011.

together. Color *matters* in the US.”¹¹ By the 1980s, sub-regional groups had begun to divide the pan-Indian identity groups. At that time, a new generation of pan-Indian identity groups (such as GOPIO, NFIA, and AIA) emerged to unite the Indian community under one voice and secure their *representation and visibility in US community and political affairs*. Said Gupta, “These people had to struggle for their existence, and they wanted something better for their children. Community centers were created, but they had to be backed by more powerful associations. That is why we started.”¹² These organization create newsletters on diaspora affairs, they organize an annual, much-publicized India Day parade in New York that not only boosts Indian visibility in the US, but also helps Indian businesses. And they organize various workshops and conferences on issues concerning the Indian diaspora (such as health, diaspora women, and diaspora studies).

Although at first, the Indian government was not involved in these US-based Indian identity organizations, its interest in them began to increase during the Afghanistan war of the 1980s. Since independence, India-US relations were tense due to the Cold War and India’s leadership in the non-aligned movement. During the Afghan War, tensions heightened when US increased its support for Pakistan (in return for access to Afghanistan), and India turned to the Soviet Union for help. US support for Pakistan was thought to be aiding the war in Kashmir. This angered Indian-Americans, who were worried about their families at home, had a personal stake in US perceptions of India, and were beginning to attain a voice with the US Government. In 1983, then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited the US to try forming better relations with the US Government and with Indian-Americans. At that time, many of the Indian identity organizations were formally recognized by the Government of India. In 1987, however, relations improved even further when then-Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited the US. Upon entering power, Rajiv Gandhi announced a pro-West, pro-business approach that appealed to the US Government and especially to Indian-Americans. During his visit to the US, he explicitly reached out to the Indian diaspora as a bridge to thaw the icy bi-lateral relations that had formed between India and the US during the Cold War. He hosted the first reception in the US for members of the Indian diaspora only; all the leaders of Indian transnational organizations attended the reception and met him personally. He also hosted the first Indian cultural festival, where artists from India were flown in (held in Washington DC and in Paris).

By the 1990s, when the Cold War had ended and India had formally announced it’s liberalization reforms, Indian-American relations improved dramatically. The role of the Indian diaspora, therefore, became even stronger in India-US bilateral relations. Indian-Americans became responsible for bringing their Congressmen to receptions at the Indian embassy. And transnational organizations became responsible for organizing and educating Indian-Americans to pressure their Congressmen on the US-India foreign policy issues. For example, the largest overseas Indian organization, Global Organization for People of Indian Origin (GOPIO), was

¹¹ Interview May 14, 2011.

¹² Interview May 14, 2011.

instrumental in shaping the recent nuclear deal between India and the US. They led countless town hall meetings throughout the US, spearheaded letter writing campaigns to local Congressmen, and advocated in front of the White House.

Finally, pan-Indian identity organizations have been active in advocating for legislative changes in India that would facilitate Indian diaspora travel, business, and capital transfers with India. They have fought hard to reduce visa fines for Indian-Americans travelling to India, they campaigned (and won) the special visa and overseas citizen status for Indian diaspora members (PIO and OCI cards), and they help Indian diaspora members interface with the Indian Embassy in the US.

Ultimately, however, the biggest challenge that Pan-Indian organizations have faced is that fighting the desire among most Indian-Americans to organize on a sub-regional basis. Let me now elaborate on the sub-regional identity groups for the 3 states covered in this study.

Gujarati Ethnic Organizations

Gujarati immigrants in the US have been extremely organized. As detailed above, they have been particularly active in religious organizations. As detailed below, they are also one of the few ethnic groups that have organized organizations along professional and alumni lines (such as the Hotel Owners Association and Baroda Medical College Alumni Association). But they have also been active in simple ethnic identity organizations that aim to preserve cultural rituals and language. These Gujarati ethnic organizations began as early as the 1970s, and some even own entire buildings.

At first, these organizations did not have many transnational linkages. “For so long, the Gujarat Government didn’t take much interest in the US. And our members in the early years didn’t have much contact with Gujarat, because they weren’t well known people,” explained Manikant Patel, President of the Gujarati Samaj of NY (the oldest Gujarati organization in the US).¹³

But in the 1990s, the Gujarat Government began to reach out to the Gujarati diaspora—using transnational organizations as an entry point. Chief Minister Keshubhai Patel (of INC) institutionalized the effort. In 1998, he created the Non-Resident Gujarati (NRG) Foundation that comprised of non-government advisors and channeled money toward NRG issues. While the NRG Division already existed under the Government of Gujarat, the Foundation strengthened the Divisions’ activities with monetary support. Twenty seven NRG Committees were created at the district level in India (with the District Collector serving as the Chairman) to deal with NRG issues, such as inheritance or philanthropy. He also revived the NRG identity

¹³ Interview April 19, 2011

card that provides members with discounts on Gujarati businesses around the world and enable the government to retain a database of overseas Gujaratis.

Despite these efforts, however, Chief Minister Patel did not manage to impress the overseas Gujarati community in the US nor did he manage to draw in much investment to the state. When he personally came to inaugurate the Gujarati Samaj building in NY after its second renovation, Manikant Patel explained, “Kheshubhai has not done anything for Gujarat. He cannot do anything. He is old and he is not educated. Our members came to hear him, because he is Chief Minister. They thought he was fine. And then they left. But that was it.”¹⁴

In contrast, present Chief Minister, Modi (BJP) has been brilliant at tapping the Gujarati Diaspora for support. Although he has famously been denied an entry visa to the US (due to the actions of human rights groups in the Indian diaspora), he has managed to intimately connect with the Gujarati diaspora. Moreover, he has *shifted the focus from eliciting investments to fomenting cultural ties and eliciting social contributions*. He sends DVDs of Gujarati cultural programs and a personalized letter to Gujarati organizations on their anniversaries. To encourage transnational philanthropy from overseas Gujaratis, he has published a book, entitled *Vatan ni Sewa*, that showcases NRG-funded projects throughout the state. He has organized several annual conferences for global Gujaratis that are replete with symbolism and fanfare. After the annual PVD conference in Delhi, for example, the Government of Gujarat hosts a smaller gathering for NRGs. “Gujaratis don’t feel too connected to Delhi; they prefer Bombay. So it is a brilliant move by Modi to take advantage of the Gujaratis that are in town for PVD, but not necessarily comfortable at PVD,” explained Ravi Saxena, Acting Chief Secretary of the NRG Division.¹⁵ Every year, the Gujarati Government also holds a “Vibrant Gujarat” meeting that targets global investors. In 2011, Modi built a massive, modern convention center, called the Mahatma Mandir (named after Mahatma Gandhi) that he announced would serve as a space to negotiate world peace. Its design, where an ornate garden will connect the Mandir to the State Parliament of Gujarat, was inspired by the mall in Washington D.C. Just in time for the 2011 Vibrant Event, Modi asked NRGs to bring with them soil and water from their own rivers and countries to pour into the foundation of the Mandir. From 2010 to 2011, Modi orchestrated a series of worldwide celebrations for Gujarat’s 50th anniversary to help the government get more connected to NRGs. The local celebrations were video-taped and shown at the culminating 2011 Vibrant Event. Some complained that Modi has undercut Patel’s earlier efforts to strengthen government initiatives with NRGs and instead made all connections part of his personal fiefdom. Others said that under Modi, the NRG Division and Foundation have expanded their budgets and thus increased their activities. Additional activities of the NRG Division and Foundation of the Government of Gujarat today include:

¹⁴ Interview April 19, 2011

¹⁵ Interview March 12, 2011

1. Working with University Grants Commission of India to create a Diaspora Research Center in Northern Gujarat University.
2. Translating the Government of India's marriage guidelines from English to Gujarati and distributing 20,000 copies to women's organizations. The book outlines everything one should check before marrying a non-resident Indian (NRI). Marrying an NRI is viewed by many Indian families as a ticket to prosperity and happiness. However, local organizations are now trying to raise awareness on potential abuses and problems that can arise from such marriages. The NRG Division has hosted Marriage Awareness Conferences, where they invited experts from women's organizations to talk about marriage abroad.
3. Encouraging transnational philanthropy from overseas Gujaratis, by publishing a book, entitled *Vatan ni Sewa*, that showcases NRG-funded projects throughout the state.
4. Maintaining an updated NRG website, where NRGs can keep up with events and activities in the NRG community and in Gujarat. They can also register their data and apply for an NRG card on the website. Today, the Gujarati Government has 68,000 names of NRGs in their data base.
5. Serving as a resource center for NRG questions or issues.

Modi has become extremely popular with the Indian-American diaspora, and Gujarati organizations work hard to connect with him, and therefore, with Gujarat. As Manikant Patel of the NY Gujarati Samaj explained:

Now we are very much connected. Modi has done so much for Gujarat, and our members are very excited about him. He put Gujarat on the world map, and we are so proud to be Gujarati! He is completely different. I have constant contact with Modi by email and phone.

When Modi was denied a visa to enter the US, Gujarati organizations actively resisted the decision, which has assisted Modi in his public relations in India.

Gujaratis are also one of the few groups in the Indian-American diaspora to organize hometown associations. Because many Gujarati immigrants in the US come from a farmer caste and grew up in rural areas, they are very active in providing contributions to their home villages. I visited several villages in Gujarat that rely almost entirely on diaspora contributions. The villages have extremely organized, professional, and structured leaders and village bodies to elicit the contributions, manage them, and spend them. With the overseas contributions, these villages have built hospitals, schools, cardiac research centers, heart surgery facilities (that host international patients), yoga retreat centers, water filtration facilities, and biogas production plants. Most of the contributions are conducted on an individual basis. Some, however, are organized through hometown associations. As Mr. Bhanji Khadria, President of the Kadwa Patel Samaj of North America, explained:

At first I was so opposed to making a caste-based organization. I became a member of my college alumni association instead. But I found that caste loyalties is what moved people to give. It is difficult to get money from city people who are schooled in English medium. I find lower classes from rural areas are more giving. So that is what we did. The money raised is *not* only used for one caste, but we used the shared caste background to motivate people to give.”¹⁶

Telegu Ethnic Organizations (from Andhra Pradesh)

Telegu organizations have become more active in recent years as the Telegu community has grown. Telegu organizations have been explicitly involved in local Andhra Pradesh politics (see Political Organizations), and they are among the most active in the Muslim American community (see Religious Organizations). Most Telegu organizations, however, are based on ethnic and linguistic identities. In addition to hosting cultural events, these organizations help recent Telegu immigrants, many of whom are students or young professionals. They assist these recent immigrants with legal issues in the US (such as arrests), visa issues, as well as crises (such as bringing a body back to India in the case of a death). “We are so large and have so many volunteers all over the country, we have incredible networking capabilities and can address crises faster than anyone else,” explained Jayaram Komati, President of TANA (Telegu Association of North America), one of the two largest Telegu organizations in the country.¹⁷ They also hold blood drives for the local community and education seminars for members of the Telegu diaspora on issues, such as the importance of creating a will (for the 1st generation) and the importance of Telegu language (for the 2nd generation).

As in the case of Gujarat, the recent pro-business efforts of the Andhra Pradesh Government have increased the transnational interests of the Telegu-American community. ATA (American Telegu Association), the other of the two largest Telegu organizations in India, for example worked to have Maryland Governor O’Malley accept Andhra Pradesh as a sister state with which to exchange business. He is scheduled to soon travel to Andhra Pradesh to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Andhra Pradesh. Telegu organizations also hold conferences in India to share knowledge on business, agriculture, IT, and pharmaceuticals. They hold seminars to increase awareness on AIDS and educate parents in India on which US university they should and can send their children. They support development efforts in the state, such as eye camps and children’s rescue centers. Interestingly, in addition to promoting Telegu culture in the US (by flying Telgu artists from India to the US), these organizations also promote and preserve Telegu culture in India. Every year, they go to India to support dying art forms and revive celebrations that are not longer practiced. “What we

¹⁶ Interview April 22, 2011

¹⁷ Interview April 12, 2011

saw as children, we don't see any more in India. So we promote it," explained TANA President, Komati.

As the Telegu community has expanded in the US (due in large part to the IT boom in the US and Chief Minister Naidu's commitment to IT in Andhra Pradesh), the ethnic and cultural divisions present in Andhra Pradesh have been reproduced in the US. The Telangana NRI Association (TeNA), for example, formed its own organization in 2007 to resist the perceived cultural domination of Kammas and Reddys in ATA and TANA. They created a forum where immigrants from Telangana could showcase their unique heritage. "Although we speak Telegu and we are all of the same economic class, we felt the mainstream Telegu organizations in the US did not represent Telangana festivals and culture and food adequately," explained Venkat Maroju of TeNA.¹⁸ For years, the Telangana groups operated virtually. But in the early 2000s, they began to organize more formally. In addition to promoting their culture, however, the Telagana transnational groups are active participants in the Indian project of *identity formation*. The Telangana separatist movement in India is working hard to articulate a unique Telangana identity. "This is an exciting movement, and we wanted to be a part of it," explained Maroju.

Although the Government of Andhra Pradesh has actively been promoting IT development, education, migration and return migration, it has not been as overt as the Gujarat Government in fomenting relations with Telegu organizations in the US. In my interviews, Government officials were well aware of the major Telegu organizations and have clearly worked with them on several occasions. Many have travelled to the US to attend their meetings. Until recently, Telegu immigrants primarily arrived in the US for professional reasons, and over time they sponsored their family members to join them. "These groups stay in the US for a long time, so they don't send as many remittances or do as much investment as the US software engineers or the Gulf workers—who are all on temporary work visas," explained N.V. Ramana Reddy, Special Secretary to Government for Political and NRI Affairs.¹⁹ The recent emigrants from Andhra Pradesh have been more diverse in terms of their social background, and many of them return to India. They have invested heavily in real estate, and they are active about sending home remittances. "I would say the entire rise in real estate prices in Hyderabad can be attributed to NRI speculation and investment," said Reddy.²⁰ The State-level Department of Industries and Commerce also provides NRIs with special incentives to invite their investments in the state. However, they have not had much luck with the Telegu diaspora per se. "Telegus in the US are mainly professionals. They are not entrepreneurs, like the Gujaratis. So they have private investments in real estate, but little deliberate investment in industry and business," explained TS Appa Rao, Secretary of Industries and Commerce in Andhra Pradesh²¹

¹⁸ Interview May 4, 2011.

¹⁹ Interview May 23, 2011

²⁰ Interview May 23, 2011

²¹ Interview May 24, 2011

Punjabi Ethnic Organizations

Interestingly, there are very few Punjabi ethnic organizations. Nearly all diaspora organizations among Punjabis are Sikh-oriented (see Religious Organizations). The Punjabi American Cultural Association, founded in 2001, is one exception. Like many Indian diaspora organizations, this one began after September 11th, when hate crimes against Sikhs increased in the US. “Instead of blaming and complaining, we decided we needed to educate people about ourselves,” explained Dr. Karput Thugga, President and Founder. Although Dr Thugga is Sikh himself, and the inspiration for the organization was to fight anti-Sikh violence, Dr. Thugga explained, “It was a very conscious decision to make our organization Punjabi and not Sikh.” The distinction aimed to highlight a cultural identity over a religious one. The organization includes all religions that share a common heritage and culture.

In Punjab, Parkash Singh Badal, the Akali Dali Chief Minister, offered incentives and simplified procedures for diaspora investments. The Punjab State Government now holds annual NRI festivals/meetings. In 2005, Chief Minister Amrinder Singh (of INC) launched a development financing scheme which seeks Non-resident Punjabis to match an equal amount of funding from the state for social and environmental projects. This initiative is called *Mera Pind* and aims to improve village infrastructure, women’s empowerment, primary health care, and create job opportunities for unemployed youth.

Development Organizations

After religious and ethnic organizations, the largest group of Indian transnational organizations self-identify as development organizations (19%). If we include the organizations that work on *faith-based* development (which are classified as “religious combination” organizations in Table 2), development organizations comprise 20% of Indian transnational organizations in the US.

Many of these organizations were started to raise money from the Indian diaspora to support an existing Indian parent organization. In most cases, the Indian organization is well-known in India and enjoys substantial capacity. As multi-lateral and bi-lateral aid to India begins to decline, however, Indian NGOs are seeking alternative funding sources, and the growing mass of “high net-worth” Indians in the US have become an important source of alternative funding for Indian NGOs. In these cases, the US organization often serves as a “younger sibling” to the Indian organization, and it is rarely the source of new ideas, strategic visions etc. The Indian diaspora is used for it’s money, but it does not exert much influence over the direction of development in India.

In other cases, the US organization was initiated on its own. In these cases, the Indian diaspora exerts more power over the Indian counterpart organizations. For example, the Indian

diaspora has used these organizations to import American ideals of formalized philanthropy, volunteerism, and tax breaks for charitable giving to India. While surveys of giving in India have shown that traditional forms of individual giving to family members, religious institutions, or beggars is extremely high in India, institutionalized forms of giving are low (Agarwal 2010). This raises important questions as to whether or not the Indian diaspora can and/or should institutionalize more formalized channels of charitable giving in India. Underlying these ideals is a strong distrust of government and a privileging of private efforts.

The Indian government's MOIA is charged with facilitating and formalizing diaspora philanthropy; however, they have not done much to date. Some NGO leaders in India said in interviews with me that American ideals of formalized philanthropy are 'un-Indian' and will therefore not spread to the mass population.²² Others felt they were necessary, because they could ensure that Indians give "more wisely" rather than on an ad-hoc basis.²³ A number of Indian NGOs are currently working with government officials to decrease the bureaucratic hurdles involved in international giving and to improve the tax incentive to give from abroad.

Whether the US organization began on its own terms or to support an existing Indian organization, almost all of them said they spend most of their time and resources fund-raising. Typical forms of fund-raising include galas that feature popular cinema actors and musicians, on-line donation campaigns, philanthropic grants, and corporate funding. The vast majority of funding still comes from individual contributions and fund-raising events. Some also attain contributions from foundations. Several organizations expressed interest in tapping the corporate sphere more, especially since Indians are so well represented in this sector. Companies are said to be eager to please their large Indian employee base, and display their commitment to India as they attempt to expand their businesses into the Indian market. In several cases, organizations targeted companies that were led by Indians (the American India Foundation (AIF) being the most famous example with Citibank and McKinsey as active partners and Bill Clinton as a founding supporter). In addition to tapping American companies, many organizations are tapping Indian companies that are moving to the US. Clearly, the economic recession has hurt development organizations' funding from wealthy individuals and corporations.

Several organizations expressed frustration with their attempts to raise money from the Indian diaspora, because of the diaspora's lack of trust for NGOs (this was found to be true in India and in the US). For example, donors often want all of their money to go to the cause and none to overhead. As a result, many of the transnational organizations have very small staff and an enormous volunteer base. Second, donors often want to donate to their own hometown, where they have relatives and friends who can monitor the use of the money and recognize their donation. Scholars of Indian migration have underlined this tendency among overseas Indian

²² Interview Sanjay Agarwal, Principal and Founder of AccountAid, January 18, 2011.

²³ Interview Dr. Pradeepta Kumar Nayak, Executive Director of Sampradaan, January 13, 2011.

donors, arguing that it has exacerbated inequalities and diverted the work of the organization.²⁴ Indian diaspora members also tend to give to their own ethnic or religious group, rather than to secular development organizations. Some leaders expressed frustration with Indian diaspora donors for being too removed from India and thus less knowledgeable of the specific constraints facing the Indian poor. In these cases, leaders said they had to spend substantial time justifying their use of donor money.

Finally, because the donor base of Indians in the US is relatively conservative (socially and politically), the causes for which they are willing to donate can be limited. Donors are often very quick and keen to donate to natural disasters (Gujarat earthquake, Tsunami in Tamil Nadu, floods in Punjab), but sustained development efforts are often underfunded. Some expressed difficulty attaining donations for women's rights abuses. A large number of organizations focus on children, which is considered a more palatable area of philanthropy for Indian Americans.

By far the most popular cause for Indian Americans is education in India. A vast majority of Indian immigrants in the US articulate their own "success" (exemplified by their migration experience) as a result of education. Because it is the 1st generation of Indian immigrants who are most active in transnational organizations, this education was mostly realized in India itself. These immigrants remain loyal to the teachers and adults who supported them through their schooling in India (see Alumni organizations below). But they also see education (in India) as the future path out of poverty for India's masses. Education is also seen as a politically non-controversial subject. This focus on education in India has inspired many of the US organizations that started on their own and Indian education organizations to set up offices in the US. In addition, however, it has forced several Indian organizations that address development more broadly to rebrand themselves through a US office for US immigrants as education oriented.

Almost all development organizations, like other Indian transnational organizations, rely on volunteers and have 1 or no paid staff. Most of these volunteers are young (students or recent graduates). First generation Indian students often volunteer for development organizations, because they are new in the country and are looking for a community. Like other transnational organizations, many development organizations found it difficult to attract 2nd generation young Indians. Unlike other transnational organizations, however, some development organizations said nearly 50% of their volunteers are 2nd generation. In recent years, they said, they have found an increased interest among 2nd generation Indians to "do something good." Some leaders admitted, however, that while they were proud of their ability to attract 2nd generation interest in

²⁴ See for example: Dusenbery, V.A., and Darsham, S.T. (2009). *Sikh Diaspora Philanthropy In Punjab: Global Giving for Local Good*. London, UK: Oxford University Press; Lessinger, J. (1992). Investing or going home? A transnational strategy among Indian immigrants in the United States. *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 645, 53-80; Taylor, S., Singh, M., and Booth, D. (2007). Migration, development and inequality: Eastern Punjabi transnationalism. *Global Networks*, 7 (3), 328-347.

India, they also found 2nd generation interest difficult to incorporate into sustained organizational activity, because it is often resume-inspired and, therefore, fleeting.

University Alumni Organizations and Professional Organizations

Over 8% of transnational Indian organizations are alumni and professional. These organizations have grown exponentially in recent years due to the dot-com boom in the US. As outlined earlier, IITs have produced a large share of the Indian American population, and many alumni in the US have formed associations and foundations to give back to their alma mater. Other universities and colleges have also followed these efforts. Almost all the alumni organizations were formed after 1990, with the majority emerging after the IT boom of the 2000s. In addition to giving back to their alma maters, they operate as social and professional networks. Some also work to showcase the contributions that Indians have made to the US economy to fight the resentment that was emerging around “American jobs being outsourced to India” and “cheap Indian software engineers taking American jobs.” PanIIT made a list of 800 IIT graduates who have significantly contributed to the US economy and presented it to Congress. The list included founders, inventors, and patent holders for flatscreens, cell phone towers, laser surgery, Sun Microsystems, fiberoptics and more. As a result of this effort, The US Congress for the first time ever recognized a foreign university in House Resolution 227. This has not even been done for Oxford and Cambridge Universities.

Professional organizations include physicians, entrepreneurs, and hoteliers—all of whom are interested in creating business partnerships with groups in India. These organizations began to support members here in the US and to create a voice for Indian-Americans who may have felt discrimination in these professions. In recent years, their interest in working with India and in India has increased. Like development organizations, these organizations pride themselves for exemplifying the secular ideal of India by spanning regional and religious identities. This same trait, however, has also made it difficult for them to attract member loyalties and contributions. Nevertheless, the members of these transnational organizations represent some of the wealthiest and most powerful elite in the world. It is no wonder, therefore, that their relations with local Indians and with the Indian government are complicated.

The Indian government is very keen to form links with this group of the diaspora. Desai et al estimate that the annual net fiscal impact of tax income lost from high-skilled emigration from India to the US is 0.5% of India’s gross national income (or 2.5% of total fiscal revenues) (Desai et al. 2009). One way to make up for this shortfall is to ensure that high skilled emigrants bring money back to India. This can take place in the form of remittances or investments. For three years, India has been the largest recipient of remittances at \$54 billion/year; this amount is even higher than that of China and Mexico (World Bank 2009). Nearly 30% of these remittances come from the Middle East (where the majority of Indians are blue collar workers),

and 40% come from North America (where the majority of Indians are white collar workers) (Reserve Bank of India 2010). Surveys have shown that nearly 95% of Indians send money to their family members or close friends to support education, health, or other personal matters (Sampradaan 2001). Indians have been sending remittances since they began to migrate, and there is no indication that this practice will change in the near future.

While remittances no doubt impact consumption levels, are more consistent than local business cycles, and provide direct assistance to poor families, the Indian government is keen to increase the diaspora's *investment* efforts in India. This is a standard economic approach for developing countries that have not yet reached full production capacity. To date, however, foreign direct investment in India from overseas Indians has been extremely low at less than 1%. Many have noted that the Chinese government has been far more successful than the Indian government in facilitating diaspora investments in the homeland (Saxenian 2005; Zhu 2007). Others have argued that investments from overseas Indians will remain low relative to overseas Chinese, because of the disproportionate share of professionals (rather than business people) in the Indian-American diaspora.

In recent years, the Indian government has made concerted efforts to attract Indian diaspora investments. The annual conference (PVD) is designed to make them feel connected and recognized by India; the PIO and OCI citizenship cards are designed to facilitate their ability to invest and identify with India, and the special terms for NRI bank accounts are designed to provide incentives for diaspora investment. Despite these concerted efforts to lure India diaspora investments, however, several officials in the Indian government expressed a frustration with the power dynamic involved in fomenting links with this group of the diaspora. The Secretary of the Ministry of Overseas Indians, Dr. Didar Singh, was emotional about this topic:

Let me make one thing clear. We are not standing with begging bowls asking for diaspora investments. Absolutely not! This is the biggest misconception among the diaspora-- that we want their money. We are just as happy if they want to invest their money elsewhere. People are investing in India because it's a good place to invest. We will showcase our growth and opportunities and we will facilitate and welcome any investments that come in. But we won't differentiate between NRI [non-resident Indian] investment and others. We believe we have a tremendous economy.²⁵

This was an ironic statement coming from the Secretary of Ministry whose express purpose is to differentiate between NRIs and others.

Government officials also claimed credit for much of the Indian-Americans' success. As Mr. Gurucharan, CEO of the Indian Council of Overseas Employment, explained, "It really is the Nehruvian legacy that laid the foundation for the global IT revolution."²⁶ Here, Gurucharan is

²⁵ Interview January 19, 2011

²⁶ Interview, January 25, 2011

referring to Nehru's deep commitment to training a cadre of youth that could participate in heavy industrialization through institutes, such as the ITTs. The Secretary of the Ministry of Overseas Indians, Dr. Didar Singh, said

We are very proud of our diaspora. We celebrate their success and award them at our annual conference. *But* we believe there is the result of their own efforts *combined* with the global brand that is India. As India's economy began to rise and our reputation grew and our importance increased, so the Indians abroad got noticed. We have a much respected brand now. It is completely different from what it was 20 years ago. No one now thinks of snake charmers and tree houses when you tell them you are Indian. They'll just ask you to fix their lap top."²⁷

With regard to alumni associations, the Indian government has tried to facilitate their investments in Indian higher education and to create incentives for US-based professors and graduate students to teach in India. Creating "world class universities" in India has now become a central component of India's economic growth strategy. At the same time, however, several controversies have ensued between this group of Indian-Americans and the Indian Government. In 1999, for example, several groups of wealthy IIT alumni in the US responded to an Indian government request and raised several million dollars for the universities. The issue turned controversial when the alumni associations suggested that the ITTs be re-structured so as to resemble American universities with differentiated pay and a broader curriculum. Indian politicians and scientists perceived this as an attempt by the alumni associations to dictate the activities of the ITTs (Lessinger 2003).

With regard to the professional organizations, the Indian government has tried to facilitate business partnerships, software technology parks, and research and development centers to attract knowledge transfer and even return migration. Ann Lee Saxenian has written extensively about this, especially with regard to the IT sector (Saxenian 2005).

Human Rights and Political Organizations

**Analysis on these organizations is pending. To date, I have conducted 10 interviews in this category. The remaining interviews are scheduled to take place in February 2012.

²⁷ Interview January 19, 2011

APPENDIX I

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR INDIAN TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Name of Organization:

Address of Organization:

Telephone of Organization:

Web address:

Fax of Organization:

Email of Organization:

Name of Interviewee

Position of Interviewee in the Organization:

Address of Interviewee:

Telephone of Interviewee:

Fax of Interviewee:

Email of Interviewee:

Date:

Place/location:

Name of Interviewer:

Group**Region**

- The U.S. ☐ New York, NY
 ☐ Baltimore/Washington DC area
 ☐ Chicago, IL
 ☐ San Francisco, CA

Structure of Organization

- 1) ☐ Stand alone
2) ☐ local chapter of national or regional organization
3) ☐ national or regional umbrella organization
9) ☐ Other, specify: _____

Type of Organization

- 1) ☐ Ethnic/caste/linguistic/identity
2) ☐ Arts/cultural
3) ☐ Political
4) ☐ Development/health/education
5) ☐ Human Rights
6) ☐ Professional/Alumni
7) ☐ Religious
9) ☐ Other. Specify:

1. When was your organization founded? _____ Year

2. What is the legal status of your organization?

- 1) ___ Operates informally
- 2) ___ Operates as a legally registered non-profit organization (501c);
- 9) ___ Other, specify: _____

2a. If legally registered, when was it registered? _____ Month/Year

3. How does your organization operate?

- 1) ___ Independently as a U.S. organization
- 2) ___ Independently as a U.S. organization with a parent partner in India
- 3) ___ Transnationally with branches or chapters in the U.S. and India
- 4) ___ As a network
- 5) ___ As part of a religious group
- 6) ___ Other, specify: _____

4. Why was your organization created? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY):

- 1) ___ To support an Indian counterpart organization
- 2) ___ Interest by an individual or a group of friends
- 3) ___ Interest from alumni or professional peers
- 4) ___ Natural disaster or other catastrophic event
- 5) ___ Initiated by a religious group
- 6) ___ Initiated by an NGO or foundation
- 7) ___ Initiated by the Indian government
- 9) ___ Other. Specify _____

Comment:

5. What are the principle objectives of your organization? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY):

- 1) ___ Networking/mentorship
- 2) ___ Development and relief
- 3) ___ Education
- 4) ___ Health
- 5) ___ Political action/social advocacy
- 6) ___ Religious practice
- 7) ___ Identity organization (region of origin /language/caste/gender) Specify _____
- 8) ___ Alumni linkages
- 9) ___ Social and/or cultural activities (music, dance, theater, crafts etc...
- 10) ___ Other. Specify _____

Comments: Have the objectives changed over time? If yes, how?

6. In what country does your organization focus?

- 1) ___ Exclusively in the U.S.
- 2) ___ Mainly in the U.S.
- 3) ___ Mainly in India
- 4) ___ In both countries
- 9) ___ Other. Specify _____

7. At what level does your organization focus?

7a. U.S.

- 1) ___ City 2)___ State 3)___ Regional 4)___ National 9)___ Other. Specify _____

7b. India

- 1) ___ Local 2)___ State 3)___ Regional 4)___ National 9)___ Other. Specify _____

8. What are the main activities performed by your organization in the United States?

(CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)

- 1) ___ Professional networking and support
- 2) ___ Collecting funds for projects
- 3) ___ Community or cultural activities
- 4) ___ Education / training
- 5) ___ Assistance with processing immigration documentation and citizenship
- 6) ___ Politics / advocacy
- 7) ___ Religious activities / functions
- 8) ___ Sports/the arts/foods promotion
- 9) ___ Other, specify: _____

9. What are the main activities in India? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)

- 1) ___ Socializing and networking
- 2) ___ Collection of funds
- 3) ___ Homebuilding
- 4) ___ Education / training
- 5) ___ Health
- 7) ___ Assisting disabled, elderly, sick persons/invalids, children
- 8) ___ Cultural exchange
- 9) ___ Knowledge transfer
- 10) ___ Support for economic development projects
- 11) ___ Support for religious activities (specify which religion)
- 12) ___ Support for political change/advocacy
- 99) ___ Other, specify: _____

10. Describe one of the most important activities or projects that your organization has accomplished (in the US and/or in India)?

11. What type of support did your organization provide for the project outlined in Question #10?

- 1) ☐ Monetary support \$
- 2) ☐ Voluntary labor
- 3) ☐ Services
- 4) ☐ Equipment/supplies
- 5) ☐ Other, specify: _____

ADVOCACY ACTIVITIES

12. In the last 5 years, did your organization do any advocacy work in the U.S. or India?

- 1) ___ Yes
2) ___ No (→ SKIP TO QUESTION 10)

12b. Over the last 5 years, which entities did your organization target for advocacy?

(CHECK ALL THAT APPLY FOR EACH COUNTRY)

	In the U.S.	In India
State and local government/parties	☐	☐
National political parties	☐	☐
National legislature (Congress, Parliament)	☐	☐
Federal government/executive	☐	☐
Business/commercial groups	☐	☐
International advocacy groups/organizations	☐	☐
Other. Specify _____	☐	☐

12c. Over the last 5 years, what issues did your organization advocate?

(CHECK ALL THAT APPLY FOR EACH COUNTRY)

	In the U.S.	In India
Commercial/business policy	☐	☐
Economic Policy	☐	☐
Expatriate issues (citizenship, taxes, etc.)	☐	☐
Foreign policy—India-US Relations	☐	☐
Foreign policy—other than Indian-US relations	☐	☐
Human rights	☐	☐
Local issues	☐	☐
Minority issues	☐	☐
Social Policy	☐	☐
Other. Specify _____	☐	☐

12d. Over the last 5 years, what methods did your organization use in its advocacy?

(CHECK ALL THAT APPLY FOR EACH COUNTRY)

	In the U.S.	In India
Advertisements in publications	☐	☐
Campaign contributions	☐	☐
Editorials/letters to editors	☐	☐
Letters/phone calls	☐	☐
Meetings	☐	☐
Petition writing	☐	☐
Other. Specify _____	☐	☐

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

13. Over the last 5 years, did your organization engage in any activity related to Indian development (e.g. economic, social, health, education, disaster relief)?

- 1) ☐ Yes
- 2) ☐ No (→ SKIP TO QUESTION 11)

13b. Over the last 5 years, where did your organization focus its development activities?
(CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)

- 1) ☐ All of India
- 2) ☐ Only in a particular state(s). Specify _____
- 3) ☐ Only in a particular village/town.
- 4) ☐ Rural areas
- 5) ☐ Urban area

13c. Over the last 5 years, what areas of development activities did your organization focus on? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)

- 1) ☐ Agriculture / rural development
- 2) ☐ Disaster relief
- 3) ☐ Education—primary
- 4) ☐ Education—tertiary
- 5) ☐ Environmental issues
- 6) ☐ Gender issues
- 7) ☐ Health—primary (public health, clinics, maternal and child care etc...)
- 8) ☐ Health—tertiary (hospitals, specialized medical services and medical research)
- 9) ☐ Industry/business
- 10) ☐ Institutional building (bureaucracy, judiciary, etc).
- 11) ☐ Technology/telecommunications
- 12) ☐ Infrastructure (water, sanitation, roads)
- 99) ☐ Other. Specify _____

13d. Over the last 5 years, what role did your organization play in these activities?
(CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)

- 1) ☐ Advocacy for specific development policy or project
- 2) ☐ Funding
- 3) ☐ Professional training
- 4) ☐ Project design/execution
- 5) ☐ Research and publications
- 6) ☐ Technical assistance/advice
- 9) ☐ Other. Specify _____

KNOWLEDGE-TRANSFER ACTIVITIES

14. Over the last 5 years, did your organization engage in any activity involving the transfer of knowledge/technology/experience/training to India?

- 1) ☐ Yes
- 2) ☐ No (→ SKIP TO QUESTION 12)

14b. Over the last 5 years, in what ways did you did your organization act as a knowledge *intermediary* (i.e. facilitate knowledge transfer without being its actual provider)?
(CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)

- 1) ☐ Advised U.S. based persons and entities regarding business opportunities in India
- 2) ☐ Advised Indians and Indian entities seeking business opportunities in U.S.
- 3) ☐ Advised Indians and Indian entities seeking U.S. technology or investment in India
- 4) ☐ Provided career advice/networking for Indians seeking employment in the U.S.
- 5) ☐ Facilitated trips to visit India for non-Indian origin individuals
- 6) ☐ Facilitated trips for Indians to visit the U.S.
- 9) ☐ Other. Specify _____

14c. Over the last 5 years, in what ways did you did your organization act as a primary knowledge *provider*? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)

- 1) ☐ Held conference and/or published on issues related to India
- 2) ☐ Conducted professional training
- 3) ☐ Facilitated project design/execution
- 4) ☐ Conducted research
- 5) ☐ Provided technical assistance/advice even if informally
- 6) ☐ Facilitated trips to visit India for your members
- 9) ☐ Other. Specify _____

****NOTE: If your organization does not have members, please apply Q15-26 to your volunteer base and/or your donor base. Please specify.**

15. How large is the membership of your organization?

- 1) ___ Less than 50
- 2) ___ 50 - 100
- 3) ___ 101 - 200
- 4) ___ 201 - 500
- 5) ___ 501 - 1000
- 6) ___ Over 1000

Comments:

(permanent vs. casual members? Duration of membership?)

.

16. (IF RELEVANT) How many organizations belong to this federation or coalition?

___ Total # ___ # Active

Comments:

(what type of organizations are these?)

(are they in the US, India, or both?)

(how many regular members do these organizations have?)

(does the federation or coalition include individuals or other entities that are not organizations?)

17. What percentage of your membership is of Indian descent/ancestry?

- 1) ___ Less than 25 %
- 2) ___ 25% - 50%
- 3) ___ 51% - 75%
- 4) ___ 76% - 100%

18. Are the children of immigrants from India interested in the goals of your organization?

- 1) ___ Yes
- 2) ___ No

Please specify why or why not?

19. Approximately how many youths born in the United States from Indian parents are members of your organization?

- 1)___ <10%
- 2)___ 11-25%
- 3)___ 26-49%
- 4)___ 50% or more

20. Approximately what percentage of your membership is female?

- 1)___ <10%
- 2)___ 11-25%
- 3)___ 26-49%
- 4)___ 50% or more

21. How many of your members are in the following age brackets?

	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
a) Less than 30 years old	___	___
b) 31 to 49 years old	___	___
c) Over 50 years old	___	___

22. How many of your members:

	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
a) Have not received any formal education?	___	___
b) Have completed elementary school?	___	___
c) Have completed secondary or vocational school?	___	___
d) Have received a degree from a university or technical school?	___	___
e) Have received postgraduate studies?	___	___
f) Have received a degree (at any level) in the U.S.?	___	___

23. What is the knowledge level of English of your members?

	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
a) Not much/very little	___	___
b) A bit/a little	___	___
c) Good	___	___
d) Very good	___	___

24. Please describe the typical forms of employment of your members?

	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
a) Professional or technical work	___	___
b) Company/business owner	___	___
c) Secretarial work/white collar worker	___	___

d) Manual labor / blue collar work	_____	_____
e) Retired/disabled	_____	_____
f) Housewife	_____	_____
e) Student	_____	_____

25. Approximately how many of your members are in the following position?

- ____ # Don't have a visa or papers
 ____ # Hold a temporary visa / work permission
 ____ # Have a permanent resident visa / green card
 ____ # Are naturalized citizens of the United States
 ____ # Are U.S. born

26. How long have your members lived in the United States?

	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
a) Less than 5 years	_____	_____
b) 5-10 years	_____	_____
c) More than 10 years	_____	_____
d) U.S. born	_____	_____

27. For how long has the head of your organization been in his/her position?

- 1) ____ Less than one year
 2) ____ At least one year
 3) ____ 1-3 years
 4) ____ 4-5 years
 5) ____ 6-9 years
 6) ____ 10-50 years
 7) ____ More than 50 years

Comments:

(how did the head get in this position? self-appointment or election?)

28. What is the management structure of your organization?

- 1) ____ There is a person who heads the organization and there are no regular elections
 2) ____ There is a Board of Directors and a president, but no regular elections.
 3) ____ There is a Board of Directors and a president who is elected for a fixed period.
 4) ____ There is no defined management structure.
 9) ____ Other, specify: _____

29. How are the principal decisions made in your organization?

- 1) ____ Decisions are made by the head of the organization or a few leading individuals

- 2) ___ Decisions are made by the majority of members
- 3) ___ By general consensus
- 4) ___ Other, specify: _____

30. What percentage of the work required by your organization is voluntary work v. paid work?

31. How often do members of your organization carry out the following activities?

	1) Occasionally	2) Weekly	3) Monthly	4) Quarterly	5) Annually
Work meetings					
Social gatherings					
Fundraising events					
Dances					
Festivals/Parades					
Community events					
Cultural events					
Religious events					
Political events					
Other, specify					

32. What is the size of your annual budget based on your last fiscal year?

- 1) ___ There are no monthly expenses (operates through volunteers and donations)
- 2) ___ Less than \$20,000
- 3) ___ \$20,000 – \$50,000
- 4) ___ \$50,001 – \$100,000
- 5) ___ \$100,001 – \$500,000
- 6) ___ \$500,001 – \$1,000,000
- 7) ___ Over \$1,000,000

33. How much of the annual financial resources of your organization come from

- 1) ___ % Membership fees and/or individual contributions
- 2) ___ % Fundraising, parties, events in the U.S.
- 3) ___ % Fundraising, parties, events in India
- 4) ___ % Grants/donations from foundations or other charitable institutions
- 5) ___ % Contributions from the state/national governments of India
- 6) ___ % Contributions from political parties
- 7) ___ % Contributions from religious organizations

- 8) ___ % Contributions from private companies
9) ___ % Other financial sources, specify: _____

34. What non-monetary resources (e.g. supplies, volunteers, knowledge, advice, space etc.) does your organization depend on?

(CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)

- 1) ___ Interested individual contributions
2) ___ Contributions from foundations or other charitable institutions
3) ___ Contributions from political parties
4) ___ Contributions from religious organizations
5) ___ Contributions from the local/state/national government of India
6) ___ Contributions from private companies
9) ___ Other, specify: _____

35. How many paid employees does your organization have?

- 0) ___ None
1) ___ Only one
2) ___ Less than 5
3) ___ 6-10
4) ___ More than 10

36. Who assists your organization with project development and supervision, investment of funds, etc. in India? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)

- 1) ___ A chapter/branch of the organization in India
2) ___ Members of the organization that have returned
3) ___ Members' relatives or friends in India
4) ___ An NGO in India
5) ___ A religious organization in India
6) ___ A government agency in India
9) ___ Other, specify: _____

37. With what institutions does your organization maintain regular contact?

37a. In U.S.:

- 1) ___ Local governments
2) ___ Indian embassy/consulate
3) ___ Religious organizations
4) ___ Other similar Indian organizations
5) ___ Other NGOs or civic organizations
6) ___ Confederation of organizations
9) ___ Others. Specify _____

37b. In India:

- 1)___ The Central government
- 2)___ State governments. Specify_____
- 3)___ The local government
- 4)___ Religious organizations
- 5)___ Other similar organizations
- 6)___ Other NGOs or civic organizations
- 7)___ Confederation of organizations
- 9)___ Others

38. How often do you or other members discuss matters of the organization with partners/contacts in India?

- 0) ___ Never or hardly ever
- 1) ___ At least once a week
- 2) ___ At least once a month
- 3) ___ At least once every three months
- 4) ___ At least once a year

39. How often do members of the community or institutions in India establish contact with your organization (e.g., to make requests, follow-up on projects, etc.)?

- 0) ___ Never or hardly ever
- 1) ___ At least once a week
- 2) ___ At least once a month
- 3) ___ At least once every three months
- 4) ___ At least once a year

40. How often do you or other members of the group travel to India per year for matters related to your organization? (Add the total number of trips taken.)

- 0) ___ Never or rarely
- 1) ___ At most one trip
- 2) ___ At most 3 trips
- 3) ___ At most 4-5 trips
- 4) ___ At most 6-10 trips
- 5) ___ Ten trips or more

41. What are the main problems that affect your organization?

(4) Significantly; (3) Sufficiently; (2) Just a little; (1) Not at all

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
a) People's lack of interest or cooperation	___	___	___	___
b) Lack of resources	___	___	___	___
c) Distrust among people here in the U.S.	___	___	___	___
d) Distrust among people there in India	___	___	___	___
e) Lack of time	___	___	___	___

- f) Difficulties in accomplishing tasks in India _____
g) Political hurdles in India (bureaucracy, corruption) _____
h) Other, specify: _____

42. What are your organization's greatest needs at the present time (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)?

- 1) _____ Economic
2) _____ Member recruitment
3) _____ Member training (in profession, business, leadership, etc.)
4) _____ Greater contact with other similar organizations in the U.S.
5) _____ Greater contact with foundations in the U.S.
6) _____ Greater contact with the government in India
9) _____ Other, specify:

43. What plans does your organization have for the future? (Specify.)

Are there any other thoughts, issues, and concerns you would like to share with us?

APPENDIX II

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR INDIAN COUNTERPART ORGANIZATIONS OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Interviewer

Date

Location

Name and position of Interviewee

Name of Indian Organization

Name of US Counterpart

Location of US Organization

Indian organization existed before, with, or after contact with the US organization

☐ Existed beforehand

☐ Arose from contact

☐ Other (specify)

1. When was your organization founded and why?
2. Is your organization legally registered? If yes, how?
3. What are the objectives of your institution/organization?
4. What are the principal activities of your organization?
5. When did you first begin working with the organization in the US?
6. Who were the principal persons to initiate contact with the US organization?
7. What first motivated an interest in working with the organization in the US?

8. How was the coordination organized between both organizations?
9. What are some of the projects that you have accomplished as a result of your work with the US organization?
10. How did the US organization assist in these projects?
11. Who decides how the projects are carried out, how the money is spent, and how to distribute the help that that comes from the US organization?
12. How does the US organization supervise the projects, help, and exchange you receive?
13. Does the US organization influence how you develop and plan your activities?
14. Approximately how many persons benefit from the projects that you accomplish with the coordination of the US organization?
15. Please describe the type of persons that primarily benefit from these projects.
16. Do you work with any other organization of migrants to the United States or in another part of the world? If yes, what is the name and location of this organization?
17. What projects have you completed in collaboration with these other organizations?

18. What percentage of your activities depends on help you receive from outside the organization?
19. With what frequency do you communicate with the organization in the United States?
- at least once a week
 - once a month
 - once every 3 months
 - once a year
 - never or hardly ever
20. How many times a year do members of the organization in the United States come to visit you?
- never or rarely
 - at least one trip
 - at least 3 trips
 - at least 5 trips
 - at least ten trips
 - ten trips or more
21. How many times a year do members of your organization go to the United States to deal with matters of the organization?
- never or rarely
 - at least one trip
 - at least 3 trips
 - at least 5 trips
 - at least ten trips
 - ten trips or more
22. Has this contact with the organization in the United States contributed to the migration of these people to the United States? Why?
23. What are some of the main difficulties that you have encountered in your work with the US organization?
24. What are your plans for the future?
25. What role does the US organization (or other organizations outside the US) play in these future plans?

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